This is a past event
Abstract:
This work studies the collective action problem: identifying and implementing mechanisms that allow members of a community to coordinate their actions in order to achieve a social, rather than individual, benefit. Rather than applying the traditional tools of game theory, we are investigating how maintaining explicit social knowledge encoded in the form of expectations can provide a generic and flexible approach for agents to coordinate their behaviour. We use a version of the discrete event calculus enhanced with the capability for reasoning about the creation, fulfilment and violation of expectations, which allows what-if reasoning about the effects of candidate actions on expectations. I will outline how this approach allows us to model agents whose actions are coordinated by various types of expectations and show how it can be used to generalised Axelrod’s metanorm game to allow norm compliance to be learned and sustained across multiple scenarios with differing norms
- Speaker
- Stephen Cranefield
- Hosted by
- Nir Oren
- Venue
- Meston 013
- Contact
-
Ehud Reiter (e.reiter@abdn.ac.uk)