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Political and Social Transformations in Egypt

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The Arab Transformations Project is an international research project operating within the European Commission's FP7 framework. The project looks comparatively at attitudes and behaviours in the context of the social, political and economic transformations taking place across Middle East and North Africa since February 2011. The countries covered are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq.

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Introduction: Authoritarianism & Regime Typologies

The ArabTransformations project aims to contribute to better empirical understanding of the Uprisings themselves and of the longer-term processes that lead to them and which they epitomise. To do this, it is necessary to analyse and evaluate both the processes within Middle Eastern societies and the frameworks used to assess such processes. Thus, the project has identified the principal approaches to transformations of and between political systems, with particular attention to the Middle East and to the Arab Uprisings, while recognising the appeal made by such approaches to more general arguments. This has made it possible to indicate a series of political, economic, and social taxonomical categories, variables, and processes central to such orthodox approaches. The project's aim is to then evaluate these arguments against empirical data, and combining survey data, macro-indicators, and qualitative evidence.

The remit of Transformation Analyses is to identify existing survey and non-survey quantitative data capable of providing indications of medium term processes, and evaluate the significance of those data in the context of area studies scholarship.

The project's Framework Paper (D1.1) set out the analytical similarities between modernization frameworks and the study of transformations within and of political systems. This underlying conceptual architecture helps highlight the shared assumptions underpinning the three main models of political systems and transformations applied to the Middle East: Democratization, Hybrid Regimes, and Resilient Authoritarianism.



Figure 1: Normative and Taxonomical Hierarchies

Democratic Transition (DT): These models identify necessary (if not sufficient) conditions for a transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, requiring at minimum the combination of a split in authoritarian elites and popular pressure (mobilization).

Hybrid Regimes (HyR): Variously referred to as 'hybrid regimes', façade democracies, 'democracy with adjectives', etc. this class of models suggests that regimes may formally present as democratic (e.g. with elections, and institutions providing checks and balances) but nonetheless remain *de facto* autocracies, in which informal authoritarian practices void formal democratic institutions of their substance.

Authoritarian Resilience (AR): This class of models identifies blockages making democratic transitions impossible either in principle or in practice. As for DT models, necessary conditions for AR include institutional, material and cultural conditions (e.g. rentierism, Orientalism).

These models are useful in identifying a series of factors associated with liberal democracy and with the impediments of transformations into democracy, and an important part of this project aims to deploy these frameworks to help provide insights into the general characteristics of

political systems in the Middle East and their recent transformations. The first goal of Transition Analyses is precisely to use these models to evaluate different types of evidence on actual changes in the Middle East over the medium term encompassing the run-up to and the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings (2010-2015).

These approaches have limitations which can obscure as much as enlighten. For example, all three approaches are effectively variations on a fixed 'conceptual menu': elements which permit transformations in one model, block it in another. The roots of such a 'fixed menu' in Rostow's Modernization theory are fairly evident, and bring their own limitations, such as the assumption of a hierarchy of needs – or at least of stages – in processes of social, political and economic 'modernization' (security, economic, political in that order), or the fact that while thinking of transformative processes as articulated along a modernization-style broadly linear trajectory does not *require* determinism, it does obfuscate more complex political dynamics.

Cyclical Authoritarianism (CA): CA models are built on the recognition that transformative while processes in the wake of the 'Third Wave' of democratization have been understood in terms of a more or less frustrated transition towards democracy or authoritarian retrenchment, but that transformation processes are themselves used by authoritarian regimes to maintain power, for example that transformations are designed to be reversible or that regimes alternate economic and political openings and clampdowns. Thus, what may appear as a fluctuation between points on a scale of change, may itself be a political strategy. CA regimes adaptively fluctuate between reversible formal configurations while not undermining autocracy.

Brittle Authoritarianism (BA): BA models represent another interpretive possibility. Ayubi's use of Gramsci's distinction between hegemonic and non-hegemonic regimes suggests that if regional autocracies are 'ferocious' in their use of force but not hegemonic (Gramsci) or legitimate (Weber), they may well *appear* stable by repressing dissent and resisting change, but remain vulnerable in being unable to absorb dissent by adapting to challenges. Such regimes rely on both extra-legal violence and the legalization of violence (harassment, torture, detention without trial, etc.) but find concessions difficult, a combination which rather than reflecting the strength and stability of the regime, is a result of a brittleness which its ferocity can only partly conceal.

In addition, although existing quantitative data – this project included – are of insufficient sophistication, breadth, and quality to subject this dynamic to scrutiny, it is important to note here that there is a further 'layer' to social, economic, and political transformation processes, namely the interaction between these processes and the categories used to describe and analyse them. The gap between formal institutions and informal practices, between form and substance of any social, political, and/or economic system has among other effects the implication that the perception of the former is affected by the experience of the latter: respondents' opinions about any political ideology, for example, will depend on their lived experience of it. For example, Arab nationalism was discredited by the loss of 1967, by the 1979 Egypt-Israel accords, by the inability of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq to deliver on unification, and generally by nationalism to deliver the renaissance it had promised. This contributed to conditions that made the 'return' of Islamist movements possible from the 1970s onwards. Similar dynamics apply to Islamist movements themselves, as well as to both authoritarian and democratic political projects. This dynamic is crucial, but can at best be glimpsed at indirectly through survey data.

In sum, these five broad models and their exploration through different types of data constitute the main remit of Transformation Analyses, and are designed to lay the groundwork for both

future analysis and future research design. The remainder of country Transition Analyses will be taken up with analysing survey and non-survey quantitative data in the context of qualitative research in Middle East Studies.

Democracy

Any authoritarian system, regardless of external rigidity, contains traces of pluralism that might make possible democratic conditions through a series of permutations (and vice versa, of course). Broadly speaking, the literature on democratization/authoritarianism in the MNEA region analyses institutional, economic, and cultural factors to identify either causes of or blockages to democratisation. Transitology, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian resilience models view elections, identity politics, and rentierism as essential, contingent, or irrelevant to transitions to democracy or authoritarian retrenchment.

Similar divisions can be identified in literature on the Middle Eastern: some studies treat the Middle East as an exceptional case, others suggests uniqueness derives from a series of (contingent) factors, some claim that change away from authoritarianism is impossible either in principle or *de facto*, others emphasise the hybridity or the fragility of authoritarianism. Perhaps the best – and most notorious – example of these disagreements is the debate about the 'compatibility' of democracy and 'Islam', with eminent figures like Huntington, Lewis, Gellner, and Kedourie taking one view, and Said, Esposito, Piscatori, and Halliday taking the opposite position.

This section draws on the BTI Status Index – perhaps the most prestigious indicator of political (democracy) and economic (social market) transformation – evaluating against survey data on public opinion preferences on the characteristics of democracy, on the perception of democratic systems, and on whether democratic systems have positive effects.

Egypt

The literature on Egypt echoes both political science and area studies. The discourse on democracy was largely absent within the immediate period following the 1952 Free Officers' Revolution (Gordon 1992; Abdel-Malek 1968), with research identifying political institutions – namely, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) – but not detecting any move towards democratic institutions (Baker 1999; Waterbury 1983). Even popular protests like those of university students against the Nasserite regime or the 1977 'January Intifada', were not framed as demands for democracy but as material grievances (Abdalla 2008). Sadat's introduction of centrist, leftist, and rightist *manabir* (political platforms) into the ASU in the 1970s (Hinnebusch 1985; Beattie 2000), and their eventual split into three distinct parties, was regarded as cosmetic, given both the power of the Egyptian military (Kassem 2004; Kandil 2012) and the dominant role of the 'centrist' National Democratic Party (NDP) which Sadat chose as vehicle of his clientelistic system. For Hinnebusch, Sadat employed the economic liberalisation process of *al-Infitah* to lead Egypt into a 'post-populist' socio-political formation: the regime remains 'an authoritarian one, but […] it has taken on an increasingly conservative face' (Hinnebusch 1981).

Throughout Hosni Mubarak's rule, a broader literature tried to identify the role of Islamist political movements – specifically, the Muslim Brotherhood and the *al-Wasat* Party – in the Egyptian democratic process (Wickham 2004; Wickham 2013; Wickham 2005). Most often, these movements have been examined through discourses on the interaction between Islam and democracy (Zubaida 1993), or through elite politics, identifying how elites in power manage, but also manipulate, their political opponents (Lust-Okar 2010). Despite various cracks in the Egyptian political system (Tripp & Owen 1989), most researchers continued to diagnose a persistence of authoritarianism, rather than democratic openings – this was the case, for instance, during the opening of 2005, the so-called "Cairo Spring" (Antar 2006; Meital 2006).

Kienle suggested that promises of democracy during a previous phase of contestation in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Egypt was part of a 'grand delusion' (Kienle 2001). Democracy came back to the forefront in the study of Egyptian politics particularly in the post-9/11 era of 'democracy promotion,' particularly within the broader context of EU or US efforts towards the region (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz 2010; Pace 2009; Seeberg 2009; Lazarou et al. 2013).

A sizeable literature has also focused on the importance of *rent* – particularly oil rent, migrants' economic remittances, and strategic rent from the United States – that negatively affected the prospects of democratisation in Egypt (Soliman 2011; Ibrahim 1982). As remittances increase the flow of foreign reserves into the sending state, economic grievances against the ruling regime are expected to decrease. Taking this a step further, "rentier state" theorists would argue that such remittances constitute "rents" that impede democratisation.[1] Yet, the "resource curse" argument is widely discredited from both a number of different perspectives (Dunning 2008; Haber & Menaldo 2011).

Another argument revolves around the re-traditionalisation of Egyptian society from return migration that further impedes democratisation. Wickham argued that:

> Egyptian migration to the Gulf in the 1970s and 1980s had the effect of reinforcing the influence of Islam in *sha'bi* communal life. As noted in the previous chapter, the regional oil boom dramatically increased private wealth, some of which was channelled—by either Egyptians or Gulf Arab patrons—into the development of private mosques and Islamic service associations in *sha'bi* neighbourhoods. At the same time, the intensive exposure of Egyptian citizens to the social mores of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries where Islamic law was strictly applied pushed their own religious beliefs and practice in a more conservative direction upon their return home. Indeed, by the early 1990s, critics had begun to openly lament that the influence of "Wahhabi" Islam (the ultraconservative strand of Islam dominant in Saudi Arabia) had begun to erode the more flexible and permissive form of popular Islam that had evolved in Egypt (Wickham 2005).

Similar arguments have been raised by a number of Egyptian intellectuals, and are quite popular, with good reason: the widespread sense that the Egyptian economy has been "infiltrated" by Gulf capital, a conspiratorial emphasis on the foreign origins of many Egyptians' wealth, and the socio-economic empowerment of key figures associated with the Muslim Brotherhood contributed to the widespread view that Egypt was being 'Saudised' (Ibrahim 2001; Aswani 2011).

> For centuries Egypt had its own understanding of Islam, a tolerant and open-minded understanding compatible with the civilized nature of Egyptians. Egypt always managed, in quite an unusual way, to preserve its form of Islam with its openness to the world [...] at least until the end of the 1970s, when Egyptian society was subjected to a sweeping invasion of Wahhabi ideas from Saudi Arabia. One factor that led to this invasion is that President Anwar Sadat used religion to overcome the leftist opposition, and the Mubarak regime continues to support Wahhabism in order to benefit from the political submissiveness it installs in people's minds. Another is that the price of oil increased several times over after the October 1973 war, giving Saudi Arabia more influence than it ever had before and enabling it to impose its understanding of Islam on Egypt and the Arab world. As corruption and despotism added to poverty in Egypt, millions of Egyptians flocked to work in the Gulf, and came [...] (Aswani 2011).

After 2011 the number of works debating the nature of democracy in Egypt – either in terms of novel forms of popular participation (Tripp 2013), of the Muslim Brotherhood (Mariz Tadros 2012), or the nature, and precarious future, of political liberalism (Rutherford 2008) – increased, although experts also focused on what Nathan Brown called 'Egypt's Failed Transition' (Brown

[1] This builds on Mahdavy's (Mahdavy 1970) analysis, which argued that petroleum revenues in states across the Middle East constituted an external source of rents that was directly captured by governments, effectively rendering them unaccountable to their citizens.

2013). The discourse on democratisation has been undeniably affected by the 2013 ousting of President Morsi by the Egyptian military, with many arguing for a possible reconstitution of the pre-2011 military regime (Gerges 2013).

Arguably, the coming years will continue the debate on Egypt's relationship to democracy across similarly sober parameters.

Survey Indices

Figure 2



Note: The Main characteristics (Civic-Political) index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of: (1) Opportunity to change the government through elections; (2) Freedom to criticize the government/ those in power. The Main characteristics (Socio-Economic) index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of: (1) Governments intervenes to narrow the gap, taxing the rich and subsidize the poor.

From 2011 to 2013, while there is a decline of the perceptions that the essential characteristics of democracy are civic-political characteristics of democracy, there is a sharp increase of the perception that the socio-economic characteristics of democracy are the most important. This increase might be a response to the economic as well as political turmoil of the post-revolutionary period – tourism, primarily, which fell drastically. Civil and political rights were also under great pressure in this period, both from the military government of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) first and later by the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated parliament and Muhammad Morsi's Presidency.

In these critical times, the 2015 Freedom House report on Egypt is telling:

> Freedoms of assembly and association are tightly restricted. A November 2013 decree gave police great leeway to ban and forcibly disperse gatherings of 10 or more people. The law also prohibits all protests at places of worship and requires protest organizers to inform police at least three days in advance. Protests against the government continued throughout 2014, but they often ended in violent clashes with police and local residents, and police repeatedly used excessive force. On the third anniversary of the 2011 uprising in January, authorities responded to secularist and Islamist demonstrations with tear gas and live ammunition, resulting in at least 49 deaths and more than 1,000 arrests.
>
> The 2002 Law on Associations grants the government sweeping powers over nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including the ability to shut down the groups, confiscate their funding, and block nominations to their governing boards. Individuals working with unregistered groups face prison terms for engaging in "unauthorized activities." The government has in the past permitted

> NGOs to operate without registration, enforcing the law when it becomes politically expedient. Under a decree issued in September 2014, members of NGOs that use foreign funding to commit acts that "harm the national interest" face life imprisonment and fines of nearly $70,000. If an offender is a public servant or committed the violation for the purposes of terrorism, he or she could face the death penalty.
>
> Strikes played a significant role in the 2011 uprising, and workers subsequently formed an independent union federation, ending the long-standing monopoly of the state-allied federation. The labor movement was dampened somewhat after Morsi's ouster, as authorities clamped down on strikes and accused those involved of sympathizing with the Muslim Brotherhood. Strikes began to increase again in early 2014, particularly around demands for the nationwide expansion of a new minimum wage that had been granted to some public-sector workers. Authorities responded with raids, arrests, and intimidation (Freedom House 2015).

However, it seemed that at least during this period, popular pressure was bringing positive results in this area, with SCAF relenting to anti-military protests by conceding presidential and parliamentary elections in 2012, and popular pressure against Morsi's perceived authoritarianism had put him under pressure, eventually eliciting the army's coup.

Figure 3



Note: The 'Perception of democratic systems' index highlights respondents' perception of importance, suitability or adequacy of democracy as a political system for their country. It is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of: (1) A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than others; (2) How suitable is democracy for your country; (3) most suitable for your country: having a democratic political system.

The magnitude of this drop – just over 10% – appears significant: the 2011 values are based on a survey that was being carried out just months after the January Revolution, albeit the survey from which this value is derived was carried out in June-July 2011, as protests against SCAF military rule were beginning to increase (they would eventually cumulate in the November protests that would force parliamentary and presidential elections held in 2012). It might be explained by increasing disaffection with 'democracy' such as it was practiced in Egypt by the regime: as such, the declining measure can give an idea of the declining legitimacy of 'façade democracy' in Egypt, placing the blame for the changing perception of democracy not merely on the military regime but, as the Economist wrote in 2015, on the opposition movement as well:

> Contrary to his rhetoric, Mr Sisi has set Egyptian democracy back. Yet the forces behind Egypt's revolution in 2011—when the previous strongman, Hosni Mubarak, was overthrown in a popular revolt—have shown scant ability and often little inclination to keep the country on a more democratic path. Most of Egypt's so-called liberals supported the overthrow of Muhammad Morsi, the former president, in 2013 on the grounds that his Muslim Brotherhood was itself undermining democracy. Many then stayed mum as Mr Sisi's troops slaughtered protesting

> Islamists. Tarnished by this history, riven by infighting and lacking broad appeal, the liberals now appear helpless to check Egypt's slide back to authoritarianism (Economist 2015).

This survey index corroborates the expectations of the 'cyclical authoritarianism' model that the Arab Transitions projects puts forth, mirrored in the initial espousal of, and later discontent with, democratic systems in Egypt.

Figure 4



Note: The Positive Effects of a democratic system index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of: (1) Under a democratic system, the country's economic performance is weak; (2) Democratic regimes are indecisive and full of problems; (3) Democratic systems are not effective at maintaining order and stability.

Although there is a drop-in value from 2011 to 2013, the drop itself is merely 0.4% and therefore not significant. The index is computed based on ArabBarometer data, which for Egypt was collected in June-July 2011 (ABII) and in early April 2013 (ABIII), suggesting there is little drop over the first two years of the revolution in support for the positive effects of a democratic system. Note that although the ABIII data is collected before the coup in which the army removed Muhammad Morsi on July 3rd: during this period there was increasing and significant dissatisfaction from specific sectors of society – mostly middle and upper class nationalist, liberal and/or secular elites portions of which had supported the Revolution – with the government of Muhammad Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood: in December 2012, the Brotherhood had forced through a new constitution through an alliance with Salafist groups in Parliament while marginalising other political groups, and was increasingly perceived as ignoring other groups who had taken part in the revolution and attempting to repress any opposition, as its predecessors had done. The changes observed in the perception of democracy between 2005-2010 take place after what was then called the 'Cairo Spring', i.e. the reforms from above Mubarak introduced partly in response to internal pressures due to his attempt to impose his son Gamal as successor (*tawreeth*) and partly due to US policy which in the wake of the invasion of Iraq accepted the then-hegemonic view amongst US neo-conservatives that 'democratisation' could afford Washington strategic leverage in the region. These 'reforms' were widely criticised as being ultimately hollow attempts at preserving the Mubarak family's authoritarian grip.

In this context, the changes in indicators above suggest what appears to be a drop in the perceived legitimacy of the formal aspects of democracy and an increase in demand for delivery of substantive aspects of democracy. At the same time, it is also likely to lend further credence to expectations of 'cyclical authoritarianism' scholars, in their prediction of the

gradual popular disappointment with democratic ideals, or authors theorising a model around the remarkable resilience of authoritarian regimes.

Macro Indicators

Figure 5



Note: The BTI Status Index is the most prestigious international index that attempts to grasp transformation. It has two analytic dimensions, one assessing the state of political transformation (Democracy Status), the other the state of economic transformation (Market Economy Status). It identifies where each of the 129 countries stand on their path toward democracy under the rule of law and a market economy anchored in principles of social jus-tice. The BTI focuses on the quality of governance.

The BTI Status Index is calculated every two years, and as such it is unfortunately ill-placed to provide a fine-grained account of the impact of the Egyptian Revolution. However, it is noteworthy that the 2010 and 2012 are so similar, indeed showing a slight decline, despite the fact that Egypt's 2010 elections were the most unfree of the late Mubarak period, while the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections are instead considered the most open and competitive in the country's history. In fact, between Morsi's removal in 2013 and Sisi's 2014 choreographed election, there is an increase of the index, by roughly 0.5. This could be due to an increase in the economy status. In its change over time, the BTI Status Index suggests fluctuations between political openings and clampdowns.

While the BTI Status Index suggests patterns that seem to initially correspond closely to expectations of the democratic transition model, the post-2014 calculations are more likely to underline the resurgence and empowerment of a versatile authoritarian regime.

Political Preferences and Attitudes towards Different Political Systems

Political Science inherits a normative and 'evolutionary' hierarchy between political systems from modernization theory (see Section 4, D1.1) which provides an analytical lens through which MENA regimes' approximation to democracy or authoritarianism is evaluated. Indicators such as the Polity IV measures of institutionalised autocracy and institutionalised democracy

attempt to provide some measure of a political system's authoritarian and pluralistic traits, and these 'objective' measures can be set against public perceptions of and preferences for political systems. In addition, country-specific studies provide a context for such quantitative data, help interpret data, and provide useful indications of limits or impasses of the analytical frameworks used to generate the data itself and the models built upon them.

Having been previously viewed as either defectively rational or beholden to 'identity', area studies scholarship has illustrated what rationales frame political behaviour under authoritarianism, including preferences for political systems, but also the role of parties and voting behaviour.

Within the Middle East, analyses usually identify linkages with the 'hybrid regime' model of analysis, although Arab bureaucracies, and other components of political institutions in the Middle East, serve models of authoritarianism.

This section evaluates respondents' preferences for types of political systems and for sources of law against the Polity IV measures of institutionalised autocracy and institutionalised democracy.

Egypt

In Egypt, the introduction of a multi-party system in the 1970s, albeit a tightly controlled one, was part of the strategies of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak to maintain control over dissent and co-opt elites (Blaydes 2011; Brownlee 2004; Kassem 2004). This signals the beginning of a debate between different political elites, as well as within the literature, on attitudes towards different political systems for Egypt (Baker 1978). This debate became more prominent after the rise of sectarian conflict between the Muslim and Coptic communities in Egypt highlighted the need for novel approaches to domestic political management (Iskander 2012; Tadros 2013). The assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 served to further highlight the need to question the regime's strategy of co-optation towards a variety of religious groups (Albrecht & Wegner 2006; Kandil 2012).

Since the rise of Hosni Mubarak to power, and until today, the debates on different political systems in Egypt has revolved around similar issues: one main issue concerns Islam and politics. A key question has aimed to explain the interplay between religion and elections in the country (Masoud 2014; Wickham 2004)? How can the resurgence of political Islam, or the 'Islamic Revival' influenced the structure of political contestation in Egypt (Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005; Haddad 1987)? Another main issue concerns the role of the Egyptian military in political transitions – an issue that arose both in the immediate aftermath of Hosni Mubarak and the rise of the SCAF in 2011, as well as following the 2013 removal of Mohamad Morsi from power (Ottaway 2013). How are political-military relations shaped in the aftermath of 2011 (Albrecht 2015; Nepstad 2013)? Is the Egyptian military truly 'above the state' (Sayigh 2012), or is truly an inseparable part of Egyptian politics (Mitchell 2002)?

Survey Indices

Figure 6



Note: The types of political systems index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of the following two indicators: (1) A strong (non-democratic) leader who is indifferent to parliament and elections [Reversed (support for democracy) In 100 points scale]; (2) having experts make decisions [Reversed (support for democracy) In 100 points scale].

Figure 7



Note: The Principles for laws and regulations index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of: (1) The government and parliament should make laws according to the wishes of the people; (2) The government should enact laws in accordance with Islamic law; (3) Laws according to the wishes of the people in some subjects and implement Islamic law (Sharia) in others.

Macro Indicators

Figure 8



Note: For POLITY IV, democracy is approached as 'three essential, interdependent elements a) the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. b) the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. c) the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are mean to, or specific manifestations of, these general principles. Data on civil liberties are not coded. The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10, 10= strongly institutionalised democracy) which combines the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive' (Diamond 2015).

The scores for institutionalised democracy are, in some ways, deceptive: *prima facie*, they appear to suggest that between 2005 and 2010 Egypt undertook significant – albeit minor, since they resulted in a mere 1-point change – reforms towards political liberalization. In fact, the reforms themselves consisted primarily in the move to elect the President directly and competitively rather than the previous system in which a co-opted parliament would put forward a name, allowing the majority National Democratic Party to put forward a candidate (Hosni Mubarak) which would then be sent out for approval by the population in a referendum. The new Article 76 of the Egyptian constitution had been criticised because it severely restricted the possibility of independent candidates running so that while it superficially appeared to pluralise elections, *de facto* it maintained the *status quo*. Conversely, the drop in score since 2011 likely reflects the constitutional crisis caused by the democratic revolution: the president was deposed and the military took supposedly temporary charge of Egypt through the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. The index's focus on institutional factors only, while compatible with a liberal democratic focus on formal procedural dimensions of democracy, fails to capture the increasing political mobilisation of several sectors of Egyptian society against Mubarak's authoritarianism.

That being said, it is surprising that no increase in score took place in 2012 since both presidential and parliamentary elections were held which were widely viewed internationally as the freest and fairest ever held in Egypt, with far higher turnout and lower reports of fraud.

Figure 9



Note: POLITY IV: Institutionalized Autocracy: Institutionalized Autocracy is defined operationally in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. The Polity IV score for Institutionalized Autocracy is calculated on the basis of the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, of constraints on the executive, and of regulation and competitiveness of participation in politics. This is on an eleven-point scale (0-10) (Lomazzi & Abbott 2016)

The 2011 Egyptian revolution, while certainly voicing – if not asserting – popular claims to sovereignty, also resulted in a constitutional vacuum after the deposition of the sitting President: the armed forces' effective take-over narrowed both the openness and the competitiveness of recruitment into the executive, as well as greatly reducing institutional constraints upon that executive, while simultaneously the failure to give way to a democratic process meant that participation also dropped, citizens were excluded from any form of institutional process (save the March 2011 referendum, itself called for and later hijacked by the military). The increase in 2012-13 could be due to the fact that popular mobilisation against the army take-over in autumn 2011 forced the military to concede parliamentary and presidential elections, both of which took place in 2012. It should be noted that the near-identical score for 2010 and 2012 is in some senses deceiving: although the rules under which elections took place were the same, popular mobilisation and participation was of course vastly different: voter turnout was reported 52% at parliamentary elections, and at 62% in presidential elections.[2]

The scores for 2013 and 2014 appear questionable: in July 2013 the sitting president was removed by the armed forces on the basis of popular protest – formally, little different from the events of February 2011. Morsi was replaced by the head of the constitutional court who became acting president until elections confirmed the head of the military, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, as president. During this period there was *de facto* military control, although some institutions remained in place.

[2] See International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2015 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2015). IFES cites 44.88% for parliamentary elections, and 51.85% for presidential elections. Turnout data in Egypt is often contested: there are no officially sanctioned statistics, and the robustness of numbers cited by the government and official media is highly contested. In pre-2011 elections, government figures reported 40% ca. turnout, international bodies estimated roughly 20%, while local organisations sometimes estimated as low as 5%.

Figure 10



Note: Combined Polity Score: The POLITY IV score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC score from the DEMOC score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic) (Lomazzi & Abbott 2016).

Similarly to the previous graph, the 2011 Egyptian revolution reflected an institutional transition marked by the ousting of President Mubarak in February 2011. The academic literature supports this statement, as well as the slight change in the Combined Polity Score resulting from the institutional changes introduced by the Mubarak regime in the 2004-05 period. The seizure of power by the SCAF introduced a process of institutional crisis that was only reversed following the 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections, which is depicted in this graph. The re-organisation of military rule under el-Sisi in the post-2013 era mirrors the *status quo ante* under Hosni Mubarak, and that partly explains the post-2013 score.

Elections

Elections under non-democratic conditions were initially regarded in political science as either political theatre for the purposes of providing a fig leaf to cover claims to 'democratic' legitimacy by authoritarian regimes. With regard to the Middle East, the politics of electoral processes has remained relatively under-researched until fairly recently, but it has since become clear, not least thanks to area scholarship, that elections may fulfil important functions in non-democracies, from inter-elite competition to securing networks of patronage.

This section evaluates the clean elections index compiled by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project against survey data on the perceived honesty of elections.

Egypt

Within the literature on Egyptian politics, elections have been often approached instrumentally as part of the ruling regime's strategies under Sadat and Mubarak. The frequent openings – electoral or otherwise – for political participation have constituted less a sign of democratisation, and more a decline of pluralism (Brownlee 2002). In terms of electoral processes, specifically, Lisa Blaydes argues that there exists a 'triadic relationship between

Egypt's ruling regime, the rent-seeking elite that supports the regime, and the ordinary citizens who participate in these elections.' She argues that, 'despite its authoritarian political structure, Egypt's government has held competitive, multi-party parliamentary elections for more than 30 years […] Rather than undermining the durability of the Mubarak regime, competitive parliamentary elections ease important forms of distributional conflict, particularly conflict over access to spoils' (Blaydes 2011). A similar argument has been put forth by Lust, and Kassem (Kassem 2004; Lust-Okar 2010). Koehler's study of Mubarak's Egypt identifies

> 'three main functions for electoral processes in non-democratic settings: (1) Electoral contests serve to periodically renew channels of clientelist inclusion, drawing both voters and deputies into networks of patronage culminating at the top of the political system. (2) Formal inclusion of parts of the opposition into the electoral arena enhances the range of means available to the ruling elite in order to control these actors. (3) Pitted against each other in electoral contests, individual members of the ruling elite's lower echelons are effectively controlled and tied to the informal structures of rule. Thus, the principal traits of the Egyptian neopatrimonial regime remain unchanged, with formal electoral processes subverted by informal institutions of authoritarian rule to an extent as to fulfil distinctly authoritarian functions' (Koehler 2008).

A second line of research identifies opposition strategies in Egypt, frequently within the Islamist camp (Abed-Kotob 1995). This line of research goes back to key scholarship of the 1970s and 1980s (Kepel 1985), as well as research drawing on social movement theory (Wiktorowicz 2001). It more recently evolved into a multitude of debates: why would Islamist actors participate in such electoral processes, and what explains voters' turnout (Blaydes 2006; Utvik 2005; Wickham 2004)? Are opposition actors actually expecting, or even hoping, to win these elections (Hamid 2011))? How do issues of class inform these electoral processes (Masoud 2014)?

Survey Indices

Figure 11



Note: The index indicates the extent to which people believed that the last elections were honest, free, and fair, or with minor problems across a 100-point scale. A score of 100 indicates that elections were honest, while a score of 0 indicates the opposite

The perception of honesty in the electoral process has varied significantly over the six years in which data is available (2009-2015). During the last years of the Mubarak era, less than 30 per cent of the public opinion perceived that the elections were honest. This corresponds with the findings of the academic literature, namely the wide-held cynicism around electoral processes being instrumentalised by the ruling regime for its own survival purposes. In the aftermath of the 2011 elections this rate has sharply increased, as sixty-three per cent of the respondents perceiving that the elections were honest. In 2013, when the military coup overthrew Morsi, people's perceptions on the honesty of the elections decreased significantly, from 77% in 2012 to 34%. In 2014 and 2015, the rate was restored to 2012 levels: this is in itself interesting to note, since most independent observers expressed significant doubts about both the fairness and the freedom of the presidential electoral campaign which confirmed Sisi in power.

The effect of military intervention in public perceptions of electoral honesty are underlined in the 2015 Freedom House report on Egypt:

> The military effectively controlled Egypt at the beginning of 2014, with no elected president or legislature in place following the June 2013 coup against then president Mohamed Morsi. In January, the interim government heavily promoted a new constitution to replace one adopted under Morsi. Authorities prevented organized campaigning against the new charter, which passed a referendum that month amid low voter turnout.
>
> A presidential election was held May 26 to 28 following a brief and tightly managed campaign period. Former army field marshal and defense minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi won a lopsided victory, credited with more than 95 percent of the vote. Observers noted major flaws in the process, however, and the sole opposition candidate, leftist politician Hamdeen Sabbahi, publicly questioned the official results. The government harshly restricted dissent and assembly by activists from across the political spectrum during the year. The media were also targeted, with authorities harassing and sometimes jailing journalists who reported on political opposition of any kind (Freedom House 2015).

Macro Indicators

Figure 12



Note: The index of clean elections prepared by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project maps the extent to which elections are free and fair. For V-Dem free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence. It is calculated on an interval scale from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest).

For ten consecutive years since 2000, the rate was stable at 0.04%. This low level corresponds with the findings of the relevant literature, which contends that non-transparent electoral processes were held in order to solidify the rule of the Mubarak regime. It should be noted that

the index does not change at all in 2005, when Mubarak introduced cosmetic reforms such as the direct and competitive election of the Presidency (his only contender, Ayman Nour, was arrested and jailed immediately after the election). In 2010, there was a slight decrease of the rate to 0.03%, which reflects the increased exclusion of non-NDP candidates in the November-December election. In 2011, the score tripled to 0.13% and in 2012 it again nearly tripled to 0.34%.

This can be explained by the ousting of President Mubarak, and the imposition of a more transparent regulatory and monitoring framework around electoral processes under the rule of SCAF and President Morsi. According to Transparency International:

> On 9 December 2014, the Egyptian government announced the launch of a national anti-corruption strategy. The National Coordinating Committee for Combating Corruption (see below) developed the strategy and its implementation will be coordinated by a technical committee headed by the Administrative Control Authority (ACA). The Egyptian National Anti-Corruption Strategy adopts ten main objectives, which range from short to medium term, namely: (i) raising the level of performance in government; (ii) establishing transparency and integrity principles among public officials; (iii) developing and updating anti-corruption legislation; (iv) strengthening judicial procedures to achieve prompt justice; (v) strengthening capacities of anti- corruption bodies; (vi) raising living standards and achieving social justice; (vii) raising awareness and building trust between citizens and state institutions; (viii) strengthening national cooperation against corruption; (ix) strengthening regional and international cooperation against corruption; and (x) strengthening civil society participation in combating corruption (Transparency International 2015).

In relation to orthodox models of democratization/authoritarianism, the lack of change in this index over the decade before the Uprisings contrasts with the democratization/transitological hypotheses suggesting that transitions towards democracy might be helped purely through the growth of civil society or procedural reform in election practices such as competitive presidential elections. By contrast, these values could be said to support the claim made by proponents of the 'authoritarian resilience' literature that autocrats draw on a 'menu of manipulation' in order to void democratic procedures of their substantive contents, as well as Bahgat Korany's claim that democratising reforms in the region were *ta'addudiyya*, superficial and always reversible, supporting also the claim that autocrats in hybrid regimes engage in 'cycles of compression and decompression', as Hinnebusch argues.

Legitimacy of Institutions

While a certain simplistic – albeit widespread – view of legitimacy in political science sees it as fundamentally dependent on the degree of freedom which it allowed its citizens to gain, others have suggested that a regime's legitimacy will be dependent in part also on its ability to deliver on its promises, on material factors in particular, as well as on the sheer ability to produce consensus (e.g. Gramsci). Thus, traditionally, models of authoritarianism have viewed these systems as either lacking legitimacy or as grounding legitimacy in a source of 'authoritarian mentality' such as (Arab) culture or Islam as a religion. Analogously, area studies scholarship, particularly until decolonisation, tended to emphasise culturalist factors, until postcolonial scholarship addressed the cultural blindness in such biases. Certainly, tracking the (perception of) legitimacy of a particular regime provides an important indicator of its stability, and the likelihood of and pressures for change. Traditionally, Middle Eastern regimes have been analysed as lacking institutional legitimacy and rule of law, as elites employed various strategies to consolidate their rule through legitimation. The lack of institutional legitimacy has, broadly, led to the normative empowerment of alternative sources of legitimation, frequently

organising around religion. Research on Egyptian politics further underlines this, particularly scholars of authoritarian resilience that identify regime linkages with the religious establishment.

For the purposes of this analysis, 'legitimacy' can be taken to refer to something akin to Gramscian hegemony or the Weberian conceptualisation of the transformation of coercive power into authority, which is obeyed without the need for the use of force or repression.

This section analyses on the one hand survey data on confidence in institutions and on the representativeness of parties, and on the other hand it considers the Quality of Governance Index on Legitimacy, the Index on State Legitimacy, and on regional government.

Egypt

The literature on Egypt has similarly identified a lack of legitimacy in its institutions (Sedgwick 2010). An exception to this is *al-Azhar*, which has frequently served as an instrument of legitimacy for the ruling regime. As Moustafa argues:

> Over the past century, and particularly since the 1952 Free Officers' coup, the Egyptian government virtually incorporated al-Azhar as an arm of the state through purges and control over Azhar finances, and by gaining the power to appoint al-Azhar's key leadership. Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Husni Mubarak all benefited from this dominance over al-Azhar by securing fatwas legitimating their policies (Moustafa 2000).

At the same time, as it has been identified by a number of Egyptian politics scholars, the Egyptian regime attempted to instrumentalise religion for legitimation purposes, fostering a so-called "Islamic Revival" (Mahmood 2005). Anwar Sadat later adopted the name Mohammad Anwar Sadat, and presented himself as the *al-amir al-mu'minin*: rarely would his speeches not begin, or end, with a reference to the Qur'an, while state media began duly reporting the mosques where Sadat would perform his Friday prayers. 'Islam was central to Anwar Sadat's self-image and claim to political authority' (Wickham 2005). Esposito argued that 'in cultivating a public image as a pious Muslim ruler, the President [promoted] a more liberal attitude towards Islamic groups, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic university student organisations. This was done to increase legitimation and counter the influence of pro-Nasser secular leftists' (Esposito 1998). The use of *al-Azhar*, and other religious establishments, for legitimation purposes continued after the 2011 revolts, as both the Morsi government and the post-Morsi elites attempted to gain political points by involving these institutions.

Survey Indices

Figure 13



Note: The index of confidence in political institutions is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of confidence in the government and in the Parliament. The index of confidence in civil/religious/media organisations is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of Confidence in: (1) churches; (2) charitable or humanitarian organizations; (3) trade/ labour unions and professional unions; (4) the women´s movement; (5) the press; (6) television. The index of confidence in law and order is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of confidence in: (1) the courts (the judiciary) / legal system; (2) the police; (3) the Armed Forces.

During the first decade of the 21st century, there has a steady and sharp decline in the confidence in political, civic and legal institutions in Egypt. This is in line with the relevant literature that underlines a consistent lack of institutional legitimacy across the country. The fact that institutions were instrumentalised by the ruling regime for its own purposes further diminishes public confidence. Interestingly, this method of political survival seems to have not born fruit, for it is the political institutions that saw their rate dropping the most in relation to the civic and legal institutions.

This decline in confidence in both institutions of law and order and in political institutions is coherent with the increasing mobilisation of ever-broader sectors of the working and middle classes throughout the decade, and contrasts notably with the stalled if not declining measures of civil and political freedom. Combined with the formal political-institutional 'openings' of 2005 (the then-named 'Cairo Spring,' which ended in the bloody repression of political opposition in parliamentary election and the arrest of Mubarak's only presidential opponent), it might be possible to argue that the strategy of tactical openings to 'decompress' socio-economic dislocation resulting from structural economic reform epitomised by the 2005 openings was unsuccessful. This in turn suggests that the regime was unable to address its structural weaknesses, leaving it in autocratic control, but brittle and vulnerable on key issues.

Given patterns in perceptions in those areas, one would expect an increase in confidence in institutions around 2011-2012 and a decline on/after the 2013 coup. Indeed, as Freedom House writes:

> A new constitution was passed in a referendum on January 14 and 15, 2014, after a campaign period in which authorities effectively banned all expression of opposition to the charter. According to official results, the constitution received 98.1 percent of the vote, amid 38.6 percent turnout. The referendum was held in a tense atmosphere, with more than 350,000 security personnel deployed throughout the country, sporadically clashing with Islamists and other government opponents. Most Islamist groups boycotted the vote, arguing that the process was an illegitimate product of the 2013 coup. The new constitution nominally improved protections for women's rights, freedom of expression, and other civil liberties. However, these rights were not enforced in practice, and the charter suffered from significant flaws, including an expansion of police and military autonomy and a provision allowing military trials of civilians (Freedom House 2015).

However, a comparison of pre- and post-Uprising data on trust suggests that while a relatively high proportion of citizens rate their government's *overall* performance highly (59%) significantly less than 50 per cent are satisfied when asked about the government's performance on specific issues, including the way education, healthcare, social security and democracy are developing. Just over 50 per cent are satisfied with the economy. This suggests that despite the levels of trust in government, structural problems remain unaddressed.

Figure 14



Note: The index of the representativeness of parties is computed of the percentage of people that perceived that a party represents their political, social and economic aspirations. It measures the % of people that have a great deal or a lot of trust in existing parties as representing their political, social, and economic aspirations. It is measured in a 100-point scale.

The percentage of people that they feel a party represents their aspirations has been stable between 2011 (82.7%) and 2013 (82%). These values are unusually high, both in general and certainly with respect to Egypt, where the party system has nearly always been neutralised by incumbent regimes and parties have been perceived – largely correctly – as vehicles of patronage and clientelism rather than as 'interest aggregators' with any significant representative function in a deliberative system. Such high values are certainly due to the 'revolutionary moment' Egypt experienced between 2011 and 2013: after an initial attempt by the military government (the SCAF) to stall democratic reforms, popular mobilisation in late 2011 forced it to concede both parliamentary and presidential elections. Both of these, as well as the March 2011 constitutional referendum called by SCAF, experience extremely high levels of popular engagement and party political debate. This very slight drop in popular satisfaction with Egyptian political parties can potentially be explained if one keeps in mind the popular dissatisfaction with the post-2011 establishment of the Freedom and Justice Party by the

Muslim Brotherhood, the inability of 'revolutionary groups' to politically organise in time for elections matching the Brotherhood's organisational capacity, its reach and its funding, as well as the re-appearance of a number of Mubarak-era political figures (so-called *feloul*). However, the minuscule entity of the drop, it is extremely likely to be insignificant, the significance of this data is certainly in the unprecedented support for the plethora of different, new Egyptian parties that sprung up in the wake of Mubarak's removal. Such support would be entirely compatible with standard democratization accounts of transition from authoritarianism: mass mobilisation was a resource that *could* have been used by competing political elites to press for ever greater political concessions from the foundering elements of the former regime engaged in a struggle for power between themselves – the armed forces, the Interior Ministry, businessmen, and *feloul* – thereby ferrying the country from opening to transition, if not yet to consolidation.

Macro Indicators

Figure 15



Note: The Quality of Government index on legitimacy is composed of the sum of scores in four performance dimensions – Security, Political, Economic, and Social – on a scale of 12 possible points.

While in the first decade of the 21st century the scores were more or less stable, the rate has dropped in a record low of five, from the 12 points possible, in 2011 and 2012. These results are interesting for several characteristics. First, the drop in legitimacy between 2008 – the year of the famous general strike in Mahalla al-Kubra which was running battles with the police for a week – and the 2011 revolution, which is both significant and sharp, and is normally linked to the regime's generally poor socio-economic performance and Mubarak's attempt to anoint his son Gamal as next president (*tawreeth*). During this period, opposition groups protested against ever more systematic attempts to quell dissent and the use of often brutal police abuse of power both against dissidents – the most infamous case being the death of Khaled Mohamed Saeed, whose killers were never found but are most likely police forces he intended to denounce the corruption of – and against ordinary citizens. In addition, the deteriorating economic situation – in terms of increasing labour precarity and pressure on working and lower middle classes, which belied increases in national income – and related increasing frequency of labour strikes, and of political mobilisation by groups like *Kifaya* and April 6. Just how eroded legitimacy had become by January 2011 is evident in the unprecedented and unexpectedly

massive and widespread turnout in the anti-regime protests starting on January 25th which lead to Mubarak's removal 18 days later.

Second, conversely, scores do not deteriorate significantly during the first eight years of the previous decade, despite the Egyptian government's unpopular positions on the Second Intifada in the Palestinian Occupied Territory first and its support for regime change in Iraq in 2003. This may be due to the index's incorporation of several dimensions, where at all but the economic level the country displayed relatively little *overt* instability during these years, and/or to the fact that 'neoliberal' structural economic reform had not fully set in or impacted upon ordinary Egyptians' lives yet.

Figure 16



Note: The Quality of Government index on state legitimacy emphasises the role of corruption and lack of representativeness in the government that directly undermine the social contract. It therefore includes pressures and measures related to corruption, government effectiveness, political participation, electoral process, level of democracy, illicit economy, drug trade, protests and demonstrations, power struggles. – on a scale of 1-10 (Teorell, Dahlberg & Holmberg 2016).

Egyptian state legitimacy has been stable over the past ten years. While this figure is in line with a broader perceived popular trust in state institutions detected in survey data – most notably, the Egyptian army and the police – it is a fairly puzzling result given the instability and anti-government mobilisation of the 2006-2010 period (partly outlined above) in particular. It is also a counterintuitive result given the opinions displayed by Egyptians through survey data concerning the effectiveness of government in delivering a range of services, their perception of the pervasiveness of corruption, and the recognised clientelistic – rather than representative – logic behind party formation and action (Teti & Abbott 2016). The only (very slight) dip in state legitimacy occurs in 2010, the year before the 'January Revolution'. Given the unprecedented size and intensity of protests and their nationwide breadth in during the '18 days', this may suggest an insensitivity of the index rather than a sudden nationwide delegitimisation of the state and consequent mobilisation in January 2011.

Figure 17



Note: V-DEM Regional government index maps the extent to which elected regional governments can operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional level. On a scale from 0 to 1.

The low score Egypt has received during the first decade of the 21st century, reflects the highly centralised system of governance where there are no elected regional governments, but instead there are local administrations that are elected with minimal voter turnout and alleged systematic election fraud. In 2012 Egypt achieved a score that would be accorded a country electing regional governments but in which those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the regional level. V-DEM data do not explain what the political or administrative change is behind the higher score achieved in 2012. This might be attributed to the reform of the local government structure that was being discussed during August 2012 in Shura Council and Constituent Assembly, although these changes were included in the new Egyptian constitution only in 2014. Since the 2011 Uprising, Egypt has been without local councils, after they were dissolved by a court order. The 2014 Constitution attempted to give local administrations more financial independence and to pave the way for electing governors. However, the current government has not implemented this.

State Monopoly on Legitimate Use of Violence

One of social sciences' best-known definitions is Weber's definition of sovereignty as the monopoly over the legitimacy use of violence. The scholarly literature building upon Weber's definition emphasizes the importance of regimes' coercive apparatus, often to the neglect of legitimacy. While scholars often make the distinction between physical and symbolic violence, many sociologists following Pierre Bourdieu's approach highlight the strong link between the two.

Area studies literature examining the nature of regimes focuses on the bureaucratic-authoritarian aspects of the Middle Eastern states and examined the specific kinds of loyalties these systems are producing in their respective societies. Following Nazih Ayubi's work on Arab states, some studies attempt to explore the link between the low levels of political legitimacy and the use of violence by these regimes as well as against them.

This section brings together non-survey indicators – the BTI index on the Monopoly on the use of Force, and V-DEM indexes of state authority over population and over territory – with survey data on trust in institutions of law and order.

Egypt

The use of violence has accompanied Egyptian politics since 1952: the consolidation of the Nasserite regime involved the imprisonment and torture of *Ikhwan* (Muslim Brotherhood) under two waves of repression. Initially, the regime imprisoned about 400 members, together with the Supreme Guide, following their alleged assassination attack against him in October 1954 (Dekmejian 1971; Jankowski 2002). They were interred either in the *Liman al-Tura* prison outside Cairo, or the *al-Wahat* prison camp in the Western Desert (Zollner 2007). After evidence of a second conspiracy in 1965 (or, as it was termed, "Organisation 1965") the regime incarcerated about 2,000 supposed members, including Sayyid Qutb (Haykal 1983; Wickham 2013). Only a few of them managed to escape abroad (Tsourapas 2016).

Under Sadat, political violence across the country reached new levels: the ruling regime employed repression on a wider scale, particularly in the aftermath of the 1977 *Bread Riots* (Haykal 1983); communal violence against Egyptian Copts escalated, leading a significant portion of the community into emigration (Ibrahim 2010; Tsourapas 2015; Iskander 2012); opposition actors also used violence (Hafez & Wiktorowicz 2004; Kepel 1985), an effort that culminated in the assassination of Sadat in October 1981 (Beattie 2000). Political violence, particularly against Islamists, has also been prevalent throughout the rule of Hosni Mubarak (Ismail 2006; Brownlee 2002), and has been frequently attributed as a factor leading to the 2011 events (El-Mahdi 2011).

Survey Indices

Figure 18



Note: The index of Trust/Confidence in Law and Order is generally computed as mean of min-max normalized values of the following three indicators: (1) % of people that have a great deal or a lot of trust in the Courts (the judiciary) / legal system; (2) % of people that have a great deal or a lot of trust in the Police; (3) % of people that have a great deal or a lot of trust in the Armed Forces. For Egypt, the question on trust in the Army was not asked, so in this case

the Index computation excludes the armed forces. The Trust in the Judiciary indicator is computed of the % of people that have a great deal or a lot of trust in the Courts (the judiciary) / legal system; the Trust in the Police indicator is computed of the % of people that have a great deal or a lot of trust in the Police.

Although survey data is very sparse on this area, it is possible to observe a sharp decline in the popular trust in law and order institutions (i.e. courts (the judiciary) / legal system, the police, the Armed Forces), in the period between 2011 and 2014. This is coherent with the massive anti-regime demonstrations which rocked Egypt between January 25th and February 12th, and the disenchantment with Army rule which re-emerged in the latter half of 2011 – particularly October and November – after an initial period of general confidence in transitional authorities. Before 2011, however, the dramatic decline of the score of the trust in police between 2001 and 2011 is coherent with the history of increasing anti-regime dissent and mobilisation visible throughout the 2000s. While there is no suggestion from the history of Egyptian opposition politics in this period that the regime lost its monopoly over the use of violence, the scholarly consensus is that its legitimacy declined noticeably. It should also be noted that these two bodies – police and judiciary – have substantially different reputations in Egypt: the judiciary has always been divided between regime loyalists and those who would uphold the Egyptian judiciary's traditional role and reputation as the most independent judiciary in the Arab world while the police has the worst reputation of the two, being experienced at an everyday level by ordinary Egyptians, who try their best to avoid interacting with a body from which they can expect mostly arbitrary abuse of power.

Macro Indicators

Figure 19



Note: This BTI index on the Monopoly on the use of Force captures the extent to which the state's monopoly on the use of force covers the entire territory of the country. It is on a scale 1-10. A score of 1 indicates that there is no state monopoly on the use of force; a score 4 indicates that the state's monopoly on the use of force is established only in key parts of the country while large areas of the country are controlled by guerrillas, paramilitaries or clans; a score 7 indicates that the state's monopoly on the use of force is established nationwide in principle, but it is challenged by guerrillas, mafias or clans in territorial enclaves; a score 10 indicated that there is no competition with the state's monopoly on the use of force throughout the entire territory (Teorell, Dahlberg & Holmberg 2016).

According to the BTI, the state monopoly on the use of force is established but started to be noticeably challenged since 2010. These data are also coherent with the standard account of increasing anti-regime mobilisation during the 2000s, and particularly chimes with mobilisation of independent labour movements, particularly since 2006. It must be emphasised that the

decline in the monopoly of the use of force is *not* related to the emergence of competing actors – with the partial but longstanding exception of Northern Sinai – but rather to the *effectiveness* of this use – ultimately linked to the *legitimacy* of those forces – inasmuch as it is increasingly challenged by increasingly frequent and large strikes and protests in the run-up to the 'January Uprising'. During the '18 days' of the uprising, the effectiveness of Interior Ministry forces in particular was dramatically diminished: notoriously, after using *baltageyya* (hired thugs) to attempt to break up demonstrations and sit-ins, Ministry of the Interior (MoI) forces entirely vanished after the February 3rd 'Battle of the Camel'. In light of this total disappearance, it is surprising that this indicator did not drop further in 2011 in particular.

It is worth noting that the general Sisi in his announcement of the military coup on the 3rd of July 2013 made very clear that the Army would not tolerate "any act deviating from peacefulness" (AlJazeera 2013). As the 2015 Freedom House report on Egypt writes:

> Since the 2013 coup, the military has dominated the political system, and all opposition forces have been thoroughly marginalized. Large numbers of Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters, including nearly all of the organization's senior leadership and Morsi himself, were arrested at the time of the coup or in the subsequent months, and an estimated 16,000 people were behind bars for political reasons as of mid-2014. Authorities declared the Brotherhood a terrorist organization in December 2013, which allowed them to charge anyone participating in a pro-Morsi demonstration with terrorism and laid a foundation for the complete political isolation of the Islamist opposition. The new constitution banned parties based on religion. The government has also pursued non-Islamist critics, including prominent political scientists Emad Shahin, who was accused of espionage, and Amr Hamzawy, who was charged with insulting the judiciary, both in early 2014. Alaa Abdel Fattah, perhaps Egypt's best-known secular activist, was in detention at year's end, awaiting retrial and a possible sentence of 15 years in prison for violating a highly restrictive law on public protests. In another severe blow to liberal political activism, a court in April banned the April 6 movement, one of the prodemocracy groups that catalyzed the January 2011 uprising against longtime authoritarian president Hosni Mubarak (Freedom House 2015).

The 2013 coup epitomised the return to assertiveness of security sections of the establishment, and as such might be expected to lead to an increase in the effectiveness of the monopoly of the use of force, although whether this firmer grip is perceived as *legitimate* is an entirely different question, not least given the political polarisation cemented by the 2013 army coup.

Figure 20



Note: V-DEM define state authority over population and over territory respectively as assessment of the percentage of populations or territory over which the state "is recognized as the preeminent authority and in a contest of wills […] can assert its control over political forces that reject its authority" (Coppedge et al. 2015).

The rise of authority over 2011-2012 could be due to the presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2012, which were obtained in no small part due to the protests against the transitional military government of late 2011, which are widely believed to have forced the concession of elections from the military. The percentage (%) of the territory that the state has effective control has decreased in 2012. This development is, again, coherent with the scholarship on mobilisation in Egypt and with the developments during and after the 2011 revolution. The percentage (%) of the population that the state has effective control has varied over the past 15 years. It is worth emphasizing that state control over territory is consistently and significantly higher and more stable than control over population.

It should be noted that both of these variables are defined as "in a contest of wills […] *can* assert its control" (emphasis added) and while it is undoubtedly true that both the armed forces and the police forces *could* have quashed the 2011 revolution, *in practice* they failed to do so – MoI forces actually dissipated, with several police stations raided and torched during the Uprising.

Checks and Balances

Following a broadly Dahlian approach to democracy, 'transitology' suggests that the presence of (a measure of) checks and balances in the formal political arena is essential for the democratic process to commence, and certainly for its consolidation. Therefore, a growing body of literature within the field has been produced to empirically examine the *de facto* and *de jure* separation of powers.

Area Studies literature has also emphasized the importance of constitutional separation of powers – or indeed of its absence – in analysing the actual mechanisms through which a regime remains in power and generates consensus. Some have pointed out the impact of traditional forms of power of appointing politically dependent judges to their political system. In general, both sets of studies have found authoritarian regimes singularly unwilling to make space for effective – rather than nominal – checks and balances. They also highlight the *de facto* non-existence of constraints to the executive as the dependence of judiciary and legislative on the executive power is at very high levels.

While there are indicators that attempt to quantify checks and balances – e.g. the Quality of Governance index of Checks and Balances, or the V-DEM Judicial constraints on the executive index – there are few direct counterparts in survey questions, particularly questions that can be subject to some longitudinal analysis, the closest being the construction of an index of confidence in (main) institutions.

Egypt

The system of checks and balances in Egypt, within broader discussions on the rule of law, has been examined by Brown, in a comparative study with the Gulf states (Brown 1997). The literature has also identified how Sadat and Mubarak have been identified as using legislative politics for legitimation purposes (Hamad 2008). In fact, Sadat several times evoked the rule-of-law in order to add legitimacy to his rule in the aftermath of Nasser's death in 1970 (Beattie 2000).

Beyond these issues, it has also been highlighted that the structural shift towards economic liberalisation also contributed to the undermining of the system of checks and balances within Egypt. Echoing widespread perception, Marfleet and Mahdi write:

> *Infitah* paved the way for traditional capitalism to operate in all fields of economic activity. As the capitalist class of the colonial period had been greatly reduced by nationalisation, the first capitalist groups to take advantage of new opportunities in the 1970s were those engaged in illicit activities such as the sale of antiquities, drugs and weapons, or in unofficial currency exchange. Others quickly accumulated wealth through connections with bureaucrats and government of officials who sold state-owned agricultural land and real estate at low prices in return for huge commissions. Such mechanisms led to the emergence of a capitalist class loyal to the bureaucratic ruling class – one which initially had no entrepreneurial culture but which profited directly from its links to the state […] Hence, the Egyptian market-oriented economy lacked commitment to practices associated with advanced capitalisms, such as formal guarantees of the rule of law, a fair wage system, or investment in knowledge production through research and development. Economic policy included repeated attempts to radically reduce public spending allocated to subsidising basic commodities, services and social transfers, which had already become one of the lowest worldwide' (El-Mahdi & Marfleet 2009).

It can, therefore, be argued that the Egyptian state has faced decades-long issues with checks and balances that have affected a number of state sectors – from public spending and

subsidies' administration, to rule of law and the failure of legislative politics to ensure accountability.

Survey Indices

Figure 21



Note: The index of confidence in (main) institutions is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of the confidence in: the Government; the Parliament; Political Parties; the Courts (the judiciary) / legal system.

Over the past fifteen years there was a sharp decline of people's confidence in the main institutions. This is mirrored in recent actions by the Sisi government. According to Freedom House:

> As with its predecessors, the Sisi administration offered very little transparency regarding government operations and budget making. The military is notoriously opaque with respect to its own extensive business interests across several sectors of the Egyptian economy. There was a civil society consultation process for the new constitution, though civic and opposition groups did not have a significant impact on the final document, and the drafting committee itself was not representative of the general population (Freedom House 2015).

These findings discount models of democratic transition for the post-2011 period in Egyptian political life insofar as post-revolutionary governments have been unable to earn the confidence of the populations they govern. This does not signal support for models of authoritarian resilience or of hybrid regimes, nor even the effectiveness of 'cyclical authoritarian' strategies however: eroded trust in institutions of state and in government suggest that – whatever the strategies elites are deploying – political allegiance to and legitimacy of these institutions by the general population remains the fragile. In turn, such low scores suggest that however much the Sisi government might have been able to return Egypt to a semblance of stability, this remains tenuous and built on brittle foundations insofar as it has been unable thus far to address the structural issues that drive the lack of trust in government.

Macro Indicators

The rate of the Quality of Governance index of Checks and Balances has been stable from 2000 to 2012, corresponding to the continuing domination of the Hosni Mubarak regime, and

its grip on the political system that did not lead Egyptian citizens to expect changes in the country's checks & balances working. This may well reflect the lack of change in formal institutional roles and responsibilities, although the introduction of a competitive election for the presidency – despite being ineffective in practice – does represent a change one would expect this indicator to be sensitive to.

Figure 22



Note: This Database of Political Institutions indicator is calculated as follows: CHECKS equals one if LIEC OR EIEC is less than 6 (5 for CHECKS_LAX) – countries where legislatures are not competitively elected are considered countries where only the executive wields a check. In countries where LIEC and EIEC are greater than or equal to 6 (5 for CHECKS_LAX): CHECKS is incremented by one if there is a chief executive (it is blank or NA if not); CHECKS is incremented by one if the chief executive is competitively elected (EIEC greater than six – this is the main difference from the deleted CHECKS2a, which increased by one when EIEC was greater than four); CHECKS is incremented by one if the opposition controls the legislature. In presidential systems, CHECKS is incremented by one: for each chamber of the legislature UNLESS the president's party has a majority in the lower house AND a closed list system is in effect (implying stronger presidential control of his/her party, and therefore of the legislature); for each party coded as allied with the president's party and which has an ideological (left-right-centre) orientation closer to that of the main opposition party than to that of the president's party (Keefer 2012).

Figure 23



Note: The V-DEM Judicial constraints on the executive index maps the extent to which the executive respects the constitution and complies with court rulings, and the extent to which the judiciary is able to act in an independent fashion. The V-DEM Legislative constraints on the executive index maps the extent to which the legislature and government agencies (e.g., comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman) is capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive. This is a composite variable and creates a cumulative scale (Coppedge et al. 2015).

While there was a steady rate of constraints on the executive, we notice that there was considerable change in the years 2011 and 2012. In 2011 there was an increase for both legislative and judicial constraints while in 2012 their rates decreased.

Government Performance

If legitimacy depends at least in part on regimes' abilities to fulfil expectations based on their rhetorical commitments and on the satisfaction of the population's needs, it is important to set objective indexes of that performance against the population's perceptions.

Scholarly literature examining the way government performance can influence political support suggests there is a strong correlation between successful developmental models and the appeal of authoritarian systems. Analogously, drawing upon the notion of the 'rentier state,' Middle East area scholarship highlights the interplay between government performance and political support in the presence of external 'rents' (e.g. economic, or geopolitical) in modern Middle Eastern states.

This section calculates an Index of government performance based on survey data, set against the index of Government Effectiveness (Worldwide Governance Indicators, WGI).

Egypt

The performance of the government in Egypt is arguably linked to a number of structural issues that have accompanied the Egyptian state functions since the 1970s. Amin characterised Egypt as a 'rentier economy,' in which oil, labour remittances, and profits from the Suez canal and tourism have been the four largest single contributors of foreign exchange (Amin 1995). This aspect has affected Egyptian government performance to a large extent. Soliman's insightful work on the Mubarak regime also highlighted the importance of remittances in financing the workings of the Egyptian state (Soliman 2011). Both scholars based their arguments in a tradition of research on Middle East migration has similarly identified remittances and economic development as the main, if not sole, consequences of regional population mobility (Birks & Sinclair 1980).

Perceptions of poor government performance have often resulted from Egyptian elites' efforts to continue the road of structural reform and adjustment:

> After a short economic boom in the late 1990s headline growth slowed and the government adopted more aggressive structural adjustment measures, floating the Egyptian pound against the US dollar and speeding up privatisation – a trend fortified by a cabinet of technocrats and businessmen inaugurated in 2004. These policies had their impact on the majority of Egyptians and played a role in stimulating all manner of protests and demands – over availability of bread, access to water and the cost of living. At the same time, intense frustration with the politics of autocracy produced novel political initiatives. During the 1990s it had seemed that popular engagement in politics – what Egyptians call the politics of 'the street' – was characterised by passivity and hesitancy. In September 2000, however, a new series of protests began, initially in support of the Palestinian intifada. Each wave of activity has been followed by another, each giving impetus to further struggles. Support for Palestine brought huge street protests and campaigns for donation and boycott; when these subsided further protests began over the US-led invasion of Iraq (El-Mahdi & Marfleet 2009).

Overall, the Egyptian case is characterised by poor government performance, as semi-rentierism has been combined with a problematic opening up of the economic realm to produce a largely ineffective central state mechanism that accompanied the country since the 1970s. Combined with the state's limited capacity to push reforms through, the problems of governmental performance have been extensively identified in the relevant literature.

Survey Indices

Figure 24



Note: Government performance is calculated by the average number of people who approved the job performance of the leadership of the country and popular satisfaction at government, from 0 (least satisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied), and recoded in a 100-points scale.

The government performance index computes the approval of country's leadership. From 2012 to 2013 there was a sharp decline in popular approval of Egypt's government. At the time, the country was becoming increasingly polarised by the Muslim Brotherhood's (and the Salafi Nour Party's) unwillingness to establish broad-based alliances for reform, pushing through legislation and a constitution – which opponents heavily opposed. In the meantime, the Egyptian economy showed few signs of post-revolutionary recovery, with tourists continuing to stay away, balance of payment problems, and shortages including electricity cuts (which some say the armed forces orchestrated to further delegitimise the Brotherhood presidency and parliament). The government's approval rate reached a record low in 2013, after which there is a sharp increase. This can be ascribed to the popular expectation that the army's ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood would bring stability and enhanced government performance. It should be noted that the high rate of approval belies Egyptians' opinion of government performance in specific areas: while the former is relatively high, in the latter the government score poorly. It is possible that the high approval ratings for government overall are motivated by the polarised political situation, while the latter scores indicate that Egyptians do not extend the same political credit on matters directly affecting their lives.

Figure 25



Figure 26



Figure 27



At the same time, this is corroborated by global rankings. As the World Economic Forum reports, in 2015, Egypt continues to not be faring very well, but shows signs of improvement:

> Egypt, at 116th, moves up in the rankings for the first time since the Arab Spring. This reflects a more positive assessment of the country's institutions (87th), in particular higher levels of physical security (up by seven places although still, at 133rd, an important hindrance to economic growth), a more efficient judiciary in settling business disputes (up by 23 places), and better protection of property rights (up by seven). Smaller improvements are registered on the macroeconomic environment (up four) and financial market development (up six). The upward movement reflects recent reforms, including a reduction of energy subsidies, tax reforms, and a strengthened business environment, as well as greater political stability after years of turmoil. Continued reforms are needed to create favorable conditions for private-sector growth, which will be crucial for job creation and hence social cohesion. These include more openness to trade and investment (130th on foreign competition), including reduction in tariff duties (132nd), non-tariff barriers (105th), and a more favorable environment for foreign direct investment. Continued efforts to strengthen the financial markets (119th) and investment in skills and education (111th) will further support private-sector growth (WEF 2016).

Figure 28



Note: The challenges and reforms index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of the following two indicators: most important problem in your country today (economic situation); and political reform must be implemented gradually rather than immediately.

There is a sharp decline from 2011 to 2013. Indeed, this hints at a greater need for the Egyptian state and government to undertake serious policy reforms. Popular perceptions of government performance hinges at the successful carrying out of a number of planned reforms, as IMF Mission Chief for Egypt, Christopher Jarvis, has expressly argued:

> For a number of years, Egypt has suffered from insufficiently inclusive growth and high unemployment. Since 2011, these problems have been compounded by large fiscal deficits, rising public debt, fragility in the balance of payments and, hence, losses of foreign exchange reserves. Unsurprisingly, vulnerabilities have been increasing in the process.
>
> But things started to turn around in the last few months. The authorities have embarked on an economic reform program to raise growth, create jobs, and contain fiscal and external deficits and the loss of foreign exchange reserves.
>
> On the expenditure side of the budget, the government started to reform the system of energy subsides. It also started to get a grip on the public sector wage bill, which, as a result of a very complicated wage structure, had been rising too fast. On the revenue side, the authorities introduced higher tax rates for high earners, and a capital gains tax. Those measures have already made a big difference in curbing the unsustainably high fiscal deficit. Going forward, the fiscal program envisages gradual elimination of most fuel subsidies within the next five years. It also includes enacting a long-awaited value-added tax which, if implemented successfully, can greatly boost government revenues and, hence, improve the country's fiscal position at large (IMF 2015b).

Macro Indicators

Figure 29



Note: The government effectiveness index prepared by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. The index is built using survey data and information from institutional sources, on a scale of 0 to 100.

The perception of government effectiveness has been in sharp decline since 2009. This is not surprising, given the extensive upheavals that accompanied post-2011 Egyptian political life,

but also a wider problem that reflects the inability of the Egyptian government to tackle the causes of this phenomenon – hampered by a bloated bureaucratic system that is unable to resolve citizens' matters quickly or efficiently and a widespread belief in the existence of corruption across governmental sectors. Although figures for government effectiveness by and large fluctuate in the 40-50% range in the first decade of the new millennium, and are typical of upper middle income countries, these scores are about half the OECD high income average, which is typically in the 85-95% range. Although this does not directly enable an evaluation of the *type* of political regime developing in Egypt, it does mean that whatever system *is* in place it remains fragile and precarious, unable to deliver in practice on its citizens' expectations.

The slight change against continuing decline in 2014 is related to a number of governmental actions This 2015 IMF report describes the shift in policy orientation aiming to increase effectiveness:

> In 2014, Egypt adopted a new constitution and elected a new president who was candid with the electorate on the need to reform the economy. The government has developed a plan centered on structural reform and investment promotion to raise growth and create jobs, and fiscal adjustment to bring the budget deficit and public debt under control. Crucially, the authorities have already begun to implement fuel subsidy reform, raising prices by 40–80 percent in July 2014. They have also begun the reforms needed to raise tax revenue and to make Egypt a more attractive destination for investment. There was agreement that the authorities' objectives are ambitious but are broadly within reach with steady policy implementation. The authorities aim to raise growth to 6 percent per annum, reduce annual inflation to 7 percent, bring down the fiscal deficit to 8 percent of GDP and debt to 80–85 percent of GDP, and increase foreign exchange reserves to 3½ months of imports, all within the next five years (IMF 2015a).

Corruption

Corruption has been long argued to be a necessary ill of both economic and political 'development', but recent studies have begun to question this claim, emphasising corruptions' corrosive effect at economic, political and social levels, undermining (inclusive) growth, skewing systems of political representation, and undermining trust.

Within the debate on political transformations, Authoritarian Resilience models emphasize the high levels of corruption along with the lack of accountability of state officials in the general poor performance of the rule of law. Area Studies literature highlights the presence of corruption, detailing its practical operation as part of mechanisms of power, and has suggested and that its widespread incidence acts as an impediment to the revenue-generating capacity of Middle Eastern states, as well as to socio-political marginalisation.

This section evaluates indexes of the perception of corruption based on survey data – e.g. the index of corruption as a justifiable action – against Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (Score).

Egypt

Corruption has been identified as a part of the Egyptian political system since early on, identified not merely by social scientists but by Egyptian thinkers, most notably Naguib Mafhouz, who criticized governmental corruption in *Children of Gebelawi*, a novel published in 1959. According to economist Galal Amin:

> While corruption in Nasser's era, especially in the aftermath of the 1967 defeat, was still in its infancy and was met with strong condemnation, it turned into a big festival in Sadat's era as people enjoyed every possible opportunity [to commit corrupt actions] fearlessly. In Mubarak's era, however, condemnation of corruption has disappeared… corruption has become part and parcel of the regime itself… in other words, since the 1980s corruption has been gradually legalised (Blaydes 2011).

A key theme in the literature ascribes the rise of corruption to the economic reforms initiated by Anwar Sadat, and continued by Hosni Mubarak. John Waterbury identified in the 1970s that, 'while it is very difficult to measure quantitatively the extent of corruption in any polity,' his evidence pointed to the existence of 'endemic, planned, and developmental' corruption in Egypt (Waterbury 1976). This continued in the 1980s and 1990s, 'in the widening circle of corruption associated with the rise of Gamal Mubarak and the neoliberal economic policies he promoted' (Sayigh 2012).

Blaydes' book on Mubarak's Egypt provides an extensive analysis of political corruption in the country, concluding that:

> Elite corruption is considered an open secret of Egyptian political life. Al-Akhbar's daily columnist, Ahmed Ragab, wrote a particularly critical editorial where he suggested that Egyptians live in a land of corruption, a "Fasadestan" (fasad is corruption in Arabic). An editorialist for Al-Masry Al-Youm argued that the force of corruption in Egypt has become stronger than the regime itself. Parliamentarians were called "liars" who have "milked the country dry" (Blaydes 2011).

El Mahdi and Marfleet summarise that

> Corruption is widespread, as can be seen in the allocation of contracts by the state for commodities, equipment and construction projects, and in the licensing of economic enterprises. This has been complemented by a long series of illicit dealings during privatisation of the public sector.
>
> Supporters of privatisation claim that it is a solution to deteriorating economic performance and corruption in the state sector and that it is now under way worldwide, so that Egypt cannot buck a global trend. Opponents insist that it has been imposed on indebted countries by international financial powers for the latter's bene t, and that wide implementation does not mean that it is the right solution in Egyptian circumstances – or indeed in developing countries in general. privatisation has nonetheless gone ahead, involving some of the most advanced public-sector companies and accompanied by high levels of corruption in which assets have been sold at levels which massively undervalue companies involved (El-Mahdi & Marfleet 2009).

Understandably, corruption has also been identified as fostering regime opposition, particularly Islamist movements in Egypt (Aly & Wenner 1982), but also leading up to the 2011 events (Lim 2012). The developments of post-2011 do not bode for optimism: an extensive report by Transparency International highlights how corruption exists in a number of different fields across Egypt's socio-economic and political spheres: *petty corruption*, or bribe-paying by Egyptian citizens for services, is quite common; *grand corruption* involves nepotism, and the use of corrupt practices to obtain a variety of licences or permits, as well as to secure government contracts; *political corruption* results from the lack of public finances oversight, and revolves around clientalistic networks, vote-buying, and the long-standing bonds between the military and the political in Egypt. Specific sectors within Egypt also face corruption challenges, including the military, the policy and the justice system (Transparency International 2015).

A number of actions have been taken since 2011 in order to tackle the issue of corruption, building on earlier legislation such as the 2002 Anti-Money Laundering Law. Interim President Adly Mansour issued an anti-corruption law for government officials in November 2013, imposing legal measures and sanctions for violators. The Central Audit Organisation, which

issues around 30,000 reports each year, as the external auditor of Egyptian economic life held a conference in 2014 that highlighted financial violations under President Morsi. The Supreme Election Committee, Egypt's electoral management body, has been tasked with electoral transparency despite a number of reports of electoral irregularities. Smaller offices – such as the National Coordinating Committee for Combating Corruption (est. 2010), the Administrative Control Authority, the Administrative Prosecution Authority, the Illicit Gains Authority, and the Money Laundering Combating Unit are tasked with identifying and fighting corruption across different spheres.

Survey Indices

Figure 30



Note: "The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. It is a composite index – a combination of polls – drawing on corruption-related data collected by a variety of reputable institutions. The index reflects the views of observers from around the world, including experts living and working in the countries and territories evaluated. The indicator Corruption Perception Index – Score refers to the score achieved by each country in a scale of 0-100 where a 0 equals the highest level of perceived corruption and 100 equals the lowest level of perceived corruption" (Lomazzi & Abbott 2016).

The perception of corruption in government has been in decline since 2013, albeit remaining at very high levels. This corresponds to the academic literature's early identification of corruption as a longstanding issue that the Egyptian state has had to battle with, but one that became even more prominent with the rise of economic inequality and uncertainty in the post-*Infitah* era. While little literature examines corruption in the post-2013 era, one explanation for the relative decline in perceptions of corruption might be the renewed popular faith in the military regime led by al-Sisi in the aftermath of Morsi's ousting from political power.

That said, the Egyptian public has traditionally identified corruption as a major problem for the country. According to Transparency International's 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, 5% of respondents argued that corruption had decreased a lot over the previous two years (Transparency International 2013). Yet, 80% of respondents still declared that the media was corrupt, or very corrupt. Similar views were held for the medical and health services (73%), the

police (78%), and public officials and civil servants (76%). Similarly, the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report for 2014-15 indicates that corruption is the fifth most significant obstacle to Egyptian business life, following political and policy instability (World Economic Forum 2014).

These survey results do not correspond to a model of democratic transition, which would expect shifts in popular perceptions of corruption; rather, it seems to support the thesis of versatile authoritarianism, given the sustained levels of perceived corruption since 2009.

Figure 31



Note: The index of justifiable actions is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of the following two indicators: someone accepting a bribe; and cheating on taxes.

In 2001 86.4% of the people believed that it is never justifiable to accept a bribe or cheat on taxes, while in 2011 81.05% shared the same belief. The high percentage of the population believing in the importance of corruption should not come as a surprise to anyone familiar with Egyptian politics, given the extent to which the literature has identified corruption as a key aspect of citizens' interaction with the state. In this sense, corruption constitutes a justifiable action given that no other alternative exists. The small decrease in the people's belief of corruption as justifiable can be linked to the overall optimism that the 2011 events would change Egypt, and eliminate the importance of *wasta* in citizens' daily lives.

While these results give ground to a belief on a democratic transition or, at the very least, a change in the political system of Egypt, this is not fully corroborated by other studies. According to Transparency International's 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, corruption is a daily part of Egyptians' life post-2011: polled at their behaviour over the previous two years, 18% of respondents reported paying a bribe to the judiciary; 38% had paid a bribe to the police; 25% had paid a bribe to the education services; and 39% had paid a bribe to the Registry & Permit Services (Transparency International 2013).

Macro Indicators

Figure 32



Note: The Corruption Perception Index (Score) by Transparency International is the most established measure of perceptions of corruption. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. It is a composite index – a combination of polls – drawing on corruption-related data collected by a variety of reputable institutions. The index reflects the views of observers from around the world, including experts living and working in the countries and territories evaluated. The indicator Corruption Perception Index – Score refers to the score achieved by each country in a scale of 0-100 where a 0 equals the highest level of perceived corruption and 100 equals the lowest level of perceived corruption (Lomazzi & Abbott 2016).

While Egypt has a relatively strong legal framework to prevent and stifle corruption, there is significant difficulty in the implementation of existing legislation. At the same time, as has been identified in the literature, corruption constitutes a main characteristic of Egyptian political life, and citizens' daily interactions with the Egyptian state – in this perceived continuity, the model that expects Egypt to undergo a democratic transition is not justifiable.

It is interesting to notice that this index on the perception of corruption gives different results compared with the index based on WVS data. Transparency International argues that:

> It is challenging to assess whether the level of corruption has increased or declined in the country due to the rapidly changing context, but it is generally admitted that political corruption remains a major problem in Egypt with clientelistic networks playing a central role both in politics and in the economy. Corruption in the country's law enforcement agencies severely undermines the rule of law, and some recent abusive trials give the impression that the judiciary has become politicised.
>
> Egypt has a relatively strong legal framework to prevent and stifle corruption, despite the notable lack of a comprehensive anti-corruption law, freedom of information law and whistleblower protection. The most important problem lies in the implementation of existing legislation. There are numerous institutions playing a role in fighting corruption, but their lack of coordination creates confusion and overlapping responsibilities. On anti- corruption day 2014, the government announced the launch of an anti-corruption strategy (Transparency International 2015).

Figure 33



Note: The control of corruption index, prepared by Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. The index is built using survey data and information from institutional sources.

Controlling corruption in Egypt certainly arduous, particularly given the extent to which the Egyptian political system itself has historically been dependent on corrupt practices. The changes observed in the control of corruption between 2005 and 2008 take place after what was then called the 2005 'Cairo Spring' – a series of administrative and institutional reforms that supposedly promises 'democratisation' and a blow to corrupt practices, but clearly failed on both counts. Corruption remains a deeply problematic issue in Egypt, and popular perceptions clearly reflect the endemic nature of the problem. Other sources concur in this diagnosis. The 2016 Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom identified corruption as pervading "all levels of government, and official mechanisms for investigating and punishing it are very weak. Like its predecessors, the el-Sisi administration is not transparent about government operations and budgeting" (The Heritage Foundation 2016). Similarly, the 2015 Freedom House report on Egypt acknowledges that "Corruption is pervasive at all levels of government. […] Official mechanisms for investigating and punishing corrupt behavior remain very weak, and the major revelations and prosecutions that emerged after Mubarak's ouster in 2011 have faltered since the 2013 coup" (Freedom House 2015).

Although some analysts still believe some degree of corruption is necessary to 'oil the wheels' of growth, there is increasing evidence that this is not the case, and that corruption – particularly on a massive and systematic scale such as Egypt's – constitutes a significant obstacle to growth. In terms of its relation to political regimes and their transformations, corruption on the one hand provides a crucial part of the informal leverage clientelistic relations rely on, but on the other hand, precisely as a drag on the economy and an implicit 'tax' on citizens, it diminishes a government's ability to deliver effectively on citizens' expectations. As such, whether corruption helps or hinders an authoritarian or hybrid political regime depends to some extent on the magnitude of the phenomenon. Certainly, corruption was a visible target of popular protest both in Egypt and in other countries in which Uprisings took place. However,

large-scale corruption entails by definition systematically disattending the rule of law, and as such is antithetical to democracy or transitions towards it.

Human Rights

'Human Rights' have in practice been equated with civil and political rights by scholarly literature on political transformations. Given the project's analytical strategy of starting by taking existing frameworks at face value in order to evaluate their claims – and the frameworks themselves – this section accepts this bias, exploring social and economic rights separately.

Within the literature on political systems and transformations, the status of Human Rights in a country has often been used as a proxy for distinguishing formal and substantial democracies. Orthodox Democratisation models have historically focused on the liberal dimensions of liberal democracy, prioritising the defence of 'freedom' – in both political and economic terms – as the most important dimension of democracy. Other more critical approaches emphasised instead the importance of protecting a broader range of civil and political freedoms and rights in order to enable democratic governance. Scales of political repression and human rights violation have been used in Democratisation and Hybrid Regimes literature as a parameter for distinguishing formal and substantial democratic states. Conversely, among the criteria commonly used to classify Authoritarian states there is their repression of political and civil liberties and human rights. Brittle Authoritarianism model offers a deeper understanding of how this repression, and the systematic political violence deployed by elites in several post-uprising trajectories, can be related to their decreasing legitimacy, resulting in a further limitation of human rights and freedoms for the population.

Culturalist positions – emphasising the religious or ethnic 'essence' of the region's socio-political systems – provide an interesting prism through which to read not only scholarly trends but also their deployment in political debates. Area Studies and postcolonial scholarship on human rights, for example, have emphasised issues such as the narrowness of liberal approaches favoured by Western governments (excluding social, economic and cultural rights, for example). In parallel, the Arab League and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) have resisted the call to respect civil and political rights partly by appealing precisely to the same kind of culturally essentialist Orientalist scholarship in both Middle East Studies and in Political science which critical scholarship had challenged. In 2004, for example, the Arab League adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights. Compared to previous versions, the 2004 Charter was more progressive and inclusive, but was still inconsistent with international standards. In terms of political rights, and more specifically of the right to vote and to form political parties, several Arab countries in the last decades progressively adopted multi-party electoral systems. At the same time, the debate over political freedoms and human rights has grown in parallel with the development of the more formal political sphere, and in connection with a variety of social and cultural issues, although after 2011 this process suffered a setback in several MENA countries.

As far as data is concerned, along with economics and security, human rights receive the lion's share of the attention to empirical measurement. This focus reflects scholarship's 'liberal' focus on civil, political, gender and minority rights, paying attention to questions such as non-survey indexes and survey-based perceptions of respect for human rights; political freedom; freedom to join political parties; freedom to protest; freedom of expression; press freedom; gender rights; minority rights.

Egypt

In Egypt, human rights defence evolved in parallel with the history of social movements and political activism. After decades of political activism, especially developed in university environments, during Mubarak's time in power human rights groups began to form a coalition of NGOs especially aimed at exposing human rights abuses at the hands of the security apparatus (Hynek 2016). These groups sought to provide a counter-narrative to the common discourse of the Mubarak regime that aimed to keep issues of abuse and accountability hidden (Morayef 2015). Notable human rights organisations – e.g. the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, the Arab Network for Human Rights Information – worked within the framework of international human rights law with the aim of applying this global mandate locally.

Over the last decade, the voice of Egyptian human rights groups and organisation also reached a new national and international resonance, thanks to the spread of digital media and networks. From the end of the Nineties, Egyptian political bloggers played an important role in reporting about Mubarak regime's human rights violations. These new digital tools, combined with well-established regional television channels, played a key role for activists groups before and during the 2011 protests, enabling them to access independent information and to share mobilisation calls - among others see (El-Nawawy & Khamis 2013; Sarnelli 2013). As for older media, both state and private national television and newspapers in Egypt, with a few exceptions, continued to be heavily influenced by regime power after 2011, particularly by the military (Issawi & Cammaerts 2015). After the coup, the military regime largely used national media to delegitimize opponents, including human rights movements, framing them as foreign (often Western) infiltrators.

The intervention of international organisations and foreign states in Human Rights promotion is surely controversial and has been largely debated (Landolt 2013), especially as it was developed in parallel with the support to authoritarian regimes. In Egypt, with the ouster of Hosni Mubarak, the U.S. policy of aid to the Egyptian regime came into the international spotlight. Focusing on a set of votes taken in the U.S. Parliament from 2004 to 2007, Berger (Berger 2012) highlighted the central role of defence lobbies in shielding Egypt's pre-revolutionary regime from increased U.S. pressure despite its clear power abuses. During the 2011 revolution though, human rights slogans were not chanted only by secularists and liberals, sympathetic with a supposedly westernised, international legal framework: the 'human rights lexicon' became instead a uniting and instrumental theme for other opposition movements with differing visions, including the Muslim Brothers (M. Tadros 2012). After 2011, a shifting power dynamic took place between competing institutional and ideological bodies, but human rights activists and organisations could no longer be silenced without alienating much of the revolutionary youth (Hynek 2016). The opening, however, was short-lived, and five years on there has been no real change. The August 2015 counter-terrorism law limited constitutional freedom of expression by giving prosecutors power to detain without judicial review on issues related to national security and terrorism (Atlantic Council 2015). In fact, 'terrorism' is used by the new Egyptian authorities as a very broad category, tending to criminalize civil disobedience and social movements (Human Rights Watch 2015), with a worsening of measures already started under Morsi government (Han 2016). The recent arrest of human rights activists and journalists illustrates a growing crackdown on freedom of expression, which impedes the right to communicate information without fear of detention over ambiguous causes related to national interests and stability. As for the freedom of assembly, the constitution gives citizens the right to assemble, march and demonstrate peacefully *if* they provide notification as

stipulated by the law, thus preventing spontaneous demonstrations. In November 2013 a new law was put forward which even restricts this right, indicating that protest organisers must receive prior authorisation from – as opposed to mere notification to – authorities, and that allowance may only be granted after a series of bureaucratic hoops are negotiated (The Right to Freedom of Assembly 2014). Moreover, security forces dispersing any unauthorised protests are *ex ante* granted permission to use force.

Since July 2013, according to Amnesty International (Amnesty International 2015), over 41,000 people have been arrested or sentenced. This crackdown conducted under the aegis of 'national security' include the mass imprisonment of those even loosely affiliated with the Muslim Brothers, arrest and intimidation of any anti-regime opposition voices, allegations of continued torture, lack of healthcare in prisons, arbitrary arrests, trials with scant or fabricated evidence, and enforced disappearances. The recent pressure put by the regime also on Egyptian and international academics and intellectuals, and in particular the shocking case of the torture and death of Italian PhD researcher Giulio Regeni, constitutes deeply disturbing evidence of new 'red lines' being drawn by the regime – or at least parts of it – to strike fear in those intending to research opposition movements.

Survey Indices

Figure 34

Note: we used a cleaned version of the data for the World Values Survey (WVS) question on the "perception for individual human rights nowadays". The graph refers to the number of respondents who believe there is a "great deal of respect" or "Fairly much respect" for individual human rights. N.B. the last data-point has been coded as "2011" to compare it with data with other surveys but the fieldwork for WVS wave 6 in Egypt actually took place between March and April 2012 (Lomazzi & Abbott 2016).

According to World Values Survey data, the perception of respect for individual human rights in Egypt has dramatically dropped from 71.2% in 2001 to 27.2% in 2011. This might be explained on the one hand by an actual increase in human rights violations, especially operated by the regime, trying to repress a growing discontent among the population that became more and more visible through demonstrations, strikes and other kinds of collective actions. Although the

regime targets particularly political demonstrators, the invasiveness of its police force also effect the whole population. In everyday living ordinary people – such as vendors at markets, taxi drivers – are subjected to policing techniques that arbitrarily detain people, ask to see their ID card, beat them and humiliate them, and often require bribes of one form or another. Everyday police brutality already characterised the Mubarak era, and the 2011 Revolution was also against it (Ismail 2012).

On the other hand, the fact that the respect of human rights is seen more critically than before could also be due to the growing activity of social groups and organisations working to raise the awareness around this issue, and to the increasing number of citizens recording and spreading through internet-based media visual evidence of the regime's violence and corruption. This growing available documentation on systematic human rights violations, disseminated by political activists and NGOs members on a national and international level, may have contributed to create a new collective perception of the widespread dimension of human rights' abuses by the regime, resonating with people's personal experiences. In addition, the attempts to repress protests which took place during 2011 Revolution, and then again the protests during late summer and autumn 2011 against the military regime's stalling the transition process are both likely to have worsened both the perception of human rights violations and the actual record of violations.

This could also lead to two different interpretations of the data in relation to the theoretical models presented above. On the one hand, the perceived critical condition of human rights in the country could support the view that the neo-authoritarian Egyptian state is reinforcing its oppressive measures, and the more it loses control over its population, the more violence escalates, as in the classical fierce/brittle state model (Ayubi 1995). On the other hand, it could also be seen as a consolidation of democratic values among the population, which are becoming increasingly widespread in the country despite their repression by an authoritarian state trying to oppose change by all means, or a consequence of increased popular anti-regime mobilisation expected during 'opening' and particularly 'transition' phases in orthodox democratisation models.

Figure 35



Note: The Political Freedom index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of the following two indicators from Arab Barometer survey: (1) people are free to criticize government without fear; (2) is the lack of respect for human rights for security purposes is justified. The values were computed in a 100 points scale, but for the second indicator were reversed (100 = lack of human rights for security purposes is never justified).

From 2011 to 2013 there is a slight decline in the people's perceptions of political freedoms from 81.15% in 2011 to 79.7% in 2013. The marginality of this decline suggests it is not statistically significant. However, it may reflect the passage from the moment of political opening started with the 2011 revolution, to the escalation of tension following the election of Mohamed Morsi (June 2012) and the military coup (July 2013). The Arab Barometer data included in this index were collected in Egypt between March and April 2013, before the army coalition lead by Abdel Fattah El-Sisi removed Morsi from power (July 3rd), but the several violent clashes between pro- and anti-government demonstrators during the previous months were already introducing a more polarised political environment, and from very early on during its time in power the Brotherhood sought to delegitimise and demobilise the 'revolutionaries'. Moreover, this transition phase between the end of the Morsi government and the new military regime was also characterised by a security vacuum in the country, leading many to fear for their safety – a climate of rising insecurity that might have influenced people's perception of political freedom.

These data could be read as a confirmation of Authoritarian Resilience theories, where the reinforcement of the authoritarian power goes along with a progressive reduction of the political freedoms allowed to the population. However, if this were the case, either the authoritarian consolidation in question would be marginal or the loss of political freedom with the emergence of the Sisi regime is marginal – both hypotheses are extremely unlikely on the face of other evidence.

It is important to emphasise that while 2011-13 is the period of greatest turmoil after the bloody post-coup repression of the opposition, it is also a period of unparalleled mobilisation and – comparatively – freedom of political expression. ArabBarometer data above was collected in June-July 2013, just before the coup, which may explain the lack of perceived change between 2011 and 2013. This may also explain both the high absolute level of the scores and the small/insignificant change. Given that this greater freedom was not consensual – both the regime's various components and conservative forces such as the Brotherhood attempted to close it – this might suggest either an 'opening' as presented in conventional democratisation models, or – particularly given the resulting return to dictatorship – a more or less temporary breakdown in regime resilience closer to the 'brittleness model' derived from Ayubi's observations.

Figure 36



Note: percentage of respondents who agreed with the statement that the "Freedom to join political parties" is one of the freedoms guaranteed in their country (Arab Barometer survey, waves 2 and 3).

A sharp decline in people's perception of the freedom to join political parties emerges from Arab Barometer data collected in 2011 and 2013. The percentage of people agreeing that this freedom is granted in Egypt went in fact from 89.3% in 2011 to only 65% in 2013. This decline is probably related on the one hand to the parliamentary elections held between November 28th, 2011, and January 11th, 2012, and on the other hand to the increasingly marked political polarisation experienced in the wake of the first free presidential elections, in May 2012, marginally won by Mohamed Morsi – the candidate of the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party – in a run-off with merely 51.73% of the vote against Ahmad Shafiq, an Air Force general who had been Mubarak's last Prime Minister during the January Revolution. The vote swung in Morsi's favour not least because some 'revolutionaries' preferred the Brotherhood candidate, despite its conservativism and its dislike of revolutionaries, believing any change would be better than a return of the old regime Shafiq represented.

During the year after the January Revolution, Egypt witnessed the period of greatest freedom in party formation and political participation in the country's history: after protesters extracted presidential and parliamentary elections from Egypt's military rulers, the country saw a flourishing of political activity and debate over programmes and alliances, especially in advance of parliamentary elections. The parliamentary elections themselves were widely regarded as the country's freest and fairest. The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist Nour Party dominated the new parliament combined with both the military's and then newly elected President Morsi's repression of dissent contributed to shutting down that period of openness and activity (voter turnout data at successive elections suggests a similar pattern). The year that followed the presidential elections and culminating in the military coup was characterised by a progressive polarisation of the political climate, in which the pro-Brotherhood and anti-Brotherhood cleavage became increasingly important displacing the pro-revolutionary vs. pro-restoration cleavage.

It is this trajectory that probably influenced attitudes of ordinary citizens, who perceived increasing pressures or risks related to joining political parties and organisations. This decline in

people's perception of the freedom to join political parties could be seen as another step towards the consolidation of a neo-authoritarian state, with a stronger hold on the population. In this sense, this trend might have anticipated the military coup that came later in 2013, and the perception of the freedom to join political parties has likely declined further since then.

Figure 37



Note: percentage of respondents who agreed with the statement that participating in peaceful protests and demonstrations is one of the freedoms guaranteed in their country (Arab Barometer survey, waves 2 and 3) as cleaned by ArabTrans Project)..

People's perception of their freedom to protests in peaceful demonstrations tracks the data regarding freedom to join political parties, dramatically decreasing from 93.6% in June-July 2011 to 64.7% in April 2013. The value for freedom to protest in 2011 is most likely influenced by the particular moment Egypt was going through: Arab Barometer data was collected June 16 – July 3, 2011, before the country's new military rulers' reputation began to ware off, when the SCAF government was still perceived as being at east open to 'revolutionaries': by the end of the summer there would be increasing protests against military rule and against the use of military trials against civilians in particular, but at this juncture the military is still relatively open and is still given the benefit of the doubt by anti-Mubarak groups. With increasing repression and no timeline to parliamentary or presidential elections and handing over power to a civilian administration, the shine came off SCAF rule by the end of summer 2011, particularly with the so-called 'Maspero Incident' in which tens or protesters were run over by army vehicles, and the two years that followed were marked by political tensions and by repeated violent clashes in street demonstrations – between revolutionary protesters and military establishment first, then between Morsi government supporters and opponents, until the military coup of 2013. After July 2013, when Abdel Fattah El-Sisi established himself as Egypt supreme leader, further institutional measures were put forward in order to discourage as much as possible ordinary citizens to take part in spontaneous demonstrations. The November 2013 law (Presidency in Egypt 2013), indicating that protest organisers must receive prior authorisation from authorities, introduced new substantial obstacles for political initiatives, while at the same time the security apparatus was granted formal permission to use force to disperse all unauthorised protests.

Figure 38



Note: the graph shows the percentage of respondents who agreed with the Arab Barometer question (included in waves 2 and 3 of the survey) asking if "People are free to criticize government without fear".

While the decline is not as dramatic as with the freedom to protest or to join parties, the perception of freedom of expression in Egypt follows the same pattern as these basic rights. In 2011, 92.1% believed that people were free to criticize government without fear, while in 2013 87.8% shared the same belief. This relative difference could be due to the fact that, compared with joining political parties or taking part to physical protests and demonstrations, freedom of expression can involve also activities exposing citizens less directly to state control – e.g. using alternative media, blogs and websites, national and international networks. At the same time, a four point decline does chime with other data suggesting that a significant change was taking place between 2011 and 2013, anticipating the neo-authoritarian restoration that followed the July 2013 military coup. Egypt's new constitution, adopted in a 2014 referendum, in theory enshrines freedom of expression, which was such a powerful demand of the 2011 revolution, but its application is far from straightforward. In practice, data such as these suggest that intra-elite splits that made Mubarak's removal possible had not translated an 'opening' into a 'transitional' phase in the way orthodox democratization approaches expect, but rather that authoritarian elites were again closing in. It is not possible to speak of a cycle of 'decompression' and 'compression' since in fact the regime did not remain unchanged and consciously manipulating a political opening to relieve pressure, but rather the regime's internal balance had ruptured significantly with the '18 days' of the revolution. Rather, since the country's underlying economic profile had not changed (it was 'merely' experiencing a sharp fall in tourism revenues) and since the political sphere was again 'closing' it could at best be said that the (new/old) regime's structural weaknesses had not been addressed, leaving its underlying vulnerability to popular mobilisation unchanged. As such, this security clampdown restricting the freedom to protest among others, could be seen as a support for the "fierce state" argument (Ayubi 1995), in which the massive use of military and police forces comes to substitute other more indirect forms of authority and legitimacy.

Figure 39



Note: The graph shows respondents' answers to Gallup World Poll question "Media in this country have freedom?" (% of people who agreed with the statement).

The popular perception of the freedom of the press is that it has been steadily increasing since 2010 with some slight decline after 2013. The 2014 constitution contained guarantees for free expression of opinions and freedom of the press, as well as a prohibition on censorship. However, this move has not inaugurated a period of open political debate in Egypt; instead, the pressure from the government has gradually increased over independent or opposition media. Although direct censorship of the media in Egypt ended in 1971, it was replaced by a widespread system of self-censorship, regime co-optation and control of key media figures, vaguely-worded laws criminalizing incitement, defamation and rumour-mongering, and especially of a state of emergency which gave authorities extensive powers for arbitrary detentions. With the 2011 revolution, this system was disrupted, and mass protest changed news agendas for a while, introducing sensitive topics such as security forces abuses, arbitrary detentions and torture, and the tone was often unsympathetic to (former) regime figures. In June 2012, the state of emergency was finally lifted, but it was imposed again from the military in July 2013, until November. In November 2013, new measures on terrorism and civil association were introduced, making ordinary many of the powers previously under the Emergency Law.

After the coup, a new system of control of the media were put in place, targeting primary print and broadcast media through a mix of repression and co-optation. Among some of the most noticeable cases of repression there was the shutdown of Islamist channels, including Muslim Brotherhood's *Misr25* in July 2013, and the arrest of four Al-Jazeera International journalists December of the same year (released two years later). The higher perception of freedom of the press might be due to the fact that many of the topics that became popular during the 2011 revolution are still debated, and that news websites, social media and blogs in particular still carry a variety of alternative news and analysis. In addition, the as yet unconsolidated nature of the regime still permits a degree of variety and dissent within mainstream media given the differential linkages between media and political patrons.

Despite the relative liveliness of alternative media sources, the present state of the media in Egypt seems to support the view that a neo-authoritarian system is consolidating. Apart from arresting journalists when covering protests in the street – under the 2013 Protest law, journalists are no longer protected by their professional status – or using financial and social pressures, the regime also targets well-known figures to intimidate the profession as a whole. In May 2016 the arrest of the head of the Egyptian Press Syndicate and two colleagues was defined by Amnesty International as "an alarming setback for freedom of expression and the most brazen attack on the media the country witnessed in decades" (Amnesty International 2016).

The relative lack of change in popular perceptions of press freedom is particularly striking given the 'closure' of the media environment and its alignment with the new regime after the 2013 coup. The stark discrepancy between popular perception outlined through survey data and specialists' analysis epitomised by Amnesty International and Reporters Without Borders might indicate the effectiveness of regime propaganda in this area, but it also suggests that there may be conditions under which closure – rather than a movement from opening to transition – can be masked to popular perception, and that a return to more authoritarian conditions will not be readily perceived at a popular level.

Figure 40



Note: The ArabTrans gender rights index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of the following three indicators from Arab Barometer survey: (1) a woman can become prime minister or president of a Muslim state; (2) a married woman can work outside the home; (3) University is more important for a boy than for a girl (% of people who agreed with these statements).

Despite the widespread participation of women to the Revolution that ousted Mubarak, after 2011 there is sharp decline in perceptions of gender rights. This is likely related to the way women participating in public protests and events have been targeted by security forces – both before and after the 2013 coup – and used by the new rulers as a symbol of the restoration of authoritarian power (Zaki 2015; Pratt 2016). The clearest demonstration of this attitude was the use of so-called "virginity tests." The first infamous episode occurred already in March 2011, when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) cleared Tahrir Square of protesters,

detaining 18 women, 17 of whom were then beaten, tortured, strip-searched in front of male soldiers, and forced to undergo this humiliating and violent practice, only to be then threatened with prostitution charges if found not to be virgins (Amnesty International 2011). Female activists were also singled out and targeted in other ways: the so-called 'Blue Bra Girl' was stopped, beaten and stripped in broad daylight by army forces, and Shaimaa al-Sabbagh was shot in the back with birdshot by police while carrying flowers to a peaceful demonstration, dying in her partner's arms in full view of the media. These discriminatory and patriarchal practices, carried out in the most spectacular and public manner, were clearly aimed at discouraging women's full participation in the reform process – as well as smearing the reputation of the 'revolutionaries' as a whole – and strongly limited their inclusion in newly-formed institutions.

Less 'institutionalised' types of sexual violence, particularly carried out in public spaces, also continues to be an effective deterrent to women's participation. During street demonstrations from 2011 to 2014 several women were attacked and gang raped. Few of these cases have been publicly denounced, and an even smaller number persecuted. While being largely responsible – directly or indirectly – for these attacks, the new-established military regime made several moves aiming to portraying itself as intending to protect women's right. The most relevant is probably the law issued in June 2014 that for the first time defined and outlawed sexual harassment and set escalating penalties for different offenses (Court Of Cassation 2014). As always, the letter of the law and its implementation are often very different matters. In addition, there is still no law criminalising domestic violence, nor other forms of violence against women which are widespread in some areas of the country, such as child marriage and female genital mutilation, while personal status laws in Egypt continues to discriminate against women in relation to marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. As Pratt recently commented, "'pro-women' policies of President El-Sisi and his supporters do not aim to liberate Egyptian women but rather to co-opt them within a new patriarchal bargain. Women who are obedient to the new regime are deemed worthy of the state's protection" (Pratt 2015). In this sense, gender issues are strongly related to the broader question of freedom of protest and expression, as women are only "selectively protected" within the new strictly defined limits of political and social life (Pratt 2016). In a resolution on Egypt adopted in January 2015, the European Parliament acknowledged that "violence against women is reported to be worsening, in spite of the adoption of a new law on sexual harassment, whose application remains to be observed… whereas Egyptian female activists are in a particularly vulnerable situation and are often subject to violence, sexual assaults and other forms of degrading treatment in relation to their peaceful activities" (European Parliamemt 2015).

The regime's combination of violence against women and a rhetoric of their protection clearly aims to – and certainly has the effect of – discouraging women's participation in protests that could support the move towards what orthodox approaches to democratization call 'opening' or 'consolidation', and as such contributes to closing avenues of (democratic) political participation and retrenching authoritarian rule. To the degree that this comes without solutions capable of addressing structural conditions in Egypt, however, suggests that this authoritarian retrenchment may be brittle and does not indicate the regime having a socio-politically hegemonic position. In the specific context of gender politics in Egypt, however, the degree to which patriarchal norms remain entrenched suggests that in this context at least the regime can rely on a socially accepted and perhaps hegemonic discourse.

Figure 41



Note: the graph refers to Arab Barometer questions: "In a Muslim country, non-Muslims should enjoy fewer political rights" (waves 2 and 3). It shows the percentage of people who agreed with the statement, in a 100 points scale but reversed (higher values= higher support for minorities' political rights).

From 2011 to 2013 the support for minorities' political rights has fallen, with more people answering that in a Muslim country, non-Muslims should enjoy fewer political rights. This changing attitude goes along with the social and political tensions that shaped the post-revolutionary years, particularly marked by confrontations between pro- and anti-Islamist government demonstrators, and also included tragic clashes between Christian Copts – the only substantial religious minority in the country – and security forces or Salafists. In August 2013, following the July 2013 coup and clashes between the military and Morsi supporters, there were widespread attacks on Coptic churches and institutions. Several Egyptian human rights associations joined forces to urge both Muslim Brotherhood and government forces to stop incitements against the Copts (Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights 2013). The emphasis on Muslim identity, used both from Morsi government and by the present regime in different ways, and the oppression of the Copts, show how the neo-Authoritarian regime tries to ignore cultural and political pluralism to promote a monolithic version of national identity to support its rule.

Interfaith solidarity had been on the contrary one of the hallmarks of the January Revolution – famously displayed when Copts protected Muslims at prayer during clashes against security forces. This solidarity was significant particularly because one of the classic instruments used by the former regime for both domestic and international consumption was precisely to simultaneously permit ongoing low-level violence against Copts while simultaneously presenting itself both to them and to Western governments as protectors of that same community, co-opting religious leaderships in order to consolidate that image. The significance of young Copts' refusal to obey the Church's instructions not to participate in the January 25th protests was precisely to undermine the regime's claim to 'protect' them (just as could be said about women's role in calling for and participating in the uprising).

Figure 42



Note: this minority rights index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of the following two indicators from Gallup World Poll: (1) "the area is a good place to live for immigrants"; (2) "the area is a good place to live for Racial/Ethnic Minorities". It shows the percentage of people who answered positively.

As a result of the ongoing civil wars and political turmoil in several countries in the MENA region, the total number of refugees residing in Egypt went from 95,056 in 2010 to 236,090 in 2014 (World Bank 2016b). According to the UN Refugee Agency though, this growing numbers are not easily integrated within Egyptian society, partly because they tend to use Egypt as a transit country, and partly because of the harsh treatment they receive from Egyptian authorities. In the last three years, according to UNHCR, an increasing number of asylum-seekers and refugees were arrested and detained for irregular departure from Egypt. Moreover, only refugees of certain nationalities had access to the public primary health care system and education institutions, and only a part of them can be absorbed in public schools due to the lack of capacity of Egyptian education facilities (UNHRC 2015). A 2013 Amnesty International report on Syrian refugees in Egypt depicted an even more dramatic picture, describing heavy discriminations and human right violations, including verbal attacks and threats in the media and by public figures, arbitrary arrests, unlawful detention and – in some cases – expulsion (Amnesty International 2013). In addition to Syrian refugees, there is also a significant number of Sudanese refugees and migrants in Egypt, and several episodes of xenophobia against them have been registered in the country, where in general discrimination against sub-Saharan Africans is generally is very strong (Habib 2016).

Despite an evident trend towards nationalist xenophobia, nurtured not least by successive regimes as a palliative for domestic socio-economic and political problems, the data above seem to show that the reality of life for migrants or members of racial/ethnic minority and the perception of Egyptians towards this are clearly different. A new anti-human smuggling law approved by the Egyptian cabinet in November 2015 has been praised by the International Organisation for migration as "in line with international standards", as it stipulates "imprisonment and substantial fines for smugglers and accomplices" but at the same time it "does not criminalize irregular migrants", and "obliges the State to provide protection in line

with Egypt's international obligations" (IOM 2015) Given the government's previous record, this might be an important legal provision, but its implementation should not be taken for granted.

Macro Indicators

Figure 43



Note: the graph shows the score of political freedom indicators from Freedom House. The rating adopted by FH goes from 1 (completely free) to 7 (completely oppressed).

Egypt has consistently received a rating of 6 in Freedom House's index, indicating that it has very restricted political rights. This score is generally attributed to countries that are ruled by a single party government, military dictatorships, religious hierarchies or autocrats. The countries included in this category "may allow a few political rights, such as some representation or autonomy for minority groups" (Freedom House 2014). It should be noted that what was called at the time the 'Cairo Spring' of 2005, in which Mubarak permitted small *de jure* constitutional reforms permitting nominally competitive presidential elections (Mubarak's opponent was later jailed) and a quota for female MPs in Parliament, produced no effect on Egypt's 2005 ranking.

Only for 2012 Egypt was rated 5, a score indicating in FH scale that the country "either moderately protects almost all political rights or strongly protect some political rights while neglecting others" (Freedom House 2014). This change in Egypt's score corresponds with the first multi-party elections and competitive presidential elections held in 2012, and more broadly with the political opening that followed the 2011 Revolution and preceded the 2013 military coup. The fact that according to Freedom House Egypt's higher (or lower according to the scale) point in terms of political freedoms corresponds to the year of the elections confirms the priority this organization gives to of formal democracy parameters, alongside with to most orthodox and neo-liberal democratization models (Giannone 2010). These parameters do not always correspond to citizens' views or lived experiences. As emerged from data shown at the beginning of this section, Egyptian citizens perceived instead a sharp decline in political rights from 2011 to 2013. It seems then that according to the citizen's understanding of politics and democracy, the higher moment of political freedom corresponded to the 2011 revolution, followed by new unsatisfactory, violent or repressive forms of institutional politics.

Figure 44



Note: Freedom House rates countries according their level of freedom with regard to the citizens' civil liberties. The rate goes from 1 (freest) to 7 (least free).

From 2001 to 2003 Egypt was rated 6, corresponding to a category of countries allowing for very restricted civil liberties (Freedom House 2014). This could be related to the political repression that prepared and followed the 2000 elections in the country and the repression of protests against the Second Intifada in 2000-2001, with a clampdown on political opposition and particularly on politicians affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. After the September 11 attacks in the United States, fear of Islamic terrorism gave the government of Hosni Mubarak a new justification – and new international support – to suppress its opposition (Freedom House 2002).

Since 2004, though, Egypt was rated instead with a 5 indicating that either moderately protects almost all civil liberties or strongly protects some civil liberties while neglecting others. A partial explanation of this could be the gradual loosening of Mubarak's control over Egyptian society, and parallel rising of political and social movements questioning the authority of the regime.

While during 1990s, with the ongoing confrontation between the regime and Islamist militants, public gatherings and street protests were banned and trade unions put under strict government control, after the Palestinian intifada broke out in September 2000 a new phase started for the expression of political and social dissent. When tens of thousands of Egyptians took to the streets for demonstrations in solidarity with the Palestinians, these protests soon gained an anti-regime dimension. Another international event with a high national resonance was the outbreak of the war in Iraq in 2003, which resulted in a crowded demonstration in Cairo and clashes with the police. Building on these experiments, in 2004 the *Kefaya* movement started to question directly the persistence of the Egyptian regime, followed by the strikes in Mahalla in 2006 and the 6th April campaign in 2008, until the 2011 Revolution. All these events, together with many other smaller-scale movements and campaigns, were partially repressed by Mubarak's regime, by targeting some of the key figures and activists with arrests, tortures and threats, but the government could not control the collective dimension of the rising dissent.

It is surprising though that Freedom House index did not register any change in the level of civil liberties enjoyed by Egyptian citizens between 2010 and 2011 (the Revolution), or between 2011 and 2013 and beyond, with the repression of civil liberties undertaken both *de jure* and *de facto* operated by the new regime. Once again, it seems that the focus applied by Freedom House on a class of formal civil and political rights cannot reflect the broader dimension of civic and politic participation that took place in Egypt through the revolution and in the transition phase afterwards, before coming under a new repressive regime.

Figure 45



Note: The electoral self-determination index compiled by the CIRI Human Rights Data Project, indicates to what extent citizens enjoy freedom of political choice and the legal right and ability in practice to change the laws and officials that govern them through free and fair elections. A score of 0 indicates that the right to self-determination through free and fair elections did not exist in law or practice; a score of 1 indicates that while citizens had the legal right to self-determination, there were limitations to the fulfilment of this right in practice; a score of 2 indicates that the right of citizens to change their government through free and fair elections is generally respected (Lomazzi & Abbott 2016). If there is not an election during the year being coded, the state is coded based on what the US State Department says about self-determination generally and about the last elections (Cingranelli & Richards 2014).

In the period from 2000 to 2011, Egypt had a score going alternately from 0 to 1. The lower score in 2000 can be related to the clampdown on political opposition and particularly on politicians affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood before the 2000 elections, and resulting in the overwhelming victory of Mubarak's ruling party. After that, a constitutional amendment in May 2005 changed the presidential election to a multicandidate popular vote, rather than having the candidate nominated by a two-thirds majority of the People's Assembly and then approved by a national referendum. The presidential election of 2005 was therefore the first multi-party, multi-candidate presidential election in Egypt, and in September Mubarak was re-elected with 87 per cent of preferences, followed at a distance by Ayman Nour, leader of the liberal Ghad Party with a mere 7 per cent. Shortly after the elections, though, Nour was jailed, and released only in 2009. In the same year also several Brotherhood members also ran for parliament as independents – parties 'with a religious point of reference – remained banned, and the

Brotherhood itself proscribed – garnering the best-ever result of 88 seats (20 per cent of the total).

This result, however, was rapidly followed by a new wave of arrests of Brotherhood members, on account of their success, and the Mubarak regime made sure to prevent its opposition from performing well again in the next elections. The Parliamentary elections held between November and December 2010 were in fact among the most fraudulent in Egypt's history, given the persistence of a framework strongly favouring the ruling party, the lack of international observers, the arrest of opposition figures, the boycott of several opposition groups, and the accuses of frauds and vote buying made by several opposition members who were not allowed to witness the vote-counting process. The elections were followed by several days of street protests, and their results was certainly a factor in the Revolution that started shortly afterwards.

Figure 46



Note: The index prepared by the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project indicates the extent to which the freedoms of assembly and association are subject to actual governmental limitations or restrictions. A score of 0 indicates that citizens' rights to freedom of assembly or association were severely restricted or denied completely to all citizens; a score of 1 indicates that these rights were limited for all citizens or severely restricted or denied for select groups; a score of 2 indicates that the citizens' rights to freedom of assembly and association were virtually unrestricted and freely enjoyed by practically all citizens. (Cingranelli & Richards 2014).

CIRI's indicator measuring freedom of assembly and association in Egypt registered a moderate 'opening' between 2006 and 2008. This could be related to the new constitutional amendments approved in 2007 by Mubarak's government, and meant to be "a step toward democratisation". These were to increase parliamentary powers and political party opportunities, but in reality were not translated in any improvement in terms of political and civic freedoms for the population (Brown et al. 2007). Other significant political events in the same years were the new popular mobilisations– from *Kefaya* to the *April 6th* campaign – which managed to gain public attention online and offline, contributing to expand the space of expression for dissent through the organisation of demonstrations and gathering. These protests were all followed by new phases of regime repression of activists and opposition, although data suggests that there was a significant increase in strikes particularly by independent trade unions in the run-up to 2011.

Interestingly, this 'opening' is not registered by other indicators of political and civil freedoms such as those of Freedom House. In the description of CIRI's indicator is specified in fact that it looks at "right of citizens to assemble freely and to associate with other persons in political parties, trade unions, cultural organizations, or other groups"; moreover, it investigates "the actual practices of governments" rather than the legal protections existing in a country (Cingranelli & Richards 2013). However, given the peak registered in 2007, and not in 2006 or 2008 when popular mobilisations occurred, it seems that the index accounts in this case precisely for the "legal protections" approved by the regime, that is for the new constitutional amendments. In fact, the lower score assigned the following year seems to reflect the lack of implementation – or the lack of "actual practices" – of the new legal protections by the Egyptian government.

Figure 47

Note: this index prepared by Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) aims at capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. The index is built using survey data and information from institutional sources.

The Voice and Accountability index reflect the political openings that occurred in the last fifteen years in Egypt, with a particular attention to the formal political sphere, although it is also partly perception-based, given a component of survey data. The rise indicated in 2005 seems to correspond in fact with the first multi-party presidential and parliamentary elections in the country, under the pressure of international allies like the U.S. (Coffman Wittes 2005), and resulting in a broadening of the political spectrum represented in the parliament, despite continuing intimidation of the opposition. After a negative trend culminating with the 2010 elections, a new increase in voice and accountability perceptions goes from the 2011 Revolution until the peak registered with the 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections, and a decline after the 2013 military coup. The new negative trend registered since 2013 seems to confirm the reinforcement of a neo-Authoritarian regime increasingly attempting to control dissent, including opposition movements and independent media.

Figure 48



Note: The Freedom of Speech variable, prepared by CIRI Human Rights Data Project indicates the extent to which freedoms of speech and press are affected by government censorship, including ownership of media outlets. A score of 0 indicates that government censorship of the media was complete; a score of 1 indicates that there was some government censorship of the media; a score of 2 indicates that there was none government censorship of the media (including radio, TV, internet, and/or domestic news agencies) (Cingranelli & Richards 2014).

The survey-based Freedom of expression showed above (figure 38) showed a negative trend starting from 2011. Although this CIRI indicator is only available until 2011, it registers oscillations that correspond to periods of political openings or mobilizations and phases of repression during the last years of Mubarak regime, as noted for other indicators on political and civil freedoms. In particular, this index suggests that mobilisations occur after freedom of speech is targeted, e.g. the 'Cairo Spring' of 2005, and between the Mahalla al-Kubra protests of 2008 and the January 2011 uprising.

Figure 49



Note: Freedom House's indicator is a score out of 100 (where 0 means totally free) and it is the average of scales regarding newspapers, televisions and other media.

With the exception of 2007 and 2011 when the press freedom status was considered as party free, the level of press freedom in Egypt over the past 15 years has been consistently characterised as not free. The data regarding the period from 2011 to 2013 correspond only partially to the Freedom of the press indicators showed above (Figure 39) and based on survey data from Gallup World Poll. Freedom House indicator however seems to reflect more accurately in this case the new repressive measures against limiting the freedom of the press following the 2013 military coup, as described above, and clearly display the consolidation of an authoritarian and repressive power.

Figure 50



Note: this gender rights index has been compiled by putting together different macro-indicators: V-DEM Women political empowerment index; V-DEM Women civil liberties index; V-DEM Women civil society participation index; V-DEM: Women political participation index. The composite index has been computed as mean of min-max normalized values of the 4 indices, recoded in a 100 points scale.

The scores of Egypt in the gender rights index indicate that the 2010/2011 improvement for gender rights was followed by sharp decline. Still, this decline is less sharp than the one reflected by our other survey-based index above (Figure 40). This could be due to the fact that this composite index based on V-DEM data puts together more dimensions, and explore more specifically the political and civic participation of women, while the previous was more focused on perceptions of women's role in society. In this sense, this graph shows a rise in women civil and political participation during and after the 2011 Revolution, followed by a return to pre-revolutionary scores already at the time of the 2012 elections. This result is also reflected in the very low number of women elected in parliament in 2012, a mere 2% despite the hundreds running, after that the quota of 64 women seats introduced in 2010 was lifted. Most importantly, even considering the 2011 peak, these scores continues to be extremely low, indicating that Egyptian social and political system is still far from favouring women's participation in public life.

Figure 51



Note: The V-DEM: Equal protection index captures the equal protection by the state of rights and freedoms across social groups (Coppedge et al. 2015). The index is scaled between 0-1.

The index shows that in 2010 there is a significant improvement of the situation of the equal protection of rights and freedoms. This could be due to the approval of a new law approved in 2009, and applied to the 2010 elections, that expanded the number of seats in parliament to include 64 extra seats reserved to women. This resulted in the election of a total of 75 women out of a possible 568 members of parliament that is 12.7% of the total. In 2012 elections, though, the number of female representatives decreased dramatically, with 2 per cent of seats won by women (even less than their representation in 1975). This result changed again in 2015, after El-Sisi's government appointed an additional 14 female members. The 89 women in parliament made up 14.9 per cent of the elected members.

Figure 52



Note: The QoG Equal Opportunity index captures the extent to which equality of opportunity exist. The score goes from 1 (denied) to 10 (achieved).

With 1 to 10 possible scores, Egypt has been consistently rated with 4 from 2006 till 2012. This scores indicates that equality of opportunity is not achieved. Women and/or members of ethnic or religious groups have limited access to education, public office and employment. While there are some legal provisions against discrimination in the country, their implementation remains very limited. This index shows that despite the 2011 protests and political turbulences, and the new elected government in 2012, no substantial change has occurred in this field.

These data could support authoritarian resilience perspectives assuming that the 2011 revolution did not impact substantially on the military and political elite ruling the country, and therefore on the living conditions of the Egyptian citizens.

Security

Security is generally understood as the prerequisite for transformations towards democracy, a *sine qua non* for economic growth and political change. This Hobbesian view underplays the normative, political and economic requirements for security and stability, and some would argue it underplays the role of domestic conflict in producing democratisation in consolidated liberal democracies, but is undeniably central to the ways social science has approached the issue of democratisation and or authoritarian resilience. It is, however, deployed quite differently by different models: while democratisation approaches emphasise the importance of minimal security for transition to take place, authoritarian resilience and sometimes hybrid regimes models emphasise the role of security forces in repressing dissent to block political change, while Ayubi's analysis suggests such a use of force may well indicate a weak and brittle regime rather than a hegemonic system in a Gramscian sense or an established authority in a Weberian sense. This suggests that like the monopoly over the use of force, security should be assessed with reference to the legitimacy of and trust in a regime.

Egypt

Egypt has long been characterised as a praetorian republic, with strong nationalist and anti-imperialist ideology and totalitarian security apparatuses. Mäkelä (Mäkelä 2014) states Egypt's *securitocracy* is comprises the following sectors: the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) that uses a system based on conscription; the Republican Guard that is in charge of the president's security; the Police; the Central Security Forces that also use conscripts as an anti-riot force; and the Intelligence community with its three main components, the Egyptian General Intelligence Service, the State Security Investigations Service; and the Military Intelligence Department. Along with the state-monopolised violence, private security companies (PSC) have emerged. Mäkelä argues that these companies can be considered as part of the *securitocracy* because their employees are usually retired police or military officers (Mäkelä 2014).

The Republic of Egypt since its establishment in the 1952 with the success of the Free Officers' coup has been ruled by military officers. The role of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) was undeniably central also after the fall of Hosni Mubarak. The centrality of the military in the emergence of the modern Republic of Egypt has been perpetuated as a narrative and historical reality through education and media (Springborg 2013).

The SCAF runs a sizeable parallel economy. Experts estimate that Egyptian army's share in the economy is between 10 and 40% (Marshall & Stacher 2012). The official military economy

generates income streams that are not accountable to the public treasury and are free from any parliamentary control (Sayigh 2012).

Military-industrial-business complex of the EAF uses conscript as free labour in army factories. In addition to the lowest possible product costs gained by using conscripts, the Army does not pay any taxes on its products, gaining remarkable market advantages compared to private enterprises (Brooks 1998).

Sirrs demonstrates how while the intelligence services curbed most forms of dissent to the Mubarak regime the Egyptian society remained repressed and divided (Sirrs 2010). Kandil argues that the recent events are just another demonstration of the ongoing power struggle between the police, the army, and political elite that constitute the major components of Egypt's authoritarian regime (Kandil 2012). Kandil argues that Egypt has gradually been transformed from a military state to a police state.

The military-founded system has gradually been institutionalized. Stephen Cook examines Egypt's political experience since the Free Officers' coup in July 1952 to explore the institutionalization of military dominance. Cook also analyzes the political dynamics that led to the exclusion of Islamist groups from the political arena and sheds light on the process of institutional revision designed to ensure the armed forces-founded order. (Cook 2007)

De Smet argues that the Egyptian state is characterised by the absence of strong hegemonies and capable counter-hegemonies (De Smet 2014). He suggests a Gramscian approach where the recent developments should be located at the context of, on the one hand, the long process of the development of the post-colonial state, and, on the other, the imposed global neoliberal policies. Within this framework De Smet claims that the role of the Armed Forces during the revolutionary process in Egypt was a Caesarist one.

Abul-Magd argues that the military as a semi-autonomous institution has adapted to political and economic transformations after the 2011 Uprising. In doing so, it maintained its hegemonic position within the state structure and increasing its economic profits, while deploying nationalistic rhetoric and making new socio-economic alliances (Abul-Magd 2015).

Egypt's state security apparatus resists any reforms. Tabaar points out three factors that contribute to this resistance of the security sector to reform. First, SCAF is very powerful politically and economically. Second, the reluctance of Morsi's regime to reform the police services demonstrate the fact that during times of recurrent street violence police support was necessary. Third, it is the fact the military and police have not put pressure to each other in order to reform (Tabaar 2013).

Survey Indices

Figure 53

Note: The index of perception of personal safety is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of the following two indicators: (1) Safe walking alone at night; (2) Money/Property Stolen from you or other household member in last 12 months.

Amidst the 2011 turmoil and in the immediate aftermath of the regime change the popular perception of personal safety had unsurprisingly been decreasing. However, it is worth noting that since 2013 the perception of personal safety has been steadily increasing after the imposition of the military rule. One if not the most prominent of the promises made by general Sisi on the announcement of the military coup at the 3rd of July was the restoration of feeling of security and stability in the country. This index shows that his regime actually achieved to realise the pledge to reinstate the national target to reduce the wide-spread feelings of insecurity and unsafety.

Figure 54



Note: This indicator is computed of the percentage of people who said yes in the question "would you recommend the city or area as a place to live to a friend".

In comparison to the graph above (figure 52), perceptions of safety and security in the country are significant lower but also demonstrate that since 2013 these perceptions have been steadily rising. This graph is interesting not because of the alteration of the scores but because of the relatively low scores. For almost a decade only half of the Egyptian citizens feel safe and secure in their country. This striking low score can be analyzed through the analytical framework provided by the Fierce State / Brittle Authoritarianism model.

Figure 55



Note: This indicator is computed of the percentage of people who replies that they are willing to fight for their own country.

The percentage of people who were willing to fight for their own country has decreased from 2008 to 2011. The revolution and then the troubled transitional situation in 2011 suggests a plausible explanation for the decline in the rates of this index. The declining rate in this indicator also chimes with data suggesting a diminishing legitimacy of the state.

Macro Indicators

Figure 56



Note: Freedom House rates countries according their level of freedom with regard to the citizens' political rights. The rate goes from 1 to 7, with 1 being the highest rating.

Apart from 2012, Egypt has been rated 6 since 2000. This score indicates that political rights in Egypt have been very restricted. This score signifies that it has been ruled by one-party or military dictatorships, religious hierarchies or autocrats. It may allow a few political rights, such as some representation or autonomy for minority groups, and a few are traditional monarchies that tolerate political discussion and accept public petitions.

In 2012 the situation was slightly improved and Egypt was consequently rated 5. This score indicated Egypt either moderately protects almost all political rights or strongly protects some political rights while neglecting others. More than reflecting a real improvement in the provision/protection of political rights, the scores of this index probably reflects the conditions of the 2012 elections, including party formation, as the electoral fairness one of the key elements for FH parameters.

Figure 57



Note: David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards constructed this additive index from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance indicators. Values go from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights).

The scores Egypt has achieved in this index portrays a very gloomy picture of the situation of physical integrity rights in the country since 2000. The frequent warnings issued by Human Rights watch organisations mirror the abysmal situation for political prisoners. In 2011 Egypt's scores in the index indicates that government had no respect for physical integrity rights. In particular, there are myriads allegations and reports that the Mubarak regime did get involved in various cases of torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance of its own citizens throughout its time in office. However, it was their downfall when the brutal treatment of its own citizens intensified.

Figure 58



Note: The Fragile States Index is based on twelve primary indicators, clustered in social, economic and political indicators. The Fragile State Index – Score refers to the score achieved by each country (from 0 to 120, where 0 indicates a very sustainable situation, while 120 indicates "very high alert").

The scores achieved by Egypt at the Fragile State index portray a picture of state under high pressure. Since 2012 Egypt falls in the category of alert. From 2006 till 2011 Egypt had been in the category of "high warning".

Mobilisation

Mass mobilisation *per se* is not necessarily associated with either democratization or authoritarianism: while orthodox approaches to liberal democracy require an informed and active citizenry and democratization models require a mobilised civil society and general population in order to translate infra-elite splits into transitions and eventually consolidation of democracy, authoritarian systems can also rely on consensus and mass mobilisation in some conditions (e.g. Fascism). On the other hand, the fragility of 'hybrid regimes' and of 'brittle' authoritarian, and the oscillations of cyclical authoritarian systems, require selective mobilisation – selective both in time and themes, attempting to mobilise using populist and demagogic themes (e.g. xenophobia), but not challenging the regime itself. Cyclical authoritarianism in particular view such mobilisation as occurring within recurring chronological patterns, corresponding to the regimes' alternative patterns of liberalisation and repression.

Similarly, scholars of Middle East politics have identified popular mobilisation as a phenomenon potentially leading towards democratic transitions, particularly following the outbreak of the 2011 Uprisings. However, mobilisation remains a necessary but not a sufficient condition for democratisation, with some studies viewing mobilisation through the lenses of Islamist politics, as a manifestation of opposition movements under authoritarian regimes, and sometimes as expressions of thoroughly undemocratic political ideologies and programmes. Scholars of hybrid regimes have also identified controlled, limited participation of citizens in protests as a part of regime strategy. Authoritarian resilience theories emphasises how rulers of MENA countries tried to actively promote mass demobilisation with a variety of strategies. In the case of cyclical authoritarianism approaches, scholars identified patterns of mobilisation and demobilisation corresponding to major political and economic transformations that shaped the recent history of the region.

Egypt

Similar to the area studies literature, mobilisation in Egypt has similarly occurred out of population pressures, throughout its modern history, albeit particularly under the Sadat, Mubarak, and post-Mubarak periods. Gamal Abdel Nasser's funeral was one of the first major instances of impromptu popular mobilisation at a time of national grief, and limited student mobilisation continued on throughout the 1970s (Abdalla 2008). The "Bread Riots" of 1977 were the first major popular mobilisation that challenged the ruling regime's policies in the post-1952 period (Hirst & Beeson 1981). These instances of domestic unrest were, very interestingly, mirrored with mobilisation of the Coptic diaspora of North America against specific domestic policies by Anwar Sadat (Ibrahim 2010; Iskander 2012). Increasingly, the mobilisation of Islamist forces, within the Muslim Brotherhood or not, became more prominent – the mobilisation processes of the Muslim Brotherhood, in particular, have been well-examined in the relevant scholarship (Mitchell 1969; Wickham 2013; Antar 2006). Since the 1970s, there have also been instances of controlled mobilisation, particularly under the rule of Hosni Mubarak (Albrecht 2013; Hamid 2011; Albrecht & Wegner 2006), a point of view that links Egyptian mobilisation with the hybrid regimes' scholarship. Intermittent mobilisation continued throughout the 2000s (Abdelrahman 2014; El-Mahdi 2009), reaching an apex with the eruption of the January 2011 events.

Survey Indices

Figure 59



Note: This variable is computed of the following variables: the % of people who answered "interested/very interested in politics" to the question "to what extent are you interested in politics?" (data cleaned from WVS and AT as they appear at the Arab Transformations Project database).

This graphs shows a dramatic drop in the rates of interest in politics from 2011 to 2014. This could be explained by the popular frustration that followed the military coup in 2013 after the term of the first elected Islamist President was violently interrupted.

What is also worth noting is the sharp increase in the popular attitude towards politics in the prelude of the revolution. This trend accurately reflects the empirical reality of popular discontent with Mubarak's regime and the growing tendencies in participation in politics for larger portions of the population.

Figure 60



Note: the direct involvement index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of the % of people who did this action: Signing a petition; Joining in boycotts; attending lawful/ peaceful demonstrations; joining unofficial strikes.

While almost 70% responded that they were interested in politics in 2011 as it is portrayed in the figure 56 the percentage of people that actually were directly involved in politics is 2%. This index reflects a traditional conceptualisation of what active political participation consists of. It only takes into account people who signed petitions, joined boycotts, attended demonstrations or joined strikes. Therefore, these two indexes on direct involvement and interest in politics portray contrasting pictures of the empirical reality of politics and political participation. This sharp contrast of the rated of these two indexes indicate that a great portion of the population that became interested in politics and eventually "politicized" participated in the political sphere through different ways than the old-time traditional political involvement.

Figure 61



Note: the Influence of religious beliefs index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of the % of people who agree/strongly agree with the statement: Democracy is a (Western) form of government that is not compatible with Islam (reversed (democracy is compatible with Islam); Religious leaders should not influence how people vote; Religious leaders should have influence on government (reversed (Religious leader should not have influence); Religious practices should be separated from social- political life.

This index on the influence of religious beliefs portray a picture where the rate of popular perception in the aftermath of the Uprising dramatically dropped from 66.6% in 2011 to only 33.6% in 2013. The debate on the relation between politics and religion in Egypt has been ongoing for a long time causing of severe divides across the society. Political Islam has also became a wedge issue in Egyptian politics. The electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood and their short-lived and controversial term in office could be an explanation for the reverse in the popular sentiment.

Macro Indicators

Figure 62



Note: This is an additive Empowerment Rights Index is constructed from the Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Assembly & Association, Workers' Rights, Electoral Self- Determination, and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these seven rights) to 14 (full government respect for these seven rights) (Lomazzi & Abbott 2016).

This index reflects oscillations in a range of rights related to mobilization in the decade before the Revolution. The more substantial improvement registered between 2004 and 2006 corresponds to a first important phase of anti-Mubarak protests, which managed to bring thousands of Egyptians in the street. The "Kefaya" ("enough") movement, a grassroots coalition drawing support from across all Egypt's political spectrum, started to gain public attention towards the middle of 2004, as a platform against Hosni Mubarak's presidency and the possibility that his son Gamal could inherit the power, but also in general against political corruption, economic stagnation and the regime's brutality. The movement grew particularly in 2005, before and after the constitutional referendum and the presidential election campaigns. After that, it gradually lost intensity with the new wave of repression following the elections results, which granted a new mandate to Mubarak while imprisoning his opponent Ayman Nour.

Figure 63



The V-DEM: Participatory democracy index maps the extent to which the ideal of participatory democracy is achieved. The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. To make it a measure of participatory democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account (0-1) (Coppedge et al. 2015).

Although the score of this index for Egypt remained very low, a clear improvement has been registered after 2011, and with the formation of the first fairly elected post-revolutionary government in 2012. Before the elections, an important phase of engagement and popular participation characterized the protests that ultimately led to the oust of Mubarak. However, the index does not cover the 2013 military coup, and the stabilization of the new authoritarian government that came to power after that. It would be interesting therefore to upgrade this index with new data when available to account for the impact the military counter-revolution had on participatory democracy principles.

Figure 64



Note: The Quality of Government "No Interference of Religious Dogmas" variable, taken from Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) database, captures the extent legal order and political institutions are defined without interference by religious dogmas. The scale goes from 1 (theocratic state) to 10 (secular state) (Teorell, Dahlberg & Holmberg 2016).

With scores from 1 to 10, in 2008 Egypt was rated as a largely secular state. However, religious dogmas have considerable influence on legal order and political institutions. This rate was decreased by one point towards theocracy in 2010 and 2012. As shown more in detail in the last section of this report dedicated to Religion, Identity and Social Life, this indicator does not necessarily correspond to a an 'Islamization' of Egyptian society or to an increase in the importance of religious values among the population, but rather to a political use of the religion made by new and old rulers, pointing towards a 'conservative' model of society that is functional to their legitimation.

Economic Development & Economic Rights

Early studies suggested a direct and deterministic relationship between economic development and political transformations generally, and democratisation specifically. The rise of 'rentier states' – particularly hydrocarbon exporters – and their 'authoritarian social contract' in which citizens were said to trade wealth for political voice undermined that early deterministic view. Today, growth is thought of as necessary but not sufficient to democratization. Area Studies scholarship has tended to analyse the actual operation of individual states' political machineries and economies, and particularly in its post-Orientalist incarnation it has emphasised the region's role in a global political economy organised under the banner of 'neoliberalism' – private enterprise as a driver of economic growth and markets as drivers of political liberalisation – and has suggested a link between such economic liberalisation and political repression.

This section focuses on describing pathways to development and key economic indicators (e.g. GDP p/c PPP; gross capital formation; quality of infrastructure;) and its perception among MENA respondents (e.g. perception of living conditions; of whether the national economy is improving).

Egypt

Between 2004 and 2009 Egypt experienced a severe food crisis. Ghoneim explored the structural aspects of the food subsidy policies from a political economy perspective (Ghoneim 2012). He refers to the Egyptian food crisis of 2007-8 connecting it with the global food crisis of 2006. Egypt was one of the 37 countries affected by the global food crisis. There was an impact on poverty, on the balance of payments, and on the government budget. Ghoneim analyses the subsidy system, mainly energy and food subsidies. He refers to the land-tenure system. During Nasser era (1954-1970), there were two Agrarian Reforms Laws (1952 and 1954) promoting the fragmentation of land ownership. Food subsidies have existed since the 1940s. Nasser allocated budget for these, while Sadat expanded the system, with even more products being subsidized. In 1977, IMF and World Bank recommended the dramatic reduction of food subsidies. These reforms led to massive popular riots (the so-called 'First January Uprising').

The privatization – if not liberalization – of the economy that has been taking place for more than three decades (*infitah*) undermines political and social stability. Gray (Gray 1998) highlighted the challenges the tourist sector face from its over-liberalization. He claims that are political reasons behind the choice of tourist sector as the prominent field of liberalization. Gray argues that the Egyptian government choose tourism because they considered that in addition to the economic benefits, it will pose little threat to the regime. Ray Hinnebusch argues that while modernization can increase popular political participation, it certainly cannot alone trigger the democratization process (Hinnebusch 2015). For Hinnebusch, economic liberalization policies like *infitah* was nothing more than the regimes response to the changing requisites of capital accumulation (Hinnebusch 2006).

Morsi's regime could not escape from neoliberal economic policy, and his failure to create an alternative economic agenda led to the loss of his support base (Mather 2014). While the Freedom and Justice Party's rhetoric portrayed a vision towards an Islamic capitalist economy, in reality it attempted to create a business-friendly climate. The so-called 'Renaissance Project' (Wickham 2013) promised to give solutions to poverty and unemployment. Morsi's economic

policy for combating poverty, however, was a top-down approach relying heavily on charity rather than impoving workers' conditions and wages (Mather 2014). The Brotherhood approach was to perceive poverty as a social justice issue rather than linking it with the approaches to economic development (Mather 2014).

Survey Indices

Figure 65



Note: The Living conditions 1.1 index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of the following indicators: (1) satisfaction with financial situation of household; (2) Scale of income; (3) Family saving last year.

Unsurprisingly the perception of the living conditions have been in sharp decrease from 2001 to 2008. The very low levels of satisfaction with the living conditions come as no surprise. The main slogan at the 2011 Uprisings was "Bread, Freedom, Social Justice" (*'Aysh! Hurriya! 'Adala al-igtima'iyya!*) reflected these poor living conditions.

Figure 66



Note: The Living Conditions 1.2 index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of the following indicators: (1) Feelings about household income; (2) Not enough money for food in the past year; (3) Not enough money for shelter in the past year.

The low level of satisfaction of the personal and family living conditions can be analysed through the framework of the Authoritarian resilience model. This model expects poor material conditions and low levels of economic development associated with a form of authoritarian government such as that of El Sisi since 2013. It's interesting that these data can be seen as a continuation of the ones in the previous graph that covers only until 2011.

Figure 67



Note: The 'National economy getting better' indicator is computed of the % of people that think that the national economic is getting better.

The perceptions of the economic development of the country has been in a sharp decline after 2012. It is very interesting that in the aftermath of the Uprising the perception that the national economy was improving increased in 2012. However, in 2014 there is a dramatic fall in that popular optimism. This graph is very striking, compared with the data in the tables above. Apparently so the new military regime make people feel that their economic situation is getting better but the country situation is not.

Macro Indicators

Figure 68



Note: GNI per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GNI is gross national in-come (GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. dollar has in the United States. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income

(compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in current international dollars based on the 2011 ICP round (Lomazzi & Abbott 2016).

GNI per capita in purchasing power parity, which reflect the average income of Egyptians, steadily increases since 2000. However, the popular perceptions suggests a very different picture. This suggests that raw per capita income figures do not capture enough the reality 'on the ground' for most citizens, and that income distribution may be polarised to a significant extent. It is therefore necessary to include inequality indicators to fully grasp the distribution of the wealth in the last 15 years.

Figure 69



Note: This indicator includes "land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on), plant, machinery, and equipment purchases, and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings" (Lomazzi & Abbott 2016).

This indicator can provide us with a picture of the level of the country's economic development. The low scores that Egypt has achieved portray a picture of low economic development. Since 2009 Egypt's gross fixed capital formation has sharp fallen. Thus, we can gain useful insights from the analytical framework provided by both the Authoritarian resilience and the Brittle Authoritarianism models.

Figure 70



Note: Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate in-puts. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3 (Lomazzi & Abbott 2016).

The neoliberal measures that restructured the economy had a significant impact on Egypt's agricultural sector since the 1980s. The centrality of agriculture in Egypt's centralized planned economy is unequivocal and is demonstrated by the fact that in the 2014 constitution agriculture is stated as a basic component of the national economy (Anon 2014). Throughout this period, approximately a fifth of total employment has been in agriculture (Assaad & Krafft 2015). According to USAID the small increases of the total contribution of agriculture in Egypt's GDP can also be explained with the "increased participation of women in agriculture, which now employs almost 45 percent of all women in the workforce" (USAID 2015).

Figure 71



Note: The Market Economy Status refers to the state of economic transformation measured in terms of seven criteria, which are based on a total of 14 indicators. The BTI's concept of a market economy includes economic performance, regulatory or competition policy and property rights; some aspects of social justice, in the framework that comprehensive development requires successful poverty alleviation in addition to economic growth (Lomazzi & Abbott 2016).

Egypt had been receiving international accolades for its performance on liberalisation throughout the 2000s. This BTI indicator, the Market Economy Status refers to the state of economic transformation.

Though Nasser and Sadat have adopted fiver-year development plans, it was Hosni Mubarak who since 1982 systematically introduced five-year plans. They all lacked an institutional dialogue mechanism during the planning process (Sakamoti 2013). In 2012 Egypt began developing a ten-year long plan for Strategic Framework for Economic and Social Development and after the 2013 coup the latest plan provided the macroeconomic framework and strategy 2014-2019 (Government of Egypt 2015). Alnashar argues that Egypt's integration in the international financial markets has been imperfect to a large extent due to high inflation rate in Egypt (Alnashar 2015). Thus even if de jure Egypt has adopted financial openness, monetary policy has still been exercised by the Central Bank.

Figure 72



Note: The World Bank's Statistical Capacity Indicator is a composite score assessing the capacity of a country's statistical system. It is based on a diagnostic framework assessing the following areas: methodology; data sources; and periodicity and timeliness. Countries are scored against 25 criteria in these areas, using publicly available information and/or country input. The overall Statistical Capacity score is then being calculated as simple average of all three area scores on a scale of 0-100 (Lomazzi & Abbott 2016).

This indicator on Statistical capacity provided by World Bank assesses developing countries' ability "to collect, analyse, and disseminate high-quality data about its population and economy" (World Bank 2015). This indicator attempts to reflect the level of economic development and 'modernisation'. Since 2006, Egypt has achieved relatively high scores.

Figure 73



Note: This Quality of Overall Infrastructure index captures the assessment of general infrastructure (e.g., transport, telephony, and energy) in a country. Within a scale from 1 to 7, a score of 1 indicates extremely underdeveloped while a score of 7 extensive and efficient by international standards (Teorell, Dahlberg & Holmberg 2016).

All the above macro-indicators in this section showed – before the January Uprising – a picture of a modernizing and developing economy. However, the relatively high scores achieved in the indexes compiled by international organizations contrast with people's frustration for their living conditions. The indexes that measure overall performance of the national economy regarding its achievement of neoliberal goals do not capture the growing social inequalities and frustration. This is also in contrast with people's perception over economic conditions – and this means that the new military regime is not doing so well after all in re-establishing 'normal living conditions' in the country.

Political Economy

In conventional models of transitions towards democracy as in modernization, increases in income inequality are not particularly central concerns, and where they are acknowledged either as effects of conventional modernisation models (Huntington 1968) or of more recent 'shock therapy' or 'market democratization' approaches, they are considered necessary if 'painful' phases. The Democratization literature eventually expects levels of inequality and polarisation to decrease, and some degree social and occupational mobility along with the protection and realisation of the basic economic rights as essential prerequisite for the process of democratization to commence. Authoritarian Resilience models expect high levels of patrimoniality, clientelism and rentierism that act as an impediment to any attempt for democratization, but also to economic development and diversification, particularly for rentier sates.

Area Studies literature on political economy sparked interest in rentierism and its by-products, and has provided qualitative studies of various aspects of rentierism and of clientelism/patronage. The economic dependence on natural resources in particular is argued to have a negative impact on transitions to democracy: the greater the reliance on natural resources, the easier it is to strike an 'authoritarian bargain', at least temporarily buying off pressure for political voice – including democratization.

This section focuses in particular on the inclusiveness and fairness of economic development, paying attention to income inequality/polarization, occupational mobility, economic rights, workers' rights, corruption and its control, and the role of the state.

Egypt

Maher offers an over-optimist Marxist analysis where he observes that the Egyptian revolutionaries are directly confronting the rule of capital, consciously or not (Maher 2011).

Inequalities and polarization in the Egyptian society have been sharpened the past three decades when neoliberal measures have been introduced.

Verme et al argue that inequalities between urban and rural is not as important as the geographical gap between the four main Egyptian cities and the rest of the country (Verme et al. 2014). Interestingly enough, Verme finds a mismatch between income inequality measured by Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Surveys (HIECS 2000, 2005, 2009) and the perception of income inequality measured by the World Values Surveys (WVSs 2000, 2008)(Verme et al. 2014).

Talani elaborates on the *prima facie* paradox that even though Egyptian economy has been long gone through extensive liberalization, privatization and economic restructuring, it largely

remains marginalized in the global political economic system (Talani 2014). While Egypt has been received international accolades for the successful implementation of neo-liberal structural programs under the Bretton Woods institutions, Egyptian economy still heavily relies on remittances. Indeed, permanent extra-regional high-skilled migration is on the rise (Talani 2014).

The Nasserist regime was largely based upon two pillars, the pre-emptive corporatism and the monopolistic state capitalism. Anwar Sadat undermined those two pillars by increasingly introducing economic liberalization policies (Waterbury 1983). Nazih Ayubi observes the expansion of the state in public and economic arena where it represents various degrees of corporatism (Ayubi 1996). Nazih Ayubi approach is equally influenced by Guillermo O'Donnell's treatise of corporatism and by Gramsci. For Ayubi corporatism is a "useful analytical tool for understanding a whole range of devices for organising and managing state / society relations". (Ayubi 1996) For Ayubi, corporatism is indicative of both weak class struggles and lack of state hegemony.

Roccu argues that three decades of implementing *infitah,* or 'opening' policies led, on the one hand, to the rise of a new capitalist oligarchy within the regime and, on the other hand, to an exceptional degree of socio-economic inequalities. These two were the key conditions that undermined the hegemonic power of the Mubarak regime (Roccu 2013). Roccu challenges the modernization orthodoxy that claims that neoliberal reforms lead to the emergence of middle classes that would pursue more political participation. Roccu observes that in the case of Egypt implementation of neoliberal reforms had the exact opposite effect. They led to the emergence of a new capitalist oligarchy that did not probe political openness. Therefore, the implementation of neoliberal economic reforms since the 1980s have gradually created the necessary preconditions for the 2011 turmoil.

Timothy Mitchell explores the way oil undermines democracy (Mitchell 2011). The central argument is that the production of energy is the central force shaping democratic politics. Mitchell traces the history of coal power, arguing that coal as an energy source was open to distribution. This lead to disruption of Western oligarchies and mass demands for democracy. On the contrary, oil as cheap and abundant energy source.

Pfeifer is one of the few scholars addressing the social costs of the "success story" of structural reforms undertaken in 1980s and 1990s (Pfeifer 1999). Pfeifer stresses that while the SAPs (structural adjustment programmers) were appraised by IMF and World Bank as 'success stories' these were only a part of the whole picture. If you see the data carefully you will notice that while the reforms had achieved to reduce inflation, to manage the budget deficits and to manage the debt service, they certainly did not restore the pre-crisis rates of saving, investment and growth. Moreover, the social repercussions of these neoliberal programs were enormous as unemployment and inequality were exacerbated (Pfeifer 1999).

Alfonso argues that Egypt under Mubarak has managed to diversify its productive activities in a way that has created mobile capital in sectors such as services and manufactory (Alfonso 2012).

Fadel explores the role of international anti-corruption norms assist Egypt Recover Misappropriated Public Funds in the aftermath of the 25 January (Fadel 2011).

Survey Indices

Figure 74

Note: This Inequality / Polarization index is computed of the average value on a range 1-10, where 1="income should be made more equal" and 10 means it definitely is "need larger income differences as incentive for individual efforts". It was recoded in 100 points scale.

The percentage of people who believed that income should be made more equal has increased dramatically from 2001 to 2011. This rate is very interesting to contrast with macro indicators that portray a picture of a flourishing and growing economy.

Figure 75



Note: The Occupational mobility and economic rights index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of the following two indicators: (1) Local Job Market; (2) Unemployment Index.

We can observe that the rate of this index has been dropping after the 2013 military coup, but remains substantively unchanged since 2009. Since 2006 there has been a deterioration in conditions in the labour market (Assaad & Krafft 2015). This trend has been further boosted after the 2011 revolution. Assad and Kraft point that this downturn in the employment conditions can only be captured through under-employment and irregular employment figures rather than the official employment rates (Assaad & Krafft 2015). There can also be noticed a contrast between public and private sector workers. While the public sector workers attracted more policy attention in the aftermath of 2011, the private-sector employees are the ones who are most vulnerable to the deteriorating employment conditions (Assaad & Krafft 2015).

Figure 76



Note: This corruption index is computed of the average value on a range 1-10, where 1="private ownership" and 10 means preference for "state ownership" of the (WVS v12054) question "is better private or state ownership of business". It is recoded in 100 points scale.

The percentage of people who prefer state ownership of business has remained stable from 66.8% in 2001 to 67.1% in 2011. This score does not mirror the scholarly accounts that picture a general disapproval of the people with the neoliberal measures that were being introduced at the same time and led to the privatization of public services.

Figure 77



Note: This corruption index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of the following two indicators: (1) Corruption in government; (2) Corruption within businesses.

An interesting trend in this index is that after the 2013 there is a fall in the rate of the public perceptions of corruption. So this could mean either success of the new government's propaganda or an actual decrease in the levels of corruption.

Macro Indicators

Figure 78



Note: The Uneven Economic Development index prepared by the Fund for Peace attempts to capture when there are ethnic, religious, or regional disparities, the governed tend to be uneven in their commitment to the social contract. It includes pressures and measures related to GINI coefficient, income share of highest 10%, income share of lowest 10%, urban-rural service distribution, access to improved services, slum population (Teorell, Dahlberg & Holmberg 2016). This index is on a scale of 1 to 10.

This index portrays a picture where the uneven economic development has been slightly improved since 2010. The difference between 2005 and 2015 is even bigger as in 2005 the disparities were measured as being even wider than in 2015.

Figure 79

Note: Poverty and Economic Decline index measures "the ability of the state to provide for its citizens if they cannot provide for themselves and can create friction between the "haves" and the "have nots". Includes pressures and measures related to economic deficit, government debt, unemployment, youth employment, purchasing power, GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation" (Teorell, Dahlberg, Holmberg, et al. 2016). This index is on a scale of 1 to 10 and a high score indicates high pressure on the state.

This index demonstrates the intensification of the dire economic conditions and rising poverty levels since 2005. Compared with the national growth rates achieved during the same period, this growing tendency confirms that such growth was unequally distributed across the society.

Figure 80



Note: The Worker's Rights index is prepared by the CIRI Human Rights Data Project. This index captures the extent to which workers enjoy freedom of association at their workplaces and the right to bargain collectively with their employers and other internationally recognized rights at work, including a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labour; a minimum age for the employment of children; and acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health. A score of 0 indicates that workers' rights were severely restricted; a score of 1 indicates that workers' rights were somewhat restricted; and a score of 2 indicates that workers' rights were fully protected during the year in question (Lomazzi & Abbott 2016).

In 2015 ILO signed an agreement with the Ministry of Manpower for closer cooperation in order to improve the governance of labour migration and the protection of migrant worker's rights in Egypt. (ILO 2016).

The Egyptian Trade Union Federation since its foundation in 1957 has been closely linked to the state rather than the workers' rights. It has a long history of attempts to sabotage protests, strikes and mobilisations of workers. In 1990 the Centre for Trade Union and Workers Services was established as an NGO and the Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social Rights in 2010 but was active for over a decade. From 1998 to 2010 it is estimated that about four million Egyptian workers have participated in strikes and other actions (Beinin 2016).

Figure 81



Note: This index captures the extent to which the state owns or directly controls important sectors of the economy. It aims at showing the "the degree to which the state owns and controls capital (including land) in the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors" but it does not measure "the extent of government revenue and expenditure as a share of total output; indeed, it is quite common for states with expansive fiscal policies to exercise little direct control (and virtually no ownership) over the economy" (Coppedge et al. 2015) The scale is ordinal, converted to interval. The five possible scores represent the following: 0, virtually all valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state. Private property may be officially prohibited; 1, most valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state; 2, many sectors of the economy either belong to the state or are directly controlled by the state, but others remain relatively free of direct state control; 3, Some valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state, but most remains free of direct state control; 4, Very little valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state (Coppedge et al. 2015).

The steady rate for the index of state ownership of the economy since 2002 did not capture the privatization of a number of public services and the introduction of other neoliberal measures. Rutherford argues that the introduction of neo-liberal policies since the 1990s have strengthened the political influence of the business community (Bruce K. Rutherford 2013).

Since the 1980s the sharp decline of the oil-rent revenues, led to the adoption of a new strategy to compensate the fiscal losses. This strategy prioritized the development of the tourist sector of the economy. Richter and Steiner argue that the since the 1980s the application of neoliberal policies and external rent diversification policies in Egyptian economy that led to the development of the tourist sector has assisted the regime in maintaining neo-patrimonialism (Richter & Steiner 2008).

Egyptian economy is heavily dependent on tourism. Since the 1980s Mubarak's policies accelerated tourist development in order to stabilize its neo-patrimonial system of power (Richter & Steiner 2007). Tourist development preserved the existing neo-patrimonial system of power in two ways: "First, it provided the Egyptian economy and its domestic financial system

with much- needed foreign exchange to balance trade and current account deficits: meeting the Egyptian government's increasing need for domestic lending in order to finance its budget deficits became possible and the main public mechanisms of material distributions could be maintained. Second, tourism development in Egypt is an example of how more traditional direct distributions of rents among the country's private elite have been substituted by the generation and allocation of new more indirect rent sources" (Richter & Steiner 2008).

Figure 82

Note: The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project index of Control of corruption aims at measuring perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. The index is built using survey data and information from institutional sources (Lomazzi & Abbott 2016).

The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project index of Control of corruption shows that the rate of trust in government controlling corruption is relatively very low. After sharp decline from 2009 to 2011, we can see a slight increase in the scores from 2012 onwards.

International Context

The influence of the international context is an aspect to which conventional models of political transformations have traditionally paid little attention to, while Structuralist approaches in International Relations and more generally Marxian models have paid attention to this aspect, but it remains one of the most contentious to operationalize and measure. Broadly, the international context can be thought of as antagonistic or permissive (Teti & Gervasio 2011) and constraints can occur at political, economic, or security levels.

Democratization models require low levels of economic dependency if the international context is non-permissive, although any version of the 'liberal peace thesis' would expect transitions to democracy to become more likely the higher the proportion of countries are democracies. For orthodox 'transitology' literature economies being fully integrated in the global market are more likely to commence the process to democracy, whereas for critics of 'neoliberalism' precisely the opposite is true.

MENA area literature has focused on 'diffusion' models of democratization, applying insights of so-called diffusion theory to the Arab Uprisings. This literature argues that the 2010-2011 Uprisings across the MENA region show precisely that developments in one country can influence movements in others through 'demonstration effects'. Even more recently, as Uprisings in Syria, Yemen and Libya descended into conflict, Bahrain's was squashed by the Saudis, and Egypt fell prey to a successful – if as yet unsettled – counter-revolution, scholarship has begun to consider that such diffusion/learning processes apply also to autocracies.

This section draws on available proxies for the configuration of the international environment (e.g. BTI index International Cooperation; economic measures related to dependence, and external intervention) with survey data on the perception of that environment (e.g. perception of foreign powers; approval of foreign powers' leadership; migration). The incomplete and unsatisfactory nature of these indexes and survey data is an indication of the relative neglect this topic has received.

Egypt

Saideman argues that 2011 protests in the MENA region manifest that the key propositions of the Diffusion theory are valid as dynamics in Tunisia spilled over across the region. However, Saideman highlights that existing diffusion theories are insufficient to fully grasp the variation in the outcomes of the popular uprisings in the region (Saideman 2012). Allinson briefly refers to the role of the geopolitical conjuncture and influenced by the intra-Gulf competition (Allinson 2015). Qatar funded and supported the Muslim Brotherhood while the Saudi Arabia backed Salafi groups and Egyptian military. The US with the exception of a brief in interest in the Brotherhood consistently supported the military. The embodiment of this support is the avoidance by the US to name the coup as a coup. The strengthening of the role of the US in Egyptian politics dates back to the cold war era and in particular during 1970s. It was Anwar Sadat's re-orientation of Egypt's foreign policy that brought the country under the US sphere influence.

Since 1979 peace treaty with Israel, the US has consistently provided the Egyptian army with large amounts of Foreign Military Aid. These funds have been used on purchases of military equipment from US suppliers.

US aid contributed to the enforcement and increase socio-economic inequalities in the Egyptian society (Sullivan 1992). Since the 1980s most of the increased Foreign Direct Investment FDI to Egypt went to non-energy sectors (Sherbiny & Hatem 2015).

The 2011 Uprisings took place within a non-permissive international context (Teti & Gervasio 2011). In Egypt the international context and external factors have established constraints on policy options of the country but also determined the power balance among political forces. The geostrategic importance of the Arab world and of Egypt in particular attract the interest of global powers (Selim 2015).

Jackline Wahba highlights the importance of international migration and remittances to the Egyptian economy (Wahba 2015). She argues that almost one sixth of Egyptian households have a returnee or a current migrant. Wahba observes that the past decades there were changes to the ways remittances have been sent back to Egypt. Unsurprisingly, he finds that migrants increasingly are using formal banking in order to send remittances to Egypt (Wahba 2015).

Survey Indices

Figure 83



Note: This indicator is computed of the % of people who blame internal issues at the question: "Some people have said that the Arab world lags behind other regions. Which factors are to blame?"

Regarding relations with the international community, the perception of the Arab world as lagging behind other regions because of internal issues decreased from 2011 to 2013, with more people perceiving the role of foreign powers as more important in this matter. This trend should not be surprising given that in the aftermath of the January Revolution the role of foreign powers was not portrayed sympathetically but used by former regime elements to reduce support for revolutionary change.

Figure 84: US interference in the region justifies armed operations against the US everywhere

Note: This indicator is computed of the % of people who agree/strongly agree with this statement "United States' interference in the region justifies armed operations against the United States everywhere".

The percentage of people who agreed that the United States' interference in the Arab region justifies armed operations against the United States everywhere has decreased from 2011 to 2013. The historically high values for this question in surveys are linked to the long shadow the US has cast in the region since 1945.

Although until Nasser's death in 1970 Egypt had been under Soviet patronage, Sadat re-oriented its foreign policy towards the Western camp. This was deeply unpopular domestically, given the Arab-Israeli conflict and the US' role therein. After the Egyptian-Israeli peace accords at Camp David in 1978, US-Egypt relations were greatly strengthened, but both Sadat's domestic position and the US' reputation were weakened. In the aftermath of Camp David, the

US has been giving Military Aid to Egypt (Sharp 2016). As a key US ally, Egypt then cooperated with the US in a number of deeply domestically unpopular initiatives, including the First Gulf War in 1991 in exchange for debt forgiveness. Egypt like the US' other close Arab ally, Saudi Arabia, did not wish to associates with the 2003 Iraq invasion of Iraq – President Mubarak even criticized the decision for military action against Saddam Hussein, famously claiming that "instead of having one bin Laden, we will have 100 bin Ladens" (CNN 2003). However, Egypt ultimately gave the US access to its air bases and to the Suez Canal and provided overflight permissions for the military campaign. More generally, Egypt has been a close collaborator to US in the Global War on Terror, not least because this allows it to pursue repression of its internal dissent under this rubric, and the US has made itself more unpopular by subsuming its relations with Egypt under the rhetorical banner of 'democratisation' while allowing the Egyptian regime to continue is internal repression undisturbed. These factors, along with increasing domestic polarisation and the regime's xenophobic rhetoric directed at Western states and the US in particular as an instrument of domestic leverage, have all sustained such high values. As such, it is fairly surprising to see these scores drop significantly between 2011 and 2013.

Figure 85



Note: The perception of foreign powers index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of the following five indicators: (1) Approval of EU's leadership; (2) Approval of Germany's leadership; (3) Approval of China's leadership; (4) Approval of Russia's leadership; (5) Approval of UK's leadership.

Figure 86



Note: This indicator is computed of the % of people who approve the leadership of EU.

Figure 87



	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Approval of Germany's leadership	36.00	26.00	18.00	16.00	17.00	18.00	11.00	17.00	23.00	21.00
Approval of China's leadership	50.00	41.00	35.00	37.00	34.00	22.00	25.00	24.00	32.00	31.00
Aprroval of Russia's leadership	26.00	19.00	16.00	12.00	14.00	15.00	11.00	13.00	25.00	27.00
Approval of US' leadership	11.00	13.00	6.00	30.00	19.00	19.00	17.00	16.00	20.00	10.00

Note: These four indicators are computed of: (1) the % of people who approve the leadership of Germany; (2) the % of people who approve the leadership of China; (3) the % of people who approve the leadership of Russia; (1) the % of people who approve the leadership of US.

The graphs above portray an interesting picture about the popular perception of approval of foreign powers' leadership. It is really interesting that the rate of approval of China's leadership is significantly higher at any point than any Western power and Russia. It is also worth noting that only China saw its levels of approval of its leadership increase in the immediate aftermath

of the Uprising.[3] On the contrary, popular approval for leadership by the US, EU, Germany, and Russia declined from 2011 to 2012.

Figure 88



Note: This indicator is computed of the % of people who approve the leadership of the UK.

The British – Egypt relations date back at least at the 19th century when the British Empire. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 Egypt gained a status of unique geopolitical significance for the British Empire. Since the late 19th century Egypt came under the British influence. Though gaining a formal independence in the aftermath of the First World War it was only after the 1952 Free Officers movement led by Gamal Nasser when Egypt was became an autonomous Republic. Though in the second half of the 20th century the British-Egypt relations had undergone various turmoil, in the 21st century United Kingdom still exercise a great deal of influences in the country.

Figure 89



Note: This indicator is computed of the % of people who said yes to the following statement: "Likely to move away permanently to another country".

The percentage of people that were likely to move away permanently to another country has significantly varied over the past few years. According to the Egypt Household International Survey, in 2015 87% of Egyptian migrants leave for economic reasons. Almost two thirds of

[3] For a more detailed analysis on EU-Egypt relations, see ArabTrans deliverable WP9 D9.25.

them are aged between 25 and 44 while 98% are male (ILO 2016). There has been a steady increase in the rates of international mobility since the 2011 uprising and the consequent turmoil.

Macro Indicators

Figure 90



Note: This BTI index captures the extent to which the "the political leadership is willing and able to cooperate with external supporters and organizations" (Teorell, Dahlberg, Holmberg, et al. 2016). It includes the following three sub-indexes on: (1) effective use of support that captures the extent to which the political leadership uses the support of international partners to implement a long-term strategy of development; (2) credibility that captures the extent to which the government acts as a credible and reliable partner in its relations with the international community; (3) regional cooperation that captures the extent to which the political leadership is willing and able to cooperate with neighboring countries. This index is rated on a scale of 1-10.

The rate is steady between 2006 and 2012. Egypt appears to be a reliable partner for the international community. And so neither the revolution nor the counter-revolution seem to have changed the country's position, at least in 2011-2012.

Figure 91



Note: This World Bank Development Indicator shows the sum of net exports of goods and services, net primary income, and net secondary income (Lomazzi & Abbott 2016).

Current account balance is the sum of net exports of goods and services, net primary income, and net secondary income. While the balance deteriorated in 2011 and 2012, it seems significant that it did not deteriorate at a higher rate than it had previously been: the revolution and subsequent turmoil as factions struggled for power did not affect the rate of this decline. The current account balance improves slightly after parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012, but it drops after the turmoil leading to the army coup and the new regime being installed – and by an amount that suggests this was a significantly more destabilizing effect than the revolution itself.

Figure 92



Note: "Total external debt stocks to gross national income. Total external debt is debt owed to non-residents repayable in currency, goods, or services. Total external debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private non-guaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term debt. Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad"(Lomazzi & Abbott 2016)

The total external debt as percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) has been declining since 2004. The main reason is the steady annual growth of GNI.

Figure 93



Note: This World Bank indicator captures the net inflows of investment from foreign investors, divided by GDP (Lomazzi & Abbott 2016)

After the global financial crisis, there was a sharp decline in FDI. In 2011 the year of the turmoil FDI reached a record low in 15 years. However, subsequent years see a steady increase in FDI. These trends appear similar to those seen in other countries in turmoil.

Figure 94



[4]

Note: This World Bank indicator captures the direct investment equity flows in current U.S. dollars (World Bank 2016a).

The net inflows of Foreign Direct Investment show a dramatic decline in the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis in the 2008. They reached their nadir at 2011. From 2012 onwards there is steady increase in their annual levels but still far away from their peak levels in the 2007.

Figure 95



Note: This OECD indicator captures the net aid received, expressed per capita (Lomazzi & Abbott 2016).

Aid has been on the rise after the 2011 uprising. Since 2011, Egypt's economy has been increasingly dependent on aid flows. The rise of aid per capita is in some measure due to the damage to the country's economy as a whole, but also reflects the strategy, particularly by Gulf

[4] This World Bank indicator captures the direct investment equity flows in current U.S. dollars. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD

countries, of supporting either the Armed forces or the Muslim Brotherhood with aid. This emphasises the importance of the international context in a country's chances of successfully transitioning from authoritarianism towards democracy.

Figure 96: External Intervention



Note: The index of "External Intervention" refers to the situation "when the state fails to meet its international or domestic obligations, external actors may intervene to provide services or to manipulate internal affairs. Includes pressures and measures related to foreign assistance, presence of peacekeepers, presence of UN missions, foreign military intervention, sanctions, credit rating" (Teorell, Dahlberg, Holmberg, et al. 2016). This index is rated on a scale of 1-10 and a high score indicates high pressure on the state.

This index demonstrates that with the imposition of the military rule in 2013 the situation in Egypt only slightly improved. The high scores that Egypt achieved in this index portray a picture where the state has been under very high pressure since 2006. This picture matches with the myriads accounts that exposed, on the one hand, the fragility of the state and on the other hand, the deteriorated political and socioeconomic situation in Egypt.

Social Rights

Orthodox Democratisation models and modernization frameworks relegate Social Rights –like economic rights – to the margins of their concern, despite the fact that these are at the core of participatory democracy, enabling substantive – rather than merely formal – political inclusion. The defence of social rights, like the pursuit of economic equality, has generally been subordinated to liberal political and economic approaches in Democratic Transition, Hybrid Regime, and Authoritarian Resilience models. Following Modernization Theory, Democratisation literature tended to consider social equality as a 'natural' consequence of market-driven economic development and income growth. However, a more critical strand of literature made increasingly evident the difference between formal and substantial democratic requirements, as a political system formally qualifying as a democracy cannot be considered a real participatory democracy if cannot promote social and economic equality among its citizens. The effective achievement of these rights is argued, by this literature, to be hindered rather than helped by the market processes which orthodox approaches argue are central to global economic development.

The area studies literature has focused on the gradual erosion of the 'authoritarian social contract' in so-called 'post-populist republics' that were not also rentier states. For decades

this authoritarian bargain had granted some social and economic rights to the population while simultaneously limiting their political rights, and its progressive erosion is one of the main factors explaining the legitimacy deficit – and thus increasing fragility and instability – of current authoritarian regimes. Some attribute this decline to the unviability of the economic model of 'revolutionary republics', others to demographic factors, others still to factors such as corruption and unemployment. After 2011, a significant strand of research explored these changes in post-revolutionary societies.

While most Hybrid Regimes or Authoritarian Resilience models only tend to acknowledge the poor realisation of social and cultural rights in MENA countries, the Cyclical Authoritarianism approach importantly highlights the connection between such rights and neo-liberal economic reforms, which have been associated with a progressive polarisation of economic conditions.

This section brings together indicators of inequality – which are in themselves relatively underdeveloped and/or unsystematic indicators – with survey data on issues such as satisfaction with basic services, employment opportunities and job security.

Egypt

In Egypt, it became evident under Mubarak that income polarisation was proceeding apace with neoliberal economic reforms, resulting in a progressive erosion of social rights. This combined effect of economic and political (security) reforms was described by Kienle (Kienle 1998) as a process of economic liberalization and civil "deliberalization". In fact, considering the long history of socialist policies in Egypt, and the kind of 'moral economy' deeply embedded in Egyptian society (Pratt 2000), it seems not easy to separate basic economic conditions, determined by economic factors such as inflation or reduction of subsidies, from social rights. Particularly the social movements promoted by labour unions and unemployed workers became an important factor in building the opposition to Mubarak's regime, long before 2001 (Beinin 2015; Han 2016) .

Other studies pointed at the influence of international allies and donors in shaping economic and liberalization affecting social rights, and at the discrepancy between institutional policies and collaborations and their actual impact on Egyptian society in terms of political and social rights (Bush 2004). In this light, the Egyptian revolution of 2011 can be understood in the context of a neoliberal economic shift, characterised by two decades of economic liberalisation policies matched by authoritarian and crony capitalist rule (Joya 2011; Alexander & Mostafa 2014; De Smet 2015).

Survey Indices

Figure 97



Note: The satisfaction with basic services index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of three indicators from Gallup World Poll: (1) Satisfied with educational system; (2) Satisfied with quality of healthcare (% of people who are satisfied); (3) Health problems (% of people who have health problems).

According to Gallup data, a clear decline in the satisfaction with basic services preceded the 2011 revolts, and surely contributed to the determination of people protesting in the streets. According to the perception of the respondents, the inadequacy of basic services such as healthcare and education continued to deteriorate in the transition phase that followed the Uprisings. However, data from the second wave of Arab Barometer, as well as from ArabTrans survey, show higher levels of satisfaction for basic services (cf. Figure 25 and Figure 26 in section 8), and the comparison between the two data points (2011 and 2014) indicate a rise in the satisfaction for most services.

This index also shows a new increase in the satisfaction with basic services, which followed the 2013 military coup, and could be motivated by the attempt of the new regime to stabilise the political and social situation in the country also by reinforcing some of the public services. In this view, a new “authoritarian bargain” would be offered by the regime to gain support from the population, and to compensate for the set of purely repressive measures.

Figure 98



Note: The employment opportunities and job security index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of the following two indicators from Gallup World Poll: (1) Today is a good time to find a job (% of people said "yes"); (2) Local Job Market (% of people who think is a good period for finding a job).

Low levels of employment opportunities and job security perceived in 2007 can be related to a combination of historically high unemployment rates in the country with the impact of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. According to the International Labour organization, the impact of the crisis on the Egyptian job market was felt particularly in the years 2008 and 2009, and affected especially female unemployment and youth unemployment, mostly in employment-intensive and export-oriented job sectors (Radwan 2009). The perception of the respondents seems to indicate however that conditions were more critical before 2007, and started to improve from that year until 2009.

These levels of satisfactions, which are still very low, fell again from 2010 to 2011. The frustration of many unemployed young people in fact has been seen as one of the main causes of social discontent, which contributed to the mobilisation of millions of Egyptians in 2011. While the level of satisfaction rose slightly from 2011 to 2013, after 2013 it increased significantly. This corresponds to the settlement of the new military regime, and to a new more stable, although repressive, government in power, which might have influenced this perception of improving job opportunities. As shown in one of the graphs below, in fact, the level of unemployment in Egypt indeed decreased after 2013, but not as much as to justify such highly positive perceptions, which can be instead related to the hopes and expectations generated by the regimes' new economic development plan.

At the same time, it seems that these expectations were only partially met, considering that unemployed people's protests and strikes regarding 'job security and condition' continued also under the new military regime, and became more substantial after 2015. One of the most debated issues in terms of job security in fact has been the 'civil service law' which was passed in March and enacted in July in 2015. Although the purpose of this law was to reform public institutions, promising less corruption and more efficiency, its contents fall into the category of neoliberal labour policies likely to increases job insecurity for public servants, which make for 25% of the whole Egyptian workforce (Golia 2015). This kind of new legal provision adopted by Sisi's government, and the reactions that followed, might have therefore an impact on the legitimacy and stability of the regime.

Macro Indicators

Figure 99



Note: The V-DEM: Educational equality indicator maps the extent to which high quality basic education is guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens. Basic education refers to ages typically between 6 and 16 years of age but this varies slightly among countries. Possible scores ranging from 0 (extreme inequality) to 4 (equality).

Egypt has been rated with 0 from 2000 till 2011. This score indicates that “at least 75 percent of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens” (Coppedge et al. 2014).

During the last decades, public education in Egypt has been characterized by a number of problems, such as the insufficient number of schools, overcrowded classrooms, obsolete facilities, underpaid teachers, and a widespread system of private tuitions adopted by all families who could pay for it. Egypt was ranked last out of 148 countries surveyed in the 2012-2013 Global Competitiveness Report, published by the World Economic Forum, for the quality of its primary education, falling behind many Arab, African and Asian nations, including Algeria (ranked 131), Uganda (120), Chad (145), Bangladesh (115) (Schwab 2013).

In 2012 the situation improved, and Egypt rated with 1 in the V-Dem scale. This indicated that the provision of high quality basic education is still very unequal and “at least 25 percent of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens” (Coppedge et al. 2014). Despite the political unrest following the 2011 Revolution, some reforms were introduced by the new governments: a 33 per cent increase in public funding for education was approved between 2011 and 2012, and the Egyptian Constitution of 2014 stipulates that the allocation for education should be no less than 4 per cent of the Gross National Product (GNP).

According to the 2013/2014 budget drafted in 2013 by the Ministry of finance, this percentage should have reached even the considerable value of 12% in 2014 (Egypt 2013). It is not clear weather this trend is going to be confirmed under the new military regime, as more recent figures are not yet available. The promised bump in public expenditure seems however unlikely given the current political and economic climate, and the percentage of GDP public spending

on education is likely to remain for the moment between 4% and 6%, considerably lower than regional and world averages.

Figure 100



Note: V-DEM "Health equality" variable maps the extent to which high quality basic healthcare is guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens. Possible scores range from 0 (extremely unequal) to 4 (equal).

Egypt was rated with 0 from 2000 to 2011. This indicated that the health inequality is extreme and "because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 75 percent of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined" (Coppedge et al. 2014).

According to WHO, in 2010 the Egyptian healthcare system was a highly fragmented one. The Ministry of Health provided 30-35% of services, mostly through primary care clinics; the Ministry of Higher Education provided about 30% of services through university hospitals; the third strand of public health care consisted of independent ministries — defence, transport, aviation, electricity and interior — and the Health Insurance Organization (HIO), accounting for more than 10% of services (World Health Organisation 2010). While the HIO was created decades ago as the umbrella organization that would provide all Egyptians with insurance and care, it ended up covering only government employees and school-age children. A large part of the population, and especially the 26% of Egyptians living below the poverty line, could only rely on the overcrowded and crumbling primary care clinics and hospitals, while all most sophisticated treatments tended to be provided by an expensive parallel private sector.

In 2012, the situation was reportedly improved, and Egypt was rated 1 in the V-Dem scale. As we saw above, also the satisfaction of the population regarding public services in the country saw a general improvement from 2012 on. However, this seems to be connected more to the reforms the new governments declared to plan than to actually implemented ones. The new constitution mandates that government expenditures on health care increase to 3% of GDP by 2017. Among the reforms planned by the new government there is the intention to implement a system of universal health insurance for every Egyptian by 2030 (World Health Organization 2014). According to the latest WHO data, there has been an increase in total

expenditure on health as % of GDP, although it is hard to determine how they have been invested (World Health Organization 2013).

As noted above, a reinforcement in health services could surely contribute to the consensus of the new military regime, and constitute one of the components of a neo-authoritarian social contract.

Figure 101



Note: this indicator computed by the World Bank Development refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but avail-able for and actively seeking employment. The primary sources for this score are the International Labour Organization and the Key Indicators of the Labour Market database.

World Bank data show a worsening of unemployment in Egypt from 2010, with a new peak reached in 2013. As noticed above, the high rate of unemployment in the country has been considered by many authors one of the most important components of the social pressure resulting in the 2011 uprisings. In this sense, the lowering of unemployment rates started in 2014, if confirmed, could became one key factor in consolidating the consensus around the new military regime, and to make up for the oppressive security measures implemented by the same authoritarian government. However, youth unemployment is a significant and growing problem: having remained relatively stable over the 2000-2010 period, it has increased very significantly since the January Revolution, stabilizing at just over 40 per cent after the 2013 coup.

Figure 102



Source: World Development Indicators.

Civil Society Organisations

In Democratic Transition theories, Civil society's development has generally been seen as one of the prerequisites to start a successful transition towards democracy. These theories often assume a separation of the political and social sphere, based on the model of liberal democracies. This separation however is hard to find in practice in any country, and MENA cases offer a variety of examples of how the relations between social groups and political power can be complex and contradictory, despite a steady growth of the so-called 'third sector'.

In classical Democratization literature, Civil society is generally described as the counterpart of a well-defined liberal democratic political system, and its development is seen as a necessary – if not sufficient – condition for helping 'pry open' authoritarian regimes, for a successful transition and eventual consolidation, enabling the population to challenge authoritarian systems. Amongst other things, this view has come under fire from outside orthodox approaches for implying a clear distinction of civil society from political society, despite the artificiality of the borders dividing the two. Authoritarian Resilience models either emphasise the absence/weakness of civil society, or the 'uncivil' or 'illiberal' nature of religious NGOs in particular. In the context of the Arab Uprisings, the more successful transition process started by Tunisia compared to other countries has been attributed to the higher degree of organization and autonomy of Tunisian CSOs. Conversely, Authoritarian Resilience approaches – increasingly popular as Western commentators in particular began to worry about an 'Islamist winter' – have often underlined how Arab civil society weakness, and its dependency from the state, makes it an unlikely allied for democracy promotion.

One of the considerable merits of Area Studies literature generally and of work on the Middle East in particular has been to show that blind faith in the 'third sector' was ill-placed. Beyond objections to the way civil society is conceived in orthodox approaches (sketched in D1.1), studies such as those by Maha Abdelrahman (Abdelrahman 2004) showed regimes were also setting up or co-opting CSOs, and others like Camau (Camau 2002) outlined the complex game of repression and resistance played by regimes and their oppositions with donors and with the very categories being used to analyse this politics. Such sophistication was lost in the enthusiasm of initial reactions to the Uprisings – particularly in the early days of Tunisia's and Egypt's apparently successful revolutions – but clearly has a place in analysis. In addition, there

is an ongoing debate over the 'civility' of Islamist NGOs, and thus whether these should 'count' or not as indication of the 'democratic potential' of Arab civil society. While Islamic religious organisations – with their long-term record of charitable activities and community support, and provision of essential welfare and educational services which the state is no longer willing or able to supply – surely cannot be dismissed as 'radicalism incubators', their interaction with domestic and regional political powers remains highly controversial.

This section brings together 'objective' indicators concerning civil society (e.g. V-DEM indicators on Civil society participation index, and 'Core Civil Society Index), with survey data both on membership of CSOs and on perceptions of the freedom to join and trust in NGOs and CSOs.

Egypt

In Egypt, some aspects of the picture described by Abdelrahman (Abdelrahman 2002) in her influential study on society organisations and hegemonic power in Egypt are still relevant after 2011. In her view, NGOs can be in danger of promoting class inequalities and contribute to reproducing existing hierarchies, and conflicts of interests typical of capitalist societies, being themselves part of bigger 'corporative' mechanism: "Advocates of civil society and associative democracy, like their classical liberal predecessors, in their preoccupation with limiting the role of the state, pay little attention to the problems within civil society itself, and fail to realise the difficulties in reconciling its inherent contradictions" (Abdelrahman 2002). From a similar perspective Albrecht (Albrecht 2005) investigated the way in which, under Mubarak, the political but also social opposition was indirectly – and often involuntarily – contributing to the legitimation and to the survival of the authoritarian regime. In his view, the tolerated opposition parties and NGOs worked in some cases as a "tool" for societal control, reinforcing the regime's political legitimacy and providing it with organisations capable of controlling societal forces outside the formal political sphere (Albrecht 2005). Some other organisations, though, were treated as political opponents by the Mubarak regime, and continued to be equally repressed under the new regimes, indicating that not all types of NGOs are likely to be co-opted.

More recently, following the 2011 revolution and the installation of a new military regime, it seems that 'licensed' Civil Society Organisations (CSO) have lost credibility and support compared to the more informal political and social movements who were behind recent political struggles. As Bellin observed, "democracy commonly emerges from social movements and explicitly political struggles that involve instability, violence, and even civil wars, and not from licensed, and therefore necessarily limited, opposition to authoritarianism" (Bellin 2014). However, it should be remembered that in 2013 not only the official trade union, but also social movements such as the two independent workers' organization federation, EFITU and EDLC, as well as other political activists' groups which had actively resisted the authoritarian rule before, supported the military coup and the establishment of the military-dominated government that followed.

Despite these contradictions, the number of registered NGOs in Egypt continued to grow (there were more than 16,000 in 2003, 26,000 in 2010 and 47,000 in 2014) (UN Human Rights Council 2014; Ruffner 2015). The ousting of Mubarak in February 2011 provided NGOs with a hope that they could finally work autonomously and actively promote (democratic) reforms, but their hope has not yet been realized. Rather, NGOs in Egypt seem to be now oppressed by the current regime even more than they were during the Mubarak era. Since witnessing the critical role of a

mass mobilization from 2011 onward, ruling elites in Egypt have considered CSOs one of the most threatening forces, and have tried to hamper the growing influence of NGOs in various ways. Although a highly restrictive NGO law already existed under the Mubarak regime, according to the International Center for Not for Profit Law (ICNL), these restrictions functioned as a legal framework to empower government agencies, rather than to dissolve or prohibit CSOs. The restrictive laws worked as a sort of red line, sending a signal to NGOs that they could only promote whatever value within the boundary allowed by the government (ICNL 2016). The current conditions in which a bulk of NGOs are being dissolved and intimidated suggest that the Sisi regime is determined to debilitate NGOs in order to consolidate the regime's control over civil society. According to the announcement from the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), the Ministry of Social Solidarity founded the Committee of Experts in April 2015, and it has investigated the Egyptian Democratic Academy (EDA), the Hisham Mubarak Law Center (HMLC), the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR) and CIHRS to see whether they conform to its mandate. Given their activities and influence, these NGOs saw the government's direct involvement as an outright attempt to put an end to the existence of autonomous civil society which has been self-empowered since the Uprising (CIHRS 2015). Furthermore, the current regime's hostility to NGOs appear in its frequent official announcements on pro-government media. In September 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement, accusing international NGOs of reporting lies to cause instability in Egypt and to support terrorism, with activities targeting the Egyptian people (Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Egypt 2015). In state-controlled newspapers, NGOs are often depicted as allies of terrorists and the Muslim Brotherhood, or as the 'long hand' of foreign interests – ironically, the very same governments propping up the Sisi regime – attempting to destroy Egypt and break up the Middle East (Ruffner 2015). These and similar cases attest the escalating distrust and tension between the regime and civil society in Egypt.

Survey Indices

Figure 103

Note: ArabTrans Membership in CSOs index has been computed by combining survey variables from ArabTrans, Arab Barometer and World Values Survey. It indicates membership to at least one of the following organizations: (1) Member of charitable/ humanitarian organization; (2) Member of professional association or trade union; (3) Membership of labour unions; (4) Membership of professional organization; (5) Member of a local development association; (6) Member of a cooperative association; (7) Membership of church or religious organization; (8) Membership of art, music, educational; (9) Member of a youth/cultural/ recreation / sport organization; (10) Member of a family/tribal association; (11) Membership of any other organization.

The suggestion amongst certain 'transitologists' that the number of CSOs was somehow directly linked to the likelihood of democratic transition was always overly simplistic, and in the Egyptian case in particular it is clear that the type and political alignment of such supposedly neutral repositories of civic virtue are important factors in either enhancing the pressure civil society can exert on government, or indeed neutralizing it.

Although the number of Egyptian citizens who declare themselves to be members of social, cultural or political organization is extremely low, it increased considerably after 2011. Anecdotal and ethnographic evidence suggests most of these organisations arose originally to protest conditions in the late Mubarak era. Their political orientation cannot necessarily be assumed to be both pro-democratic and anti-regime insofar as some for groups, nationalism and opposition to the Brotherhood were sufficiently strong to lead them to support the 2013 army coup.

The increase in their numbers matches the rise in the number of organizations registered in the country, particularly the growth of NGOs, which also doubled from 2010 to 2014. This growth also reflects the important role played by several social organisations – 'civil' or religious, new or traditional – in contributing to the 2011 Revolution, and mediating between the population and the institutions in the several stages of negotiation that followed. This growth however, stopped in 2014, with the consolidation of military regime and the introduction of new repressive measures targeting in particular organization funded by international networks or agencies.

While in Democratic Transition literature the growth and consolidation of Civil Society Organisations is traditionally associated with an opening or progress of the democratization process, the rise in the number of Civil Society Organization between 2011 and 2013 in Egypt coincides instead with a counter-revolution and with the establishment of a new authoritarian regime. It could be argued that this growth might be of support to new democratic developments in the future. However, for the moment, given the repressive measures adopted by the current regime and the previous history of controversial relations between civil society organisations and political power in Egypt, it seems unlikely that the growth in CSOs participation alone might lead to any further democratic opening. What this growth does suggest, however, is an increasing demand for representation and action by citizens on a range of specific issues. This might tally with the dissatisfaction expressed by citizens with government performance on a range of specific issues – healthcare provision, education, etc. – and the rise in independent labour unions is associated with the increasing precarious labour conditions coupled with the ineffectiveness of the official trade union federation, ETUF, in effectively representing workers.

Figure 104



Note: the graph shows positive responses to Arab Barometer question on "Freedom to join NGOs and civil society organizations" in 2011 and 2013 in Egypt.

Answers to this further variable from Arab Barometer partially contradict the previous data on membership in Civil Society Organisations showed above. While membership levels rose from 2011 to 2013, the perception of people's freedom to join such organization *de*creased during the same period. This could be due to the increasing social and political tensions that characterized this transition period, in which joining a well-identified organization meant also become an easier target for different factions and for increasingly repressive government security services. Another way of interpreting this contradiction is to focus on the *mismatch* between the perceived structural containment, that is the high level of threat or repression, and the perceived 'opportunity' related to the political opening, that lead to the high level of participation in CSOs. In this sense it could be argued that the perceived opportunities for further political change was likely to be stronger than the structural threat during the period from 2011 to 2013, as Kurzman (1996) suggested in his analysis of the Iranian revolution. In both cases, the growth in membership is all the more significant given the decline in perception of freedom to join. However, the perception of increased difficulties to joining seems to corroborate the notion that the 2013 coup marks the definitive end of a phase of transition towards a more democratic system, confirming the consolidation of a more repressive and authoritarian regime.

One clear example of the intimidating climate surrounding NGOs activities is the foreign funding case, in which 17 NGOs were convicted. Case No. 173/2011 dates back to December 2011 when prosecutors, backed by the police, stormed the offices of 17 local and international NGOs, including the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, and Freedom House. The NGOs were investigated for allegedly receiving 'illegal' foreign funding and/or for being unregistered. The case that continued under Morsi's government resulted in the conviction and sentencing of 43 foreign and Egyptian NGO employees to prison in 2013. Five international organizations were also forced to close. Since then, authorities have issued a number of executive decrees placing NGOs under the direct supervision and control of the Ministry of Social Solidarity. In September 2014, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi issued a presidential decree criminalizing the receipt of foreign funds for activities the state deems a threat to national security, with penalties of life-imprisonment and/or hefty fines. At the he beginning of 2016, government authorities reopened the investigation to include a number of prominent rights groups in Egypt, imposing travel bans and asset freezes on their leaders, and interrogated staff.

Figure 105



Note: The trust in different organizations index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of the following three indicators from Arab Barometer and World Value Survey: (1) Trust in charitable or humanitarian organizations; (2) Trust in Trade/Labour and Professional Unions; (3) The Women´s Movement. The graph shows the number of people that have a great deal or a lot of trust in these institutions.

The significant decrease in the level of trust in Civil Society Organisations from 2001 to 2008 corresponds to a period during the last years of Mubarak rule in which several independent CSOs were co-opted by the government, and become part of its economic and political networks, or were sidelined by a number of Civil Society Organisations directly sponsored by the government. The paradox of “GoNGOs” (Governmental Non-Governmental Organisations), documented in the academic literature from the early 2000s, seemed in this sense to have successfully undermined the credibility of the sector, at least until 2008, when anti-Mubarak movements started to become stronger and to gain new consensus and visibility among different segments of the society.

The other important cleavage among Egyptian CSOs is the split between Islamist NGOs – especially those connected to the Brotherhood – and their secular counterparts. The former are usually both more numerous and better funded – partly by Egypt’s ‘pious bourgeoisie’, partly by Gulf donors – and certainly as a whole have a broader and deeper nationwide reach than their secular counterparts. Since the 2013 coup, both kinds of organisations have been targeted by regime propaganda and repression: Brotherhood groups often being accused of being ‘terrorist’ groups, and secular counterparts accused of supporting such terrorist groups. Although the regime repression of such groups is significant, it should be noted that in particular in relation to religious charities the government is partially dependent on these to provide the services – in particular education and healthcare – it is unwilling to fund.

Macro Indicators

Figure 106

Note: The V-DEM: Civil society participation index captures the following questions: "are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymaker; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?" (Coppedge et al. 2015). The scale of the index is from 0 to 1.

The V-Dem index on Civil Society participation confirms previous data on membership in CSOs, indicating a rise in the participation from 2010-2011. This data also seem to confirm that participation in civil society organization, understood in a broader way and not only confined to the category of the non-political or non-religious associations postulated by orthodox Democratization models, has been strongly related to the phase of mobilization that ultimately led to the 2011 Revolution.

Figure 107



Note: the graph show the scores of a composite index computed as mean of min-max normalized values of two indices from V-DEM project: CSO repression (0-4) and V-DEM: CSO consultation (0-2).

This composite index confirms the survey data presented above, although it does not capture the decrease in freedom of CSO that other indicators suggest worsened from 2013, following the implementation of repressive measures by the new military regime specifically targeting Civil Society Organisations, given the political relevance it acquired within the years preceding the January Revolution.

Figure 108



Note: V-Dem "core civil society" index (CCSI) is designed to provide a measure of "a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived" (Coppedge et al. 2014). These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem core civil society index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1.

According to this V-DEM, the "core civil society", or the robustness and independence of civil society in Egypt showed no substantial change before or after the uprising, despite the revolutionary changes the country went through. This could be due to the persistent threats involved with membership of civil society organisations in the country, first during the Mubarak era and then during a turbulent transition phase culminated in the establishment of a new authoritarian regime.

The picture that emerges of Civil Society from available data confirms work conducted in Area Studies to the effect of an increasing number and activity of CSOs both before and after the January Revolution, as well as the sense of a still limited overall size and political influence of the sector. These studies also alert to the splits within civil society – particularly along pro-/anti-Islamist and pro-/anti-regime lines – which do not necessarily easily map onto a simplistic pro-/anti-democracy dualism.

Religion, Identity & Social Life

Religion – and particularly Islam – has often been portrayed in mainstream Democratisation literature as a factor opposing political 'modernisation'. However, the global growth of religious movements seen in the last two decades resulted in very diverse political trajectories, making the claim of a singular relation between religion/religious movements and modernisation or indeed democracy even more precarious.

A common thread in Democratisation theories is the idea that democracy is furthered precisely by the separation of religious and political beliefs, or at least of religious and political institutions ('church and state'). Early examples of such 'secularization' literature variously claimed that Islam did not display a separation between 'church' and state, or that it was still awaiting an 'Islamic reformation', or indeed pointing at different theological-jurisprudential elements in Islam which were supposedly incompatible with secularization. A later strand of Democratisation literature focused on 'political culture' or 'political capital' rather than religion, but equally entailed a claim of incompatibility between 'Islamic culture' and democracy, providing useful arguments to Authoritarian Resilience models.

The 'Brittle Authoritarianism' model does offer a different perspective – as do more critical approaches to political transformations – making it possible to place Arab states' political structures within a theoretical framework that avoids Orientalism but recognises the importance of previous local 'political culture' as imposed or agreed-upon but always changeable norms.

The relation between religion and social/political life has also been historically one of the most debated issues in MENA area studies. This question became increasingly politically as well as analytically topical since the resurgence of political Islam since the 1970s into become a regional and global phenomenon. While traditional Orientalist scholarship tended to take essentialist views of identity – Arab or Islamic – and deterministic positions on the relation of these identities to politics, post-Orientalist scholarship has shown the variability of religious beliefs and identity politics across national (and sub-national) contexts. For example, particularly in North African states, it was the decline in the legitimacy of authoritarian states in the Eighties – not least due to the decline of 'authoritarian bargain' and the rising importance of religious organisations in welfare services – that paved the way for the re-emergence of Islamist movements, for social phenomena like 'retraditionalization,' and for political radicalization under a religious banner.

It is important to note that the debate over identity politics and its relation to political transformations is not limited to religion. National, sub-national, and trans-national identities are also an important factor related to (political) culture. While classical models assumed that a sense of national unity is an indispensable prerequisite for the transition process, the interrelation between national and transnational (political, cultural or religious) communities is at the heart of the definition of national political culture today.

This section brings together indicators (on the degree to which religious dogma determines decision-making, on freedom of religion, and on the range of consultation and degree of orientation towards the common good of decision-making) and survey data concerning perceptions of whether religious practice should be separated from socio-economic life, on gender and religion, on the degree to which religion is important in life and the degree to which people feel proud of their nationality, and finally on the desire more respect for authority and on the approval of national leadership.

Egypt

In Egypt, organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood, active since the early twentieth century, went far beyond this first stage, becoming an important component of the opposition to the ruling regimes. After the 2011 uprisings, optimistic expectations about a possible collaboration between moderate Islamic and non-religious parties in Egypt started to rise. As Rutheford wrote at the time, after 2011 "the state no longer dominates the economy and society. This situation has created opportunities for competing ideologies and institutions to emerge—most notably, a liberal conception of law within the judiciary and an Islamic conception of governance within the Muslim Brotherhood. These new approaches to constitutional order have grown into meaningful alternatives to the declining statism of the regime" (B. K. Rutherford 2013). However, the post-2011 opening was followed by the rapid rise and dramatic decline of the Brotherhood to power. The implications of this and other religious organisations – for example, organisations in the Salafi Da'wa – for a future democratic governance and stability in the country remain open to debate (Wickham 2013).

As mentioned above, 'culture' in the Arab world, whether religious or national, has often been presented as an argument for explaining the failure of democratization, with an overwhelming tendency to present Arab/Muslim culture as ahistorical and essentialized, as in the works of Orientalist scholars such as Elie Kedourie and Bernard Lewis (Lewis 1990), or indeed Samuel Huntington (Huntington 1993). At the same time, as Nicola Pratt argued that 'culture', in its broad sense, can contribute to the understanding of the political and social structures of a given state, and in particular it can help understand the way collective national culture is used by those in power in order to promote and reinforce a shared national identity (Pratt 2005). In her study on Egypt, Pratt explained how "in the course of searching for an 'authentic' Egyptian identity, uncorrupted by Western influences, a critical mass of Egyptian civil society participates in producing a political consensus that excludes the possibility of fluidity and heterogeneity, thereby contributing to creating a climate in which civil and political freedoms may be legitimately sacrificed in the name of national unity and security" (Pratt 2005). Despite the efforts of some Egyptian activists to challenge dominant conceptions in order to open up democratic spaces, this process of identity construction, often presented "as a means of resistance to the West" contains "an anti-democratic logic" insofar as it too attempts to fix the meaning of 'Egyptian' or 'Arab' or 'Muslim' identity if only by contrast to Eurocentric categories and definitions used by former colonial powers (Pratt 2005).

However, an even cursory examination of the nation-building process shows its profoundly and explicitly political dimensions and implications. Nation-building and the emergence of a national identity proceeded in parallel with the consolidation and evolution of a regional, transnational 'Arab' identity (Barnett 1998). By analysing how the concept and consequences of 'Arabness' changed during the last decades over the MENA region, Phillips tries to address some fundamental questions, such as "why do citizens in these states still feel Arab?"; "What does Arab identity means to today's Arabs, and how does it interact with other identity ties, notably state nationalism and religion?" (Phillips 2012). Since the 1970s the attention to the importance of Arab identity in MENA literature has notably decreased (Ajami 1978), with most of scholarly attention now focused on religious-state ties. At the same time, ideas such as that of an 'Arab World', an 'Arab culture' or 'Arab Uprising' seem to imply that a common regional identity has been accepted as an established fact. In this sense, as Phillips argues, "rather than being a new phenomenon, Arabism has never gone away" (Phillips 2012) (AbuKhalil 1992), and its presence has to be considered alongside national, ethnic and religious factors in defining MENA citizens' perception of local and regional political and social transformations.

Survey Indices

Figure 109



Note: the index combines survey questions from Arab Barometer and ArabTrans asking if religious practice should be separated from socio-economic life. The graph shows the percentage of people who agree/strongly agree with the statement.

The percentage of people believing that religious practice should be separated from socio-economic life has been steadily decreasing since the Uprising, although it remains very high. This could be related to the new visibility acquired by religious groups after the fall of Mubarak's regime, which had oppressed them for decades. While most of groups and movements that supported the Revolution did not have a strong religious connotation and religion was consciously eschewed as a trope of protest save for showing Muslim-Christian solidarity, in the Revolution's aftermath well-established, better organized and better-funded organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood managed to attract more political consent and ultimately to win the elections.

It should be noted that the amount of people believing that "religious practice should be separated from socio-economic life" did not decrease only during the contested presidency of Mohamed Morsi, but actually accelerated after the 2013 military coup. This could be related to a different use of religion made by the two different governments. The government led by Morsi tried to implement new a new legislation based on religious principles, more specifically though its overwhelming parliamentary majority including the Salafi and other Islamist groups, and was highly contested for this with secularists and liberals in the demonstrations erupting in the country in 2012 and 2013. The new military regime instead uses religion mostly to legitimate its actions, resorting to the official religious establishments with the approval of religious leaders such as the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar and the Coptic Pope, combined with a new clampdown on leaders of opposing religious organisations. This strategy seems to be particularly instrumental in reinforcing a national consensus and a nationalist perspective while demonizing foreign influences.

Another possible explanation is the socio-economic conditions under which this novel interpretation of 'traditional' scholarship has been emerging, namely the country's increasing

socio-economic polarization: the claim, for example, that 'Islam' forbids the charging of interest for profit may reflect a broader demand for social justice.

In any case, such data seem to show that the separation between religious practice and from socio-economic life assumed as a necessary condition– albeit secondary to separation between religion and politics – by most orthodox Democratization theories is far from straightforward in Egypt as in other Arab countries, and also after 2011 the combination of these two aspects had an important role in shaping the political line of the new governments.

Figure 110



Note: The Gender and interpretation of Islam index is computed as mean of min-max normalized values of variables included in both Arab Barometer and ArabTrans surveys: (1) Gender-mixed education should be allowed in universities; (2) Women should wear modest clothes but not necessarily the hijab; (3) Women's share of inheritance should be equal to that of men; (4) The law should not allow to marry more than one woman; (5) Men and women should have equal rights in making the decision to divorce; (6) A woman can reject a marriage that her family chose for her without her consent; (7) The first wife's consent is a prerequisite for permitting a man to marry a second woman (% people who agree/strongly agree with the statements).

Our combined index on Gender and interpretation of Islam shows a significant trend towards less progressive attitudes on women's role in Egyptian society after 2012/2013. In fact, the percentage of the respondents who believe that religious teachings concerning the rights of women should not be interpreted in a conservative and discriminatory way dropped by about four points, reaching little more than half of the total. This negative trend could be related to discrimination Egyptian women faced after 2011, despite (or probably because of) their highly visible participation in the revolution, and given the fact that many of them became then the victims of sexual violence and abuse in the streets, particularly during 2013. The new legislation against sexual harassment, introduced by the new military regime in 2014, should have contributed to create a more progressive climate on issues related to gender differences, often backed by conservative interpretation of religious texts. Thus Sisi's regime – in this respect much like Mubarak's – on the one hand associates national honour with women's and presents his regime as its defender, while on the other hand, having established itself as defender of women it also presents itself as arbiter of appropriate femininity, thereby claiming for itself the credibility to tarnish dissident women's reputations (e.g. using 'virginity tests', or smearing them as it did Shamiaa al-Sabbagh, shot in the back and killed in broad daylight by police forces as she went to lay flowers in Tahrir Square). As such, as Pratt noted, the 'protection' granted to women's "honor" and respectability comes at the price of a new authoritarian and "patriarchal

bargain" (Pratt 2016). Indeed, after 2013 a specific new gender discourse began emerging in Egypt, one that "stresses the supposedly unanimous and uncontested support of 'Egyptian women' as a uniform category, to the Egyptian military in their war against Islamic terrorism and to the military State" (Zaki 2015). In several public speeches, Sisi frequently referred to Egyptian women as his "daughters", therefore casting himself as the "father" of the state (Elboubkri 2014). The national campaign against sexual harassment he launched after a new violent attack on nine women in Tahrir Square in June 2014 – a few days after the approval of the new law– called also for the joint participation of Al-Azhar and the Coptic Church.

As emerged from the data above, this political use of traditional and religious values "in support of women's rights" can also be located more broadly in a process of 'retraditionalizatoin' of social mores and political values in Egypt since the 1970s – one successive leaderships have sought to use and encourage to their own political advantage. Despite the long-history of Egyptian feminism, and the new kinds of political participation experienced by many young women during the Revolution, it seems that the revolutionary opening has been interrupted also in the area of gender rights and women's emancipation by the regime's conservative policies.

Figure 111



Note: the graph shows the percentage of respondents to Gallup World Poll survey who said that religion is important in their life.

According to Gallup survey data, the percentage of people who say that religion is important in their life has been decreasing over the past decade. This apparently contradicts the data above showing that in the same period an increasing number of Egyptians believed that religious practice should not be separated from socio-economic life (Figure 101). The different trends shown by the two indicators suggests that a decrease in what are generally perceived as "secularist" views does not necessarily imply a growing importance of religion in everyday life. Religion or religious practices could also be interpreted in fact by the respondents as a part of traditional culture, reinforcing collective identity through shared social practices, without having to have the same importance in individuals' life. In this sense, the assumptions on the separation of religion and politics made by orthodox models might create unnecessary contrasts between the collective and individual sphere, and show strong limits when applied to a context such as that of contemporary Egypt.

Alternatively, ArabTrans data for Egypt in 2014 on the issue of trust in religious leaders shows opinion is fairly split (44.6% vs. 36.4%) but opinion on whether religious leaders should have a say in public life is quite clear: 84.6 per cent believe clerics should not influence the way people vote, 65.7 per cent believe clerics should not influence government decisions.

Figure 112



Note: the graph shows the percentage of respondents to World Values Survey who said that proud or very proud of their nationality.

The percentage of people feeling proud of their Egyptian nationality has been steadily decreasing since 2001, although data does not capture what the effect of the January Revolution was, nor the August 2013 coup. The growing disconnection between Egyptian people and the state in the Mubarak era – dissatisfaction with the bureaucracy and living conditions, poor performance of all government institutions, corruption, etc. – eventually resulting in the 2011 Revolution, is one of the factors that might have influenced this trend. Another is the new pan-Arabist wave – after the historical one actively promoted by Egyptian Nasserist government in the Fifties – supported by satellite television and Internet-based media. The reinforcement of this bigger collective identity marker – "Being Arab"[5] – was probably seen as a more appealing alternative compared to a disappointing national dimension, especially for the younger generations, frustrated by the lack of jobs and the systematic government corruption.

[5] Recalling the book by the Lebanese scholar, journalist and pro-democracy activist Samir Kassir, assassinated in 2005 (Kassir 2006).

Figure 113



Note: percentage of respondents to World Values Survey who think it would be good, among future changes, to have greater respect for authority.

The percentage of people who view positively a greater respect for authority has decreased noticeably from 2000 to 2008, and then increased again in 2011. The 2008 nadir seems to correspond with a first important phase of mobilization against the Mubarak regime, followed by a restoration of authority after the 2011, when the Supreme Council of Armed Forces took control over transition process until the first post-revolutionary elections held in the country. The data referring to the year 2011 in the table are actually based on fieldwork that took place in Egypt between March and April 2012, just before the May 2012 elections that saw the victory of Mohamed Morsi, and as such likely reflects the trust with which the 'revolutionary' government was still awarded at this point.

Figure 114



Note: percentage of respondents answering positively to Gallup World Poll question on the approval of the country's leadership.

The approval of country's leadership dramatically increased since the imposition of Sisi's regime. The steady growth of the personal success of the leader of the new military regime resonates with academic literature focusing on authoritarian states ruled by "strong leaders". Figures like Sisi, creating personalized regimes, neo-patrimonial states and cult of the personality, appear to be particularly effective following periods of high social tension, political violence and uncertainty, performing the role of saviour of the nation which appears to have met with the approval of a substantial part of the population. Such approval levels seems to suggest that the new stability offered by the regime – although superficial and based on

repressive measures – is considered a positive result by a large part of those who took part in the 2011 revolution but who were dissatisfied under Morsi. Even considering these contextual elements, these numbers are very high, and reflect the cult of the personality surrounding Egypt's new leader. Although some commentators have claimed that "this style of sycophancy augurs the beginning of a new cult" (Sassoon 2016) it is notable that the Sisi regime has thus far done little more than smear and repress opponents, offering little in the way of solutions to the country's long-term economic problems. Indeed, security, which is one of the regime's key watchwords, has noticeably deteriorated since the 2013 coup, not just in terms of armed attacks both in Sinai and in Cairo, but also in the tension between domestic security forces which leaves ordinary citizens – who have often in the meantime become more mobilised and assertive since the 2011 uprising – unclear about their 'red lines' and even more exposed to abuse by security forces.

Macro Indicators

Figure 115



Note: The Quality of Government "No Interference of Religious Dogmas" variable, taken from Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) database, captures the extent legal order and political institutions are defined without interference by religious dogmas. The scale goes from 1 (theocratic state) to 10 (secular state).

With a score of 7, in 2008 Egypt was rated as a largely secular state, in which however "religious dogmas have considerable influence on legal order and political institutions" (Teorell, Dahlberg, Holmberg, et al. 2016). This rating decreased of one point towards theocracy in 2010 and 2012. This was surely influenced by the new political visibility and acquired by religious groups in Egypt during and after the fall of Mubarak regime, and particularly from 2012 on with the election of the Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi. However, the attempts of Morsi's government to implement legal and constitutional reforms based on religious principles were highly contested by secular sectors of the population. On the other hand, the new military regime, also tried to secure from the beginning the support of authoritative religious leaders in order to legitimize its mandate, and often used references to traditional religious values and principles to gain and strengthen popular consent. In this sense, as noted above, it seems that the definition of 'secularism' assumed in most orthodox Democratisation models does not take into account different possible combinations of religious values and political rationales that have been determinant in the last two governments in Egypt.

Figure 116



Note: The Freedom of Religion indicator by CIRI Human Rights Data Project indicates the extent to which the freedom of citizens to exercise and practice their religious beliefs is subject to actual government restrictions. The scores of government restrictions on religious practices go from 0 (severe and widespread) to 1 (moderate), and 2 (practically absent).

The 0 score assigned by this CIRI index to Egypt from 2000 to 2011 indicates that government restrictions on religious practices are “Severe and Widespread” (Cingranelli & Richards 2013). While Egyptian law protects in principle religious beliefs and practices, it also places several restrictions on these rights in practice. Islam is the official state religion, and other officially recognised religions are Christianity, including various types of churches, and a very small number of Jews left in the country after the mass expulsion by Nasser, following the 1956 Suez crisis. Christian Copts are the only sizeable religious minority in the country, estimated between 5 and 10 per cent of the population, although these numbers are often debated (Hulsman 2012). Other historical religious communities such as Ahmadiyya Islam, Bahá'í Faith and Hinduism are not recognised by the state. The number of Egyptians identifying themselves as atheist and agnostic is also largely unknown, as they risk legal punishment for apostasy. Conversion from Islam to other religions is also persecuted, and inter-religious weddings are highly problematic unless conversion to the same belief is proven. Several violent episodes of attacks to members of religious minorities (particularly Copts and Baha’i) were registered between the 2011 Revolution and the election of the Morsi government. After 2013, the new military regime tried to show from the beginning support for it by the Coptic community, by inviting the Coptic Pope, along with the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, to legitimate the coup against Morsi. The new 2014 constitution introduced minimal changes. As summarised by an official state report (US Department of State 2014), provisions for religious freedom remain restricted to followers of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. However the 2014 constitution now makes clear that freedom of belief is “absolute”, while it was previously only “protected”. There are still no guarantees for Shi’as, Sufis, Baha’is, atheists, and other communities, meaning that freedom of belief is not absolute in practice. While the new constitution provides for the establishment of an “anti-discrimination commission” and requires to pass a new law facilitating the construction of Christian churches, it also enables the government to prosecute individuals for “defaming religion”, and still does not recognize conversion from Islam to any

other religion. These limits and prohibitions, while rhetorically attributed to the conservatism of Egyptian society generally, allow the regime to continue its practice of presenting itself –both domestically and internationally – as defender of religious pluralism while simultaneously turning a blind eye to – if not participating more or less directly in – discrimination against religious minorities, much in the same way as it does with regard to women's rights.

Figure 117



Note: the graph shows the combination of two indicators from World Development database, Life expectancy at birth for men and Life expectancy at birth for women.

Life expectancy at birth variables by World Development indicate the number of years a new-born infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. Life expectancy at birth rose of about two years both for men and for women between 2000 and 2001. However, women have a higher life expectancy compared to man, with a difference of about five years that remained constant during the whole period considered, even though the two curves became slightly closer from 2010 onwards.

Figure 118



Note: The Quality of Government Group Grievance index explores when tension and violence exists between groups, the state's ability to provide security is undermined and fear and further violence may ensue. Includes pressures and measures related to discrimination, powerlessness, ethnic violence, communal violence, sectarian violence, religious violence. It is rated on a scale of 1-10.

The Group Grievance indicator clearly reflects an important phase of anti-government mobilisation in Egypt that took place between 2006 and 2007, with a number of union strikes, demonstrations and clashes with security forces. After a period of restoration, notably around

the 2010 elections, in 2011 the protest again the government mounted until becoming a revolution, followed by a transition phase marked by political, social and religious tensions and violence. Interestingly, the index does not register any decreasing level of group grievance after the installation of the new military regime in 2013, which according to other indicators this is supposed to have brought a new – although repressive – stability in the country. This reinforces the suggestion that the structural causes that lead the population to protests in 2011 remain unresolved and powerful enough to mobilise people despite increased regime repression.

Figure 119



Note: this V-DEM index shows answers to the following question "When important policy changes are being considered, i.e. before a decision has been made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions?". The scale goes from 0 (no justification) to 3 (sophisticated justification).

Egypt has scored 1.5 constantly, until a peak corresponding with the 2011 Revolution. The score of 2 implies that "Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why the proposed policies contribute to or detract from an outcome" (Coppedge et al. 2014). Interestingly, after 2012, in correspondence with the first revolutionary elections, the score went down again, implying that the justifications offered by the new elite were not matching the expectations for higher standards of political debate and transparency raised during the 2011 mobilisation.

Figure 120



Note: this index explores the question: "When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good?". Scores go from 0 (Little or no justification in terms of the common good) to 4 (Justifications are for the most part almost always based on explicit statements of the common good for society).

Egypt was rated with 1 from 2000 till 2010. That indicated a V-DEM classification that "Specific business, geographic, group, party, or constituency interests are for the most part offered as justifications" (Coppedge et al. 2014). From 2011, the score raised to 2, corresponding to a political context in which "Justifications are for the most part a mix of specific interests and the common good and it is impossible to say which justification is more common than the other" (Coppedge et al. 2014), and stayed stable until 2012. This value seems to partially contradict the data from the previous V-DEM indicator: while people perceive that political elites did not give public and reasoned justifications for their choices after 2011, they still assumed that these choices were at least partially justified by "common good" interests. This attitude is likely to be confirmed after Sisi became officially the national leader, and the consensus around his authority grew considerably, as shown with previous data.

Figure 121



Note: this index explores the question: "When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation at elite levels?". Scores go from 0 (no consultation) to 5 (consultation that engages elites from essentially all parts of the political spectrum).

Egypt was rated with 2 from 2000 till 2010. That indicated that there was very little and narrow consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling elites (Coppedge et al. 2014). In 2011, the index registered a significant change in the political scene in Egypt, with the fall of Mubarak regime and the opening of consultation to different parts. A score of 4 in fact indicates that consultation includes as before a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling elites, but in addition in also involves a select range of society/labour/business representatives (Coppedge et al. 2014). After 2011, the score went back to pre-revolutionary levels, indicating a closing of the political scene and a consolidation of the new undemocratic elite's power already under Morsi.

Figure 122



Note: V-DEM Engaged society index explores the question: "When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?". Scores go from 0 (Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed) to 5 (Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies).

Egypt was rated 2 from 2000 till 2010, indicating for V-DEM that public deliberation was “not repressed but nevertheless infrequent” and non-elite actors were “typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites” (Coppedge et al. 2014). Following the revolution, in 2011 Egypt was rated 4, indicating that public deliberation was “actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participated and varied with different issue-areas” (Coppedge et al. 2014). However, as for the previous two indicators, according to V-Dem this opening in consultations engaging Egyptian society did not continue with the new post-revolutionary governments.

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