News of the decision by Middlesex to close its distinguished Philosophy Department has now reached a large part of the world that is concerned with critical thought and intellectual life in the academy. The expression of support for the philosophers at Middlesex in these early days is nothing less than astounding. (After just one week, 9,000 signatures have been collected on a petition to support the Department.) But the gravity of this event should not be underestimated.
The exceptional quality and success of the Middlesex Philosophy programme are a matter of public record. If this decision has been made on economic grounds, as the University has suggested, then a calculus is at work that is inimical to the very idea of a research university (Middlesex would be cutting its highest ranked research programme—a financially sustainable programme in a core field—for profit motives). If it is based in some measure on ideological prejudice (a subset of which would be philosophical prejudice), the implications remain profoundly disturbing. It would seem that freedom of thought is in danger in the contemporary British academy if a university such as Middlesex can feel free to proceed in this abrupt manner (and so freely surrender its academic stature).
The phrase “freedom of thought” must extend in this case beyond its immediate political connotation. The Middlesex decision effectively targets forms of reflection (historically protected in the university) proper to the humanities. Here it conforms to a dangerous paradigm that has been established in recent years by default, because no provision has been found in contemporary academic and governmental accounting for the “social” contribution of the humanities—particularly the contributions of those parts of humanistic research and teaching that remain “free” by reason of their distinctive modes and temporalities (and particularly in those transgressions of the given that win them the name of “thought”). As in the case of the arts, their forms of activity remain foreign to a technocratic calculus. Needless to say, what escapes this accounting faces possible elimination in a time of crisis if a university abandons traditional academic commitments (including its commitment to prepare students for full participation in society). A “good crisis” in fact amounts to little more than an alibi for such a development. We must recognize that the role of the humanities and the meaning of the contemporary university are at stake in the unfolding developments at Middlesex.
From discussions with colleagues, I am confident that I can speak for the Centre for Modern Thought as a whole in offering a statement of support for the philosophers at Middlesex—staff and students. Let us all work to raise awareness concerning the meaning of this decision and seek forms of concrete support. Let us also wish all strength to our colleagues in Philosophy at Middlesex. Their cause is ours.
Christopher Fynsk
Director of the Centre for Modern Thought
May 6, 2010