Last modified: 25 Mar 2016 11:36
Have you ever wondered if, like characters in the movie The Matrix, you might be victim of a massive illusion, that the world around you is nothing like it appears? In this course we systematically investigate questions of this type and questions about nature of knowledge and related notions (such as epistemic justification and evidence). This investigation will lead to some surprising and potentially disturbing, results. This is a foundational course in epistemology (philosophy of knowledge) that provides a critical survey of theses, problems and issues that have discussed in this field in the last 50 years. See course guide
| Study Type | Undergraduate | Level | 2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Term | Second Term | Credit Points | 15 credits (7.5 ECTS credits) |
| Campus | None. | Sustained Study | No |
| Co-ordinators |
|
||
We will start with analysing conceptions of the nature of knowledge and epistemic justification. We will then focus on theories of the architecture of epistemic rationality (i.e. theories about how all justified beliefs link with one another). We will consider advantages and disadvantages of general perspectives from which to do epistemology (e.g. the traditional "armchair" perspective and the novel naturalized perspective). We will then discuss problems of a priori knowledge (e.g. mathematical and logical knowledge), and we will conclude with a presentation and appraisal of popular sceptical arguments.
Information on contact teaching time is available from the course guide.
1st Attempt: One 2500 word essay (50%) plus one two-hour written examination (50%). Resit: One 2500 word essay (100%). In line with School Policy, failure to submit a component piece of assessed work, or submitting a token piece, will result in the withdrawal of the class certificate (students are not eligible for resit).
There are no assessments for this course.
We have detected that you are have compatibility mode enabled or are using an old version of Internet Explorer. You either need to switch off compatibility mode for this site or upgrade your browser.
