The Review of International Studies (RIS) has published an article by Dr James Johnson, Senior Lecturer and Director of Strategic Studies in the Department of Politics and International Relations, examining the stability-instability paradox: a theory centred on the effect of nuclear weapons on international conflict. The paradox proposes that, while possessing nuclear weapons deters all-out war between countries, it simultaneously increases the likelihood of low-level or indirect conflicts between them.
The stability-instability paradox is fascinating, says Dr Johnson, because it highlights this counterintuitive dynamic: nuclear weapons deter large-scale wars, but that same deterrence can make more minor, riskier conflicts more likely.
One historical example cited by Dr Johnson is the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan. Both countries had recently become overt nuclear powers, having conducted tests the year prior. With nuclear deterrence in place, Pakistan felt emboldened to send troops and militants into Indian territory in Kargil, assuming that the threat of nuclear escalation would prevent India from responding too aggressively. While India did push back and retake the territory, the conflict remained localised – it never escalated into a broader war, showing how nuclear weapons can create space for riskier, albeit limited actions.
As well as critiquing the dominant interpretation of the stability-instability paradox, Dr Johnson considers the risks of using emerging technologies, such as AI-enabled weapon systems, in future conflicts. Through exploring fictional scenarios Dr Johnson illustrates how the use of these technologies in low-level conflicts could cause an unintentional escalation leading to the use of nuclear weaponry.
A more contemporary example with the added factor of newer technologies is US-China relations in the South China Sea. Both nations are nuclear-armed, so there’s a clear deterrent against full-scale war. However, that hasn’t stopped either side from engaging in aggressive posturing: China militarising islands and conducting close naval patrols, and the United States asserting freedom of navigation with its warships. These actions create constant friction, and the presence of advanced technologies like drones and autonomous systems only adds to the potential for accidental escalation.
What’s striking, says Dr Johnson, is how both cases – the Kargil War in 1999 and the ongoing US-China dispute in the South China Sea – illustrate the paradox perfectly: "the existence of nuclear weapons provides a veneer of stability at the macro level. Still, it makes these lower-level, risk-laden conflicts more likely. It’s a precarious balance that shows how deterrence can sometimes invite danger.”
Much of Dr Johnson’s research explores the intersection of artificial intelligence and nuclear strategy, with a particular interest in understanding how emerging technologies, like AI-enabled weapon systems, could unintentionally escalate conflicts between nuclear-armed states. His goal in hypothesising these scenarios is “to challenge traditional views about strategy and provoke new thinking about the role of technology in modern warfare.”
The use of fictional scenarios, including those illustrated in the article, is a valuable conceptual tool for strategic thinking. By challenging assumptions and encouraging introspection, this tool can help “improve policymakers’ ability to anticipate and prepare for (but not predict) change.”
You can listen to Dr Johnson discuss the key arguments from his article in this short video from the British International Studies Association. You can also read the full article “Revisiting the 'stability–instability paradox’ in AI-enabled warfare: A modern-day Promethean tragedy under the nuclear shadow?” online.