Last modified: 05 Oct 2023 08:46
In almost any area of contemporary philosophy that you study, you will eventually encounter talk of possible worlds. Physicalism, naturalism in ethics, counterfactuals, necessity and possibility, propositions, dispositions, determinism, mental and linguistic content, to name a few, are often stated or analysed in terms of possible worlds. What should we make of all this possible worlds talk? Should we take it as the literal truth? Is there really a possible world in which I am a concert violist? If so, then what sorts of things are possible worlds? Are they concrete spacetimes like the actual world? Or are they linguistic descriptions, abstract states of affairs, sets of n-tuples? Or perhaps all this possible worlds talk is a useful fiction that philosophers participate in and, strictly speaking, there are no such things. Or perhaps appealing to possible words is not really the best way of capturing our thought and talk about possibility. In this course, we will consider these questions.
| Study Type | Undergraduate | Level | 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Term | First Term | Credit Points | 30 credits (15 ECTS credits) |
| Campus | Aberdeen | Sustained Study | No |
| Co-ordinators |
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In almost any area of contemporary philosophy that you study, you will eventually encounter talk of possible worlds. Physicalism, naturalism in ethics, counterfactuals, necessity and possibility, propositions, dispositions, determinism, mental and linguistic content, to name a few, are often stated or analysed in terms of possible worlds. What should we make of all this possible worlds talk? Should we take it as the literal truth? Is there really a possible world in which I am a concert violist? If so, then what sorts of things are possible worlds? Are they concrete spacetimes like the actual world? Or are they linguistic descriptions, abstract states of affairs, sets of n-tuples? Or perhaps all this possible worlds talk is a useful fiction that philosophers participate in and, strictly speaking, there are no such things. Or perhaps appealing to possible words is not really the best way of capturing our thought and talk about possibility. In this course, we will consider these questions. We will read parts of David Lewis's influential book On the Plurality of Worlds in which he defends the view that possible worlds are concrete spacetimes just like the one we inhabit. We will evaluate alternatives to Lewis’s modal realism including linguistic ersatizism, Leibnizian realism, modal fictionalism, as well as recent attempts to analyse possibility in terms of dispositions and potentials. We will also consider analyses of de re modality in terms of trans-word identity and counterpart theory.
Information on contact teaching time is available from the course guide.
| Assessment Type | Summative | Weighting | 50 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assessment Weeks | Feedback Weeks | |||
| Feedback |
Feedback will normally be provided within three working weeks (excluding vacation periods) of the submission deadline |
Word Count | 2500 | |
| Knowledge Level | Thinking Skill | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
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| Assessment Type | Summative | Weighting | 50 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assessment Weeks | Feedback Weeks | |||
| Feedback |
Feedback will normally be provided within three working weeks (excluding vacation periods) of the submission deadline |
Word Count | 2500 | |
| Knowledge Level | Thinking Skill | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
|
|
||
There are no assessments for this course.
| Assessment Type | Summative | Weighting | 100 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Assessment Weeks | Feedback Weeks | |||
| Feedback | Word Count | 2500 | ||
| Knowledge Level | Thinking Skill | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
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| Knowledge Level | Thinking Skill | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Factual | Remember | ILO’s for this course are available in the course guide. |
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