The SNP was expected to lose seats in this election. The result, though, was worse than pre-election polls predicted and worse than the party leadership feared. The SNP returned only nine of Scotland’s 57 MPs, a dramatic collapse from the 48 elected in 2019, and the party’s percentage of the vote declined from 45% to 30%. Labour won 37 seats on 35% of the vote. (The Lib Dems won six seats and the Conservatives five.) To a degree, the 2024 election reversed the events of 2015 when the SNP jumped from six to 56 MPs, an electoral shock which itself stemmed from the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence. Compared to the SNP’s heady days of electoral success a decade earlier, 2024 will be regarded as a meltdown. Ian Blackford, the party’s former Westminster leader, remarked: “To some extent people have fallen out of love with us and we must ask why”. So how can this result be explained?
John Swinney returned as SNP leader and became Scotland’s First Minister in early May, only weeks before the election was called, and in highly unfavourable circumstances. SNP membership had fallen, which the party attempted to mask. The police investigation into SNP finances and fundraising culminated in Peter Murrell, husband of Nicola Sturgeon and former party chief executive, being charged with embezzlement of SNP funds. Humza Yousaf’s short period as leader ended with the clumsy collapse of a governing arrangement with the Scottish Greens. We know from academic research that governing competence was crucial in the party’s early success, combined with ‘standing up for Scottish interests’ in the context of UK politics, but this status had become damaged.
The SNP in 2024 appeared less competent as a governing party. In big areas of devolved public policy – health, education, economic development – the Scottish government had immense challenges. Negative publicity surrounded delays in the building of ferries, so important to Scotland’s Island communities, and there were difficult debates around gender recognition reform. It was unclear whether the Scottish electorate would hold the SNP responsible for Scotland’s public policy failings.
The SNP campaign promoted Swinney as a likeable politician who combined pro-business and social justice themes and who could ‘steady the ship’: 29 seats became an informal target. The SNP was in a poor financial position to fight this campaign, with the drying up of big donations and reduced income from party members. A party battle bus appeared only a week before the poll. The party in the past had effectively combined ‘digital and doorstep’ campaigning but it was reported that a cash-strapped SNP was spending considerably less on online advertising than its rivals.
There was a sense that the SNP was fighting different campaigns within Scotland, attempting to protect its presence in the Central Belt of Scotland, largely Labour-held areas before 2015, but in competition with the Conservatives in the North-East and Borders. This led to some contradictions in messaging. The party advocated investment in a green economy but was acutely aware that the traditional energy sector was heavily embedded in the North-East of Scotland, and its position on new oil and gas licenses came across as equivocal, leading to claims that it faced two ways on fossil fuels.
The party had agreed that independence would be ‘page one, line one’ of a general election manifesto, and that if the SNP won a majority of Scottish seats, it would ‘immediately start negotiations with the UK government’. That the SNP would have the leverage to make this happen with declining support was never plausible, but the sheer scale of SNP losses made the strategy completely irrelevant. Debate now exists on whether the party should have placed more (or less) emphasis on independence in the campaign. On this question, the party seems unsure.
By the election, it was abundantly clear that Labour would win big and events in Scotland wouldn’t determine whether Labour would govern at Westminster. This became an SNP refrain – ‘Labour doesn’t need any Scottish MPs to win the election’ and in these circumstances ‘Scottish interests are protected by the SNP’. This theme had worked well in the past, but in 2024 former SNP voters appeared driven to vote for Labour to ensure change at Westminster. The electoral map of Scotland altered dramatically, with SNP Central Belt representation completely swept away by Labour. The SNP lost all seats in Glasgow and Edinburgh, which included the loss of high-profile and hard-working MPs Alison Thewliss in Glasgow and Tommy Sheppard in Edinburgh. The party’s MPs are now all North of a Central Belt red stripe, a combination of rural and ‘urban’ representation (two seats in Aberdeen and one in Dundee, cities that lean different ways on independence). One source of SNP satisfaction was defeating the leader of the Scottish Conservatives, Douglas Ross, in Aberdeenshire North and Moray East. The existence of Reform, which stood in every seat in Scotland, may have worked to the SNP’s advantage here.
Some key factors help us understand these events. First is a decline in the electorate’s faith in the SNP. As the results became clear, John Swinney said the SNP ‘needs to heal its relationship with the people of Scotland’. This is much easier said than done. The SNP once had a reputation for unity, competence and good leadership, but no longer. Another factor is that some independence supporters are clearly prepared to vote Labour. For some time, polling has indicated that SNP popularity has been trailing support for independence. The 2024 election provides further evidence. The 2014 referendum shifted attitudes to independence, with voters who hold a view still split roughly 50:50. Key questions are whether the SNP can win back the lost independence supporters in the 2016 Scottish Parliament election, and whether attitudes towards independence will begin to change.
The consequences of the 2024 general election may be far-reaching. The SNP loses its position as the second largest opposition group at Westminster and associated parliamentary benefits. The party’s financial problems are compounded by a reduction in Short Money and financial contributions from MPs. The election might also represent the unwinding of SNP electoral support. Voters perceive a democratic problem when parties are in power for a very long time. 17 years as a party of government in Scotland is a very long time. By the next Scottish Parliament election, the SNP will have governed Scotland for two decades, a feat that few in the party would have dreamt of back in 2007. The SNP requires renewal from within, a process that might best take place in opposition. A party that enjoys something akin to electoral dominance is bound to falter eventually.
An abbreviated version of this article is published on the website ‘2024 UK Election Analysis’.
