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
# The Arab Transformations WORKING PAPER

NUMBER 4

ArabTrans Project Framework Paper

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UNIVERSITY  
OF ABERDEEN



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Ethical approval for the Project was given through the Ethical Review Procedures of the University of Aberdeen.

Further details of the project can be found on the project web site at [www.arabtrans.eu](http://www.arabtrans.eu).

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# 1. Introduction

The Arab Uprisings represented a series of events unprecedented in the history of the Middle East: mass, popular and largely non-violent uprisings took place starting in December 2010 in Tunisia and reverberating throughout the region. These protests threatened – and in several cases resulted in the overthrow of – apparently stable autocratic regimes. The unprecedented nature and extensive domestic, regional and international impact of the Uprisings in and of itself merits attention, but coming hard on the heels of a global financial crisis and given the resonance of the Arab Uprisings with protest movements beyond the region, these Uprisings appear all the more significant beyond the region itself. The significance of the Uprisings is not just academic, however: the Middle East is one of the most frequently conflictual regions in the world, it is central to the global political economy – e.g. as a source of hydrocarbon fuels, and as a global logistical nexus –, it is a source of and transit point for migratory flows towards Europe, and its autocracies have been supported as key allies by Western governments, both in Europe and North America.

This project aims to generate new data and analyses of the Uprisings themselves, but is also sensitive to the policy implications of these analyses. The objective of the ArabTrans project is to contribute particularly to a better empirical understanding of the Uprisings and of the longer-term processes that lead to them and which they epitomise. To do this, the project will a) identify the principal approaches to transitions between political systems as they pertain to the Middle East generally and to the Arab Uprisings in particular; b) identify a series of political, economic, and social categories and variables based on these orthodox approaches; c) evaluate the available literature and existing data on the basis of these variables; and d) design a survey based on available data in order to facilitate the creation of a useful longitudinal database against which long-term trends and transformations might be identified.

While the project will use existing data sets from public opinion surveys to look at long-time trends and transformations in public opinion, it will update and integrate these data by carrying out a new survey which will provide up to date information on public opinion in the MENA countries in 2014. This survey will use relevant questions that have been used in previous surveys to facilitate the longitudinal analysis as well as adding new questions to answer questions that arise from the literature review, particularly focusing on security, detailed questions on participation in the Uprisings and on EU-MENA relations, as well as additional questions on media, including social media use. These survey data will then be combined in a longitudinal database with non-survey quantitative data, enabling measurements of long-term trends and transformations.<sup>1</sup>

This report sets out the rationale for, objectives of, and analytical structure and methods for the Arab Transformations Project (ArabTrans). After a general introduction to the events and significance of the Arab Uprisings (also known as ‘Arab Spring’ or ‘Arab Revolutions’), the report a) identifies the challenges posed to both scholarship and policymaking by the Uprisings; b) identifies project objectives which might help address those challenges; c) on that basis it outlines an analytical strategy, project structure, and research questions which operationalize the pursuit of those objectives; and d) outlines the methods required by each step of the project structure.

## *Background: Context and Development of the Uprisings*

The Arab Uprisings began in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid as a protest against the police’s arbitrary treatment of Muhammad Bouazizi, who committed suicide by setting

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<sup>1</sup> For a discussion of the trade-off between using questions from other surveys to permit longitudinal analysis and asking questions on new issues/topics, see (Abbott et al., 2016)

himself on fire outside the town's police station in desperation at police harassment. These protests snowballed into an increasingly broad nationwide protest which, despite government attempts to repress it and prevent awareness of it spreading, quickly took on national and mass proportions, moving from countryside towns towards the capital thanks in no small part to social media's ability to bypass state-controlled national media. An increasingly desperate regime turned to the armed forces asking that they fire upon peaceful protesters, but the Tunisian Army refused, effectively forcing President Ben Ali out of office. These events gripped not only Tunisia but the entire Arab region, and indeed increasingly caught world attention. Opponents of autocracies across the Middle East watched the Tunisian regime – infamous for the extensive reach the domestic security services had in its 'soft autocracy' – in disarray in the face of widespread peaceful popular mobilization and activists around the region wondered whether such events could come to their countries as well. In early January 2011, protests took place in several countries, including Oman and Morocco, but most notably in Yemen, Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria. The most significant of these in terms of scale and regional impact was certainly protests in Egypt starting on January 25<sup>th</sup> and which sparked nationwide protests on January 28<sup>th</sup>. By February 12<sup>th</sup>, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had been forced to step down, and protests of various sizes were taking place across most of the region.

These protests caught both people and governments unaware inside and outside the region. Participants and observers both within the region and beyond were surprised at the apparent ease with which mass mobilization wrong-footed supposedly efficient authoritarian regimes, galvanizing protesters, dismaying regime supporters, and leaving Western governments' policies in disarray.

Governments reacted quickly, and where Tunisian, Egyptian and Yemeni regimes had trodden relatively carefully, the Libyan and Syrian regimes swiftly resorting to violent repression. Most Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) governments, particularly Saudi Arabia, attempted to prop up their regional counterparts, helping Bahrain's rulers quash protests, pressuring Western governments not to support protesters, and even offering Jordan and Morocco GCC membership. Qatar sought to ride the wave of Egypt's protests, aligning itself with the Muslim Brotherhood in something of a proxy competition with the Saudis. Meantime, Western governments were caught in a bind: on the one hand committed to support democracy and human rights as 'fundamental values', while on the other hand having wedded themselves to autocratic regimes on 'pragmatic' grounds and espousing those regimes' own narratives of a slow transition.

Nonetheless, protesters won significant victories: Tunisian President Ben Ali resigned on January 14<sup>th</sup>, Egyptian President Mubarak stepped down on February 11<sup>th</sup> and protests flare in Bahrain on February 14<sup>th</sup> and in Syria on the 15<sup>th</sup>, with smaller protests in Iran, Iraq (albeit these were less related to the Arab Uprisings themselves and more to ongoing strife since 2003), Morocco, and Jordan. For all the assumed resilience of these authoritarian regimes, conventional instruments of repression and cooption appeared ineffective, betraying both the regimes' lack of support domestically, and the precariousness of the altar of stability upon which Western allies had sacrificed the pursuit of democracy.

By mid-2011, Tunisia and Egypt appeared to be struggling for transitions away from authoritarianism, Libya and Syria had descended into conflict, Bahrain's protests had been bloodily repressed with the Saudis sending forces across the King Fahd Bridge, Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies had promised reforms, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies were moving to shore up authoritarian regimes, and Algeria alone appeared not to have experienced significant protests. By late October 2011, Syria and Yemen were mired by conflict, the Libyan conflict had been brought to an end with Gaddafi's assassination and foreign intervention, and only renewed protests preventing Egypt – however temporarily – from descending into counter-revolution. Many observers began to describe events either as an 'Arab Winter' where conflict dominated, or as an 'Islamist Winter,' where Islamist

parties appeared the best placed to translate popular uprisings into electoral advantage, as in Tunisia and Egypt, and where some claimed Islamist groups would suppress embryonic democracy.

### *The Challenges of the Arab Uprisings for Analysis and Policy*

The Uprisings represent a challenge both to analysis and to policy. At an analytical level, the Uprisings represent a major event which must be explained. However, existing models of transformations/transitions or indeed lack thereof (transitions to democracy, resilient authoritarianism, and hybrid regimes being the main three) face major challenges in doing so. For example, the fact of the uprisings needs to be explained by authoritarian resilience models, particularly those relying on culturalist claims (e.g. that Arab culture or Islam as a religion make transitions away from authoritarianism difficult if not impossible, such as Hutnginton's 'clash of civilisations' thesis). Certainly, during the high points of the Uprisings, regional autocracies appeared much more **fragile** than the literature on authoritarianism had supposed. On the other hand, the Uprisings represent a challenge for models of transitions to democracy, since only Tunisia can be said to have experienced a transition to a semblance of democracy: Uprisings mostly **did not lead to democracy**, at least yet. In addition, both sets of models need to be able to explain the **timing and outcome** of the Uprisings, and indeed the **diversity** of those outcomes in different cases. On a more specific level, the Uprisings were notable for the important role of trade unions before and during the protests (particularly the strong and relatively independent unions in Tunisia), and of Islamist parties in determining post-Uprisings trajectories (e.g. Tunisia's Nahda, Egypt's Freedom and Justice Party).

From the point of view of policy-making towards the region, the Uprisings represent a challenge for example to major regional and international actors' **conceptions of security and democratization**: understanding democracy and its promotion as focusing on elections and certain civil-political rights, and understanding security as the absence of conflict had contributed to Western policy-makers prioritising 'stability' over democratization. Then-French Interior Minister Michelle Alliot-Marie's offer to Ben Ali to help control Tunisia protests in their early stages suggests how entrenched – and how mistaken – that prioritisation of stability as absence of change was. This suggests a broader problem, namely that a better understanding of socio-political transformations generally can inform policy-makers' **re-evaluation of goals and instruments** of policy.

## **2. Project Objectives**

The challenges the Uprisings pose suggest a number of objectives for the project.

The goal of the project is to describe, explain and understand the root causes, the evolution and future outlook of the Arab Uprisings (also known as 'Arab Spring' or 'Arab Revolutions'). To do this, the project analyses socio-political transformations in seven Arab countries with a focus on examining homogeneities and heterogeneities in regional and historical development.

- The project will examine comparatively the beliefs, values and behaviour of Arab public opinion in several countries with respect to political transformations and social transformations through use of comparative sample surveys. The countries covered are: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq.
- This subjective survey data will be grounded in a series of national reports for each country (area expertise and qualitative data) and objective longitudinal data (also quantitative) which will significantly enhance the description and analysis of processes of political and social transformation.

In addition, the project will:

- compare the values, attitudes and behaviour of citizens of Arab countries over time by systematic comparison with other comparative cross-national and national surveys carried out in the region since 2000 – with such a diachronic comparison greatly increasing the scope and accuracy of conclusions;
- examine the factors which triggered the political and social transformations in the Arab World since January 2011;
- monitor the evolution and pathways of socio-political change in seven countries of the Arab World, namely Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq;
- describe and explain the specific role of young people in 7 Arab countries;
- describe and explain the impact of the Uprisings on the EU's role in the region;
- compare trajectories of socio-political transformations both within countries over time and between different countries.

The project will help to outline, examine, and inform policy options with regard to the political and social change in these countries. It will provide a valuable and unique source of comparative data, building on previous knowledge, which will be of use to the EU, the policy-making community, the scientific community, and a range of non-governmental stakeholders. It will also help to create a common research area across the European Union's Southern neighbourhood in the Southern and South-Eastern part of the Mediterranean area, since many of these countries have been left out of international research programmes, or incompletely included until now.

### 3. Conceptual Framework

This section translates the objectives described above into a conceptual framework.

Part of the function of this report is to outline the literature on political transformations (transitions to democracy, authoritarian resilience, and 'hybrid regimes') focusing on the way such transformations/transitions – particularly those towards democracy – have been conceptualised. Work Package 2 will build on this outline to offer a detailed literature review with particular focus on individual countries with a view to arriving at the precise formulation of the research to be carried out in the remainder of the project. This report focuses on what *ways* of understanding there are, what *types* of explanations there are for why the Uprisings happened and for what happened after the Uprisings. In turn, this makes it possible to identify the specific research questions the project will investigate through new research using a public opinion survey, the secondary analysis of macrodata and survey data, and discourse analysis.

The section begins with an outline of the analytical and political contexts and problems within which the toolkit offered by existing scholarship was forged, paying particular attention to the debates over/limitations in conceptions of democracy, authoritarianism, and political systemic transformations leading towards one and away from the other.

It then outlines approaches found in the literature to the question of democratic transitions (or lack thereof) in general and in the Middle East in particular, and identifying the principal domains / categories these approaches use and the variables they focus on in order to analyse the transformation of political systems.

#### 3.1. Challenges for the Democratisation Toolkit

By the Middle of the 1990s, orthodox approaches to political transformations towards democracy came to be dominated – including at the level of operationalization into policy –



by so-called 'transitology'. Not least thanks to the apparent success of the transitions towards democracy by CEEC countries formerly in the Soviet bloc, 'transitologists' explained successful democratization by emphasising key aspects of procedural definitions of democracy (particularly competitive, free, and fair elections) and the role of civil society in constraining the authoritarian impulses of the state.

This apparent success in the political transition towards democracy was in turn instrumental in helping legitimise the specific kind of ('neoliberal') economic reforms – particularly privatization – which were being required by Western dominated International Financial Institutions (IFIs), namely so called 'shock doctrine'. The clear economic misery these produced for the bulk of post-Soviet populations, worryingly widespread electoral fraud, emerging demagogic trends, vast and deep corruption, and the shocking pauperization of the state – and thus the society it supposedly acted in the interest of – by Western-mandated privatizations in post-Soviet 'democracies' were all justified as necessary collateral damage of processes that would lead to both short-term political gains and the promise of longer-term economic gains.

By the end of the decade and the century, however, this optimism became difficult to sustain. Several countries in the Caucasus and in CEEC followed Belarus and Azerbaijan in being downgraded even by Freedom House to 'not free': Democratization's supposed 'third wave' was being undermined by a 'reverse wave' of authoritarianism. The implications for analysis and for policy of this authoritarian riptide were temporarily ignored in part thanks to the 'Colour Revolutions' of the early 2000s – Georgia's 'Rose revolution' of November 2003, and Ukraine's 'Orange Revolution' at the end of 2004 – although these, too, quickly showed their limitations.

Coupled with this 'democratic backsliding' in post-Soviet transitional states, the shift towards 'hybrid regimes' (façade democracies, or 'democracies with adjectives') in the Middle East, and the post-9/11 erosion of democracy through its 'securitization' among Western consolidated liberal democracies raised questions both about the political future of democracy and about the analytical categories and concepts underpinning its analysis.

### 3.2. Principal Limitations of Existing Approaches

The ensuing debate has yet to overcome important analytical and political obstacles, amongst which is the narrowness in the conception of democracy employed in both scholarly work and policy practice. Amongst these limitations, four particular tendencies are explored here under the following headings: determinism, teleology, polarity, and taxonomy.

#### *Determinism*

From 'within' the democratization paradigm, O'Donnell and Schmitter had already in 1986 warned about the complexity of the transition process in their seminal volume, pointing out the precariousness and reversibility of political transformations, as well as the possibility of 'stalled' transitions at intermediate stages, such as what they called *democradura* and *dictablanda*, or – depending on the balance between authoritarian elements, reformists and revolutionaries in the opposition – the tipping of controlled democratization such as they envisaged into open revolution (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986).

#### *Teleology*

In addition, O'Donnell (1996a, 1996b) criticised the 'teleological' tendency amongst 'transitologists' to think purely in terms of the movement between authoritarianism and democracy, and specifically to think of the North-Western liberal incarnation of democracy as the highest and final point of democratising trajectories, assuming a fundamentally linear,

or polar, taxonomy defined by two prescribed end points – totalitarianism and liberal democracy (Collier & Levitsky, 1996; Diamond, 2003; Huntington, 1968; Linz & Stepan, 1996).


### **Polarity**

Most analyses and policy design, however, oversimplified ‘transition’, treating democratization as linear, close to deterministic, and with (marketised) liberal democracy as its terminal point (O’Donnell, 1996a). This has in part to do with the political climate of the early 1990s and the political uses to which analyses such as O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead’s were put (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 170), but it is also connected to the conceptual framework being used to think about the problem of transitions between democracy and authoritarianism (Teti, 2012a). Linz and Stepan’s contribution at the same conference at which O’Donnell voiced his concerns can serve as an exemplar (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Here, the authors claim that without a functioning modern state, there can be no democracy or hope for it: while not a sufficient cause, ‘stateness’ is nonetheless a necessary one. They then proceed to examine which additional conditions are necessary for democracy. Their claims are summarised in the table below.

| <b>(A) Authority</b>   | <b>(B) Liberty</b>   |
|--|--|
| <p><i>A.I Sovereignty</i></p> <p>a) Government institutions able to make decisions through political process without external influence; b) Independent <i>Political Society</i>: mediates between itself and the state</p> <p><i>A.II Capacity</i></p> <p>State capable of a) political regulation of the market; b) exercising functions via an effective bureaucracy; c) monopoly of legitimate use of force.</p> | <p><i>B.I Influence</i></p> <p>a) Vibrant <i>Civil Society</i>: articulates demands, values, &amp; interests; b) <i>Civil &amp; Political rights</i>: Universal suffrage; free, transparent, competitive elections; freedom of expression &amp; association; multiple sources of information</p> <p><i>B.II Independence</i></p> <p>Rule of Law regulating the actions of a) the market and b) elected politicians</p> |

**Table 1: Conditions for Democracy according to Linz and Stepan (1996).**

Nonetheless, most ‘transitology’ still today thinks in terms that retain the polarity and normative hierarchy of earlier studies – including the literature on ‘Modernization’ in which studies on democratization and authoritarianism originate (Hinnebusch, n.d.) – in the sense that totalitarianism and liberal democracy remain the terminal points of the taxonomy of political systems which constitutes the basic framework within which these analyses are located; hierarchical in the sense that the *normative* preference for liberal democracy in the vast majority of most key figures and of analysts generally is quite clear.



**Figure 1: Transitology's Implied Normative Hierarchy**

Orthodox scholarship reacted to this criticism by rediscovering the sophistication of earlier models, allowing for temporary reversals from and multiple pathways towards democracy (See e.g. Carothers, 2002). However, the hierarchy between categories of political systems was left unchallenged (e.g. Wigell, 2008), and with it the orientation the taxonomy of political typical totalitarian/liberal-democratic orientation of the set of political systems. This produced a 'complex polarity', a more sophisticated but essentially unchanged version of earlier linearity.

Two observations should be noted here. First, as shown in greater detail below, integral to this taxonomical and causal hierarchy is the commitment to the priority of 'polyarchical' characteristics representing the core, minimum, and causally prior requirements for a democracy. Other characteristics of democracy – particularly socio-economic issues, whether understood as matters of material conditions or of rights – are considered 'less essential', or 'extensions' present in 'more advanced and complete' democracies. Second, the linearity of these approaches is challenged even from within if taking Linz and Stepan's remarks on minimal stateness seriously: democratic transitions describe a movement in conditions of high authority from low to high liberty, but considering varying degrees of authority/'stateness' makes the space of political transformations not one-dimensional (along the liberty axis) but bi-dimensional (along both liberty and authority axes).

Transposed into models of transitions and into policy, it is this taxonomy's masked normative commitment to liberal democracy which underpins the hegemony and limitations of liberal approaches to scholarship on democratization/authoritarianism, as will become clearer once the difficulties with the particular categories identified by this liberal taxonomy – and the relation between these categories – are illustrated.

### **Taxonomy**

The hierarchy between aspects of democracy and their disposition in an 'accretive layering' is made possible by claims making certain conditions both necessary and causally prior to others. This identification of relevant categories and their (normative) organisation based on causal priority is evident in all major reflections on the 'state of the art' since the mid-1980s. In the first large-scale debate over the 'transition paradigm', Linz and Stepan identified several conditions for democracy and transitions towards it, which can be summed up in five dimensions: *Stateness*, *Elections*, *Civil and Political Society*, *Economic Society*, and *Rule of Law & Monopoly of the legitimate of the use of Force*. The strengths and weaknesses of their taxonomy and the analysis they base on it usefully epitomise traits found in the near totality of the literature on political transformations, including Dahl, Przeworski, and O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead themselves, but also Levitsky, Way, Diamond, Huntington,

Carothers, etc. The limitations of this literature affords a useful starting point for the analysis of transformations which the ArabTrans project sets itself as a goal.

Stateness: Quite simply, for Linz and Stepan, stateness as a precondition for democracy: 'no state, no democracy,' or indeed *any* political system (Linz & Stepan, 1996). This aspect had been taken for granted by transitologists (although it was not made explicit by O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead), yet it is conceptually vital, since, if it is true that there can be no democracy without a state, any loss of stateness also undermines the possibility of democracy, and as such state capacity-building becomes a both causal and a political prerequisite of democratization.

This categorisation evidently retains the assumption that a certain kind of 'North-Western' version of (liberal) democracy is taxonomically privileged – and thus the politically preferred – terminus of the democratization process. It should be noted that in equating order and stateness and policy priority accorded the latter over democratization via bottom-up popular mobilization, Linz and Stepan end up echoing Huntington's classic argument for the necessary authoritarianism of a 'praetorian phase' before full democracy. The logic underpinning this analysis is also clearly related to Rostow's S-shaped pathway to (political) development and to its contemporary heirs (Inglehart, Norris, Welzel, etc.) which either explicitly claims or implies a hierarchy between security, economy, and politics in that order, in much the same way as Hobbes' notoriously problematic approach to the social contract. (It is worth noting that Linz and Stepan define the lack of stateness and excess of freedom as precisely as a 'Hobbesian' outcome.)

Inglehart (e.g. R Inglehart, 1997; Ronald Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) abandoned standard modernisations theory's simplistic assumption of linearity in development arguing that modernization is reversible and can change direction. He also shifted from a narrow focus on change in socioeconomic conditions to stressing the importance of changes in people's subjective beliefs as economic conditions change and the impact of these changing beliefs on political regimes and policies. Evolutionary Modernisation Theory posits that there are two main transitions, from agrarian to industrial society and from industrial society to postmodern society. Rising economic and physical security increases with the transition from agrarian to industrial society and this tends to challenge the rigid cultural norms typical of agrarian societies and a move from 'traditional' to secular values which makes the emergence of 'electoral democracy' possible but not inevitable. The shift from industrial to post modern society involves a shift from 'survival' values to a growing emphasis on 'self-expression' values of tolerance, trust and political activism including support for gender equality all of which are conducive to the emergence of liberal democracy (Inglehart & Weizel, 2010). However, Inglehart also argues that cultural change is path depended and that a societies historic heritage including religious beliefs and experience of colonialism shapes people's values as socioeconomic conditions change.

In addressing the question of why Muslim countries have not experienced the third wave of democratization as they have moved from agrarian to industrial societies Inglehart argues against the 'clash of civilisations' thesis arguing instead that that lack of democratisation in the Muslim world is due to is due to patriarchal Islamic values (Inglehart & Norris, 2003; P Norris & Inglehart, 2002; Pippa Norris & Inglehart, 2004). There is strong support for democracy in authoritarian Islamic countries but they retain traditional attitudes to women's role in society and sexual liberalisation more generally. Stable democracies are countries where there is both strong support for democracy and for gender (and other forms) of equality suggesting that before sustainable democratic transformations can occur in the Islamic world there is a need for the development of more liberal gender attitudes. More recent research, however, suggests that the democratic deficit is not so much Muslim

exceptionalism as Arab exceptionalism (Kucuk, 2013; P Norris, 2014; Rizzo, Abdel--Latif, & Meyer, 2007; Spierings, Smits, & Verloo, 2009). Arab countries are democratic 'underachievers' when compared to the level of their GDP but a third of non-Arab Muslim countries are over 'achievers' compared to their GDPs (Stepan & Robertson, 2003). In non-Arab Islamic countries support for gender equality is strongly linked to support for democracy but this is not the case in the Arab countries, where, support for democracy as a system of governance does not extend to supporting women's rights suggesting that the deeply traditional Islamic gender norms prevalent in these societies are what is holding democratisation back. Furthermore, there is no evidence of a generational shift toward more liberal gender attitudes with younger cohorts being no more supportive of women's empowerment than older ones

However, the Arab countries are part of a belt of 'classic' patriarchal societies that extends from North Africa through the Muslim Middle East to South and East Asia including India and China (Caldwell, 1982; Kandiyoti, 1998; Rizzo et al., 2007). These countries include Hindu and Confusion majority societies as well as Muslim ones. They are characterised by high levels of gender inequality and low levels of women's empowerment including high levels of illiteracy and low labour force participation. This suggests that it is not Islam but cultural and social heritage that accounts for the persistence of patriarchal attitudes (Blumberg, 2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c; Litterell & Bertsch, 2013; Moghadam, 2013, 2014).

Civil and Political society: For Linz and Stepan, civil society should be vibrant, but political society should also be relatively autonomous, and both should be independent from the state. The function of political society is to mediate between civil society and the state, translating the former's demands into priorities for and policies by the latter. However, the taxonomical distinction between civil and political society is predicated on a difference in form and nominal function which is not particularly clear: civil society is made of groups of various kinds which act politically, albeit often on single issues, pressing on political society as well as on the state directly, while political society is made of parties which have 'interest aggregation functions' which social movements also have, albeit without the same formal characteristics as either CSOs or parties. Nor is the distinction and relation between these categories in democratization/ authoritarianism studies without alternatives. For example, CSOs can be seen as the backbone of civility in the sense of a peaceful expression of differences within the framework of a *Rechtstaat* (Hegel); as the sphere in which – far from being reconciled in the state – conflicts between competing private interests take place (Marx); as integral to mechanisms of hegemony – the 'outer earthworks' of the state – a stepping stone between economic structure and the state (Gramsci) epistemologically integral to the organisation and operation of (different forms of) power (Foucault) (Cavatorta & Durac, 2010; Mitchell, 1991; Pratt, 2007). A more broadly Anglo-Saxon conception of civil society influential in democratization/authoritarianism studies, however, ignores these traditions – with the partial exception of Hegel – and is rooted in Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767). Here, civil society is understood as separate from and in an antagonistic relation with the state,<sup>2</sup> a repository of citizens' moral sentiments, separate from government, providing a distinct source of political causality, and thus becoming a key

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<sup>2</sup> Ferguson's analysis explains the evolution of societies as passing a sequence of three stages – savagery, barbarism, and civilisation – in in this sense is not dissimilar from Modernization theory.

motor of political change, but mobilising it without leading it.<sup>3</sup> Whether with reference to the early successful cases of Solidarnosc or Charter 77, or whether casting a more sceptical eye over *Kefaya* or the Iranian 'Green Movement', it is this second conception which is hegemonic.

**Elections:** Perhaps no single element defines democracy in both academic and public discourse as 'free and fair elections'. Free, fair and competitive elections supported by the rights and freedoms are also the core of the most famous and influential definitions of democracy in scholarship, namely Dahl's conception of 'polyarchy' (R. A. Dahl, 1973). Here, the possibility of regularly electing and replacing leaderships which is taken as the defining characteristic of democracy, and Dahl presents human rights – particularly civil and political liberties – as necessary only insofar as they support such a dynamic. In early work, Dahl focused on "the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals" (R. A. Dahl, 1971) as a necessary albeit "probably not sufficient" condition for democracy. Linz and Stepan, like Dahl, focus on a cluster of key elements: universal suffrage; free, transparent, competitive elections; freedom of expression and association; multiple sources of information. Critical of other aspects, O'Donnell and Schmitter agree on the 'polyarchic' characteristics representing the core, minimum, and causally prior requirements for a democracy. Other characteristics of democracy are considered 'less essential', or 'extensions' present in 'more advanced and complete' democracies, and for some, elements of social democracy – particularly of the 'welfare state' – may have negative unintended consequences including demobilised, politically disengaged, and/or economically parasitic citizens.

However, as Linz and Stepan also acknowledge, the *effective exercise* of such civil and political liberties necessary to the functioning of democracy understood as polyarchy requires a number of socio-economic conditions, and indeed Dahl's conception of such rights and freedoms changed over time not least to reflect this. For example, in *Democracy and its Critics*, he recognises not only the importance of several "effectively enforced" *civil and political rights* (universal suffrage, right to run for office, expression and association) and the *translation in practice* of central democratic principles (e.g. the peaceful 'circulation' of elites in government replaced via elections, government policy made by elected officials), but also a series of *material conditions* that affect the practical likelihood democracy can emerge/be sustained (access to plural/uncensored information, reduction of inequalities, basic services including education) (R. Dahl, 1989, p. 233).

In this sense, although Dahl and much North-American political science scholarship have more or less intentionally – and for more or less consciously political reasons – underplayed the role of socio-economic *conditions* and specifically of socio-economic *rights* in democracy, it is clear that such issues – as both conditions and rights – are also necessary for democracy, if not sufficient. The particular resistance in Western Political Science to acknowledge the importance of socio-economic questions both *on a causal par with* civil-political liberties, and understood as *rights* – not merely as issues of material conditions – is clearly rooted in the Cold War political competition between Soviet and American blocs over inequality and the curtailment of political freedom (Carothers, 2002), and survives in a post-Cold War world in which alternatives to 'marketised' liberal democracy remain marginalised.

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<sup>3</sup> NB: for Locke, 'civil society' coincided with political society as repository of moral virtue (*civic* virtue) and thus action in opposition not to the state but to the 'state of nature' (e.g. ch. 7 of the 1689 *Second Treatise on Government* is entitled "Of Political or Civil Society").

Economic society: Linz and Stepan emphasise that, contrary to prevailing neoliberal and transitological dogma, the state has a central role in the economy, both as a regulator of markets and guarantor and arbiter of contracts, and in the production of a basic number of public goods (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Their position is actually more 'Keynesian' than most in their acknowledging the state as more than just a contract-enforcer in a marketised economy, and most theory and policy emphasises 'free markets', however much actual policies do not live up to principle. It is important to note that the provision of 'social services' is not opposed in itself, but that it too is claimed to be best provided by private contractors rather than states.

Rule of Law & monopoly of the legitimate of the use of force: Of the key characteristics of the modern state, Linz and Stepan emphasise the legitimate monopoly of the use of force on the one hand, and on the other hand the Rule of Law, equality before the law, the absence of exceptions or jurisdictional enclaves or privileges for particular actors (e.g. the military) (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Of these 'Weberian' criteria, it is the monopolistic aspect of the use of force that has often been emphasised rather than legitimacy, implicitly reinforcing the ontological priority of security over other aspects of a socio-economic-political compact. Sufficient perceived *legitimacy*, however, is the lynchpin of social contracts, without which by definition disintegrative forces undermine the polity. Nor can the question of legitimacy be understood in purely formal terms, decontextualized from allegiances to political doctrines, such as liberal democracy, which in practice are not unconditional, requiring performance and delivery on rhetorical commitments. In this sense, the question of legitimacy calls attention back to the conditions of social, economic, and political inclusion and responsiveness

Finally, an aspect which is as important in real transformations as it is infrequently mentioned in literature is the absence of significant *foreign interference* (R. Dahl, 1989).

### 3.3. Summary and Implications

In brief, for the study of political transformations, democracy is commonly understood as the confluence of a recognisably limited number of factors:


1. the presence of a (modern) **state** (Rule of Law, monopoly of the legitimate use of force);
2. **polyarchy**; and
3. a set of **minimal material conditions** required by polyarchy in political, social, and economic 'spheres'.

These factors are viewed as necessary, if not sufficient, since as O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead originally pointed out, the path to democracy is fraught with precarious equilibria. By contrast, authoritarianism is understood in terms of what such a (liberal) democracy lacks. This framework is largely taken to imply a roughly linear relationship between authoritarianism and democracy, such that authority is a prerequisite for liberty, and thus for democracy.

It is fairly obvious that the way democracy and authoritarianism are understood are very specific and that a number of alternatives are closed off in the construction of the conceptual toolkit with which these political systems – and transitions between them – are understood. These specificities result in a 'fixed menu' from which analysts and policymakers pick, with a particular analytical and policy blind spots. The first is the oscillation between capacity-building approaches focusing on civil society and those prioritising state institutions (Teti, 2012b, 2015). The second is a mostly implicit hierarchy in prioritising certain categories of rights (civil and political) over others (especially social and economic) which affects the kinds of CSOs and HRs targeted. One consequence of this

'demotion' of socio-economic rights is a continuing emphasis on 'culture' and 'identity', with a more or less masked side-lining of socio-economic issues (class, poverty, social justice, etc.) which in turn facilitate a re-Orientalization of academic and public debates. Third, this taxonomical focus has led to confusing the identification of basic categories and of causal processes: taxonomies map the set of *possible* transformations or states, but say nothing about causal processes involved in actual transformations, which variables have which significance/weight in specific circumstances or in general, and which pathways might lead from one condition to another, much less which causal forces might be involved. Such taxonomies can help guide and conceptualise a first analysis, but attention must be on real processes of transformation.

The specific blind spots and overall limitations of existing approaches are all the more important in a context such as the Middle East, where grand claims have been advanced ascribing the limited progress towards (liberal) democracy as the result of cultural factors (especially 'identity politics').



**Figure 2: Requirements for Transitions to Democracy**

Unfortunately, despite extensive criticism since at least the mid-1990s, most proponents held to orthodox approaches, leaving their foundations essentially unchanged (Bunce, 1994; Collier & Levitsky, 1996; Diamond, 2003; Diamond, 2002; Gunther, Diamandouros, & Puhle, 1996; Kratsev, 2006; P. C. Schmitter & Karl, 1995; P. Schmitter & Karl, 1994).

In this context, the challenges for scholarship are to:

1. Draw on and adapt variables from existing orthodox approaches. These variables, regardless of other criticisms, have the potential to cover the entire socio-economic-political field, which is just not usually done in practice;
2. Pluralise taxonomy (e.g. introducing stateness Linz-style);
3. Examine real processes and drivers of change, rather than assuming taxonomy and/or normative commitments to particular political systems (polyarchy) exhausts these.

The aim of such work must be to develop analyses free from the strictures of the way the democratization/authoritarianism paradigm has been understood thus far, and eventually to develop a new analytical toolkit.

Understanding the Arab Uprisings and the trends and transformations underpinning them is therefore crucial in two ways: first, to better understand the transformative processes involved in transitions to democracy and attempts to prevent or reverse these in general, not just in the MENA region; and second, to better understand the characteristics of and factors that led to the Arab Uprisings.



## 4. Research Problem and Questions

The key question in studies of political systems and their transformations – particularly in the Middle East – remains as it always has been the identification of a) *what* drives change; b) *how* change happens; and c) *where* (global and regional) transformations lead, if anywhere.

Detailed and specific research questions will be formulated in the context of Work Package 2.

## 5. Analytical Strategy

The study of political transformations is normally conducted within a particular range of models and examining a particular range of variables. These frameworks are also those through which the Arab Uprisings are normally examined: taking such frameworks as starting point for this project's analysis makes it possible on the one hand to evaluate the usefulness of those approaches, and on the other hand to highlight any novelty of the Uprisings in relation to existing data and models of political transformations.

### *Models of Political transformation*

Political Science approaches the question of political transformations largely through a range of models rooted in the logic of Rostow's Modernization theory: whether through modified versions of that approach (Ingelhart, Welzel, Huntington) or through its counterparts in studies of Democratization and 'Authoritarian Resilience', these approaches share a set of assumptions and analytical strategies. As a consequence, Democracy and Authoritarianism are normally conceptualised as polar opposites - particularly viewing authoritarianism as a lack of democracy – the path between which is traced by a specific set of necessary transformations, albeit reversible and not necessarily always in the same sequence. This also explains the existence of three main classes of models and their relation to one another: Democratic Transition (DT), Authoritarian Resilience (AR), and Hybrid Regimes (HR).

The main approaches explored in this project are:

Democratic Transition (DT): This class of models identifies necessary (if not sufficient) conditions for a transition to take place from authoritarian rule to democracy, requiring at minimum the combination of a split in authoritarian elites and pressure from population (mobilization).

Hybrid Regimes (HyR): Various referred to as 'hybrid regimes', façade democracies, 'democracy with adjectives', etc. this approach hypothesises the possibility and emergence of regimes that present themselves as democratic, but are *de facto* autocracies, in which informal practice empty formal democratic institutions and procedures of their substance.

Authoritarian Resilience (AR): This class of models identifies blockages making democratic transitions impossible either in principle or in practice. As such, AR models present variables and causal processes that are in essence the inverse of those found in DT. As for DT models, necessary conditions for AR include institutional, material and cultural conditions (e.g. rentierism, Orientalism).

Some of the notable problems of this limited 'menu' include understanding the complex possibilities of political transformation along a single 'axis' linking authoritarianism to (liberal) democracy, the desirability of more than just liberal versions of democracy, or the blindness to transformations and possibilities *within* authoritarian systems. To address the latter problem in particular, the Project framework is expanded to include two additional types of authoritarian categories: Cyclical and Brittle authoritarianism.

*Cyclical Authoritarianism (CA)*: Without finding favour in mainstream literature, some specialists point to the superficiality and reversibility of ‘openings’ by regional autocracies, suggesting regimes adopt a strategy alternating political and economic concessions and clampdowns. Unlike the fixed configuration of hybrid regimes, CA regimes adaptively fluctuate between reversible formal configurations while not undermining autocracy.

*Brittle Authoritarianism (BA)*: If regional autocracies are ‘ferocious’ in their use of force but not hegemonic (Gramsci) or legitimate (Weber), they may well appear stable by repressing dissent and resisting change, but remain vulnerable in being unable to absorb dissent by adapting to challenges. Such regimes rely on both extra-legal violence and the legalization of violence (harassment, torture, detention without trial, etc.) but find concessions difficult.

Orthodox approaches also rely on a recognisable taxonomy, partly outlined above, and more extensively illustrated in the table below. Across several Work Packages – particularly 2, 6, 7, and 8 – the project evaluates available ‘qualitative’ literature (from Political Science and Middle East Studies, including the literature comprising of single country case studies for Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq) and existing quantitative data (both survey and non-survey). To supplement existing data and contribute to gaining a more systematic understanding of processes of transformation and transition in the Middle East a survey will designed informed by this conceptual framework and the literature and analysis of existing survey data to be carried out in WP2.<sup>4</sup>

#### *Taxonomy for the study of Political Transformations*

Underpinning the first three categories of approaches in particular is a taxonomy based on a tripartite distinction between political, social and economic spheres. However unsatisfactory such a taxonomy might be, the present project adopts it precisely because it provides an important foundation for the main approaches through which the Uprisings are currently being conceived and which the project aims to critically evaluate.

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<sup>4</sup> ‘Quantitative’ here specifically refers to a) analysis of quantified data from nationally representative public opinion surveys (primarily at the national level), and b) exploratory analysis of change over time (exploratory insofar as data depth does not permit the application of more sophisticated methods such as time series analysis); while ‘qualitative’ refers to a) non-quantified data (primarily policy documents as primary sources, as in Work Package 9). That said, the project also conducts single case studies (albeit designed for comparability, as in WPs 6 and 7) and small-*n* studies (e.g. WP 8).

|                                   | <b>Transition to Democracy</b>   | <b>Hybrid Regimes</b> | <b>Authoritarian Resilience</b> | <b>Brittle Authoritarianism</b> | <b>Cyclical Authoritarianism</b> |
|-----------------------------------|--|-----------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <b>Political System</b>           |  |                       |                                 |                                 |                                  |
| <i>Democracy</i>                  | Elections; change of governments;  |                       |                                 |                                 |                                  |
| <i>Formal Political Arena</i>     | Parties (barriers to formation); parliaments   |                       |                                 |                                 |                                  |
| <i>Checks &amp; Balances</i>      | Judicial independence  |                       |                                 |                                 |                                  |
| <i>Rule of Law</i>                | (in)dependence of judiciary; equality before the law; no exceptions/privileges   |                       |                                 |                                 |                                  |
| <i>Political Attitudes</i>        |  |                       |                                 |                                 |                                  |
| <i>Gov't Performance</i>          | Law & order; basic services (education, health, welfare)   |                       |                                 |                                 |                                  |
| <i>Human Rights</i>               | civil & political  |                       |                                 |                                 |                                  |
| <i>Security</i>                   | Personal; regional; national   |                       |                                 |                                 |                                  |
| <i>Corruption</i>                 |  |                       |                                 |                                 |                                  |
| <i>International Context</i>      | Permissive/oppositional  |                       |                                 |                                 |                                  |
| <b>Economic System</b>            |  |                       |                                 |                                 |                                  |
| <i>Economic development</i>       | living conditions; 'development' / 'modernization'; Economic rights satisfaction; material conditions; political and economic reforms / repression   |                       |                                 |                                 |                                  |
| <i>Political economy</i>          | Equality / inequality; income/wealth polarisation; social mobility; economic rights; reforms; Patrimoniality; Clientelism; Rentierism; corporatism; crony capitalism.  |                       |                                 |                                 |                                  |
| <i>International Context</i>      | levels of dependency (economic, geopolitical)  |                       |                                 |                                 |                                  |
| <b>Social System</b>              |  |                       |                                 |                                 |                                  |
| <i>Social and Cultural Rights</i> | Granted / Non-fully granted / denied   |                       |                                 |                                 |                                  |
| <i>Civil Society</i>              | Absence/presence ; (in)dependence/co-optation; (de)politicisation  |                       |                                 |                                 |                                  |
| <i>Legitimacy</i>                 | Culture/semiotic system: identity (religion, ethnicity, etc.) & politics<br>Cultural (anti-)essentialism, but importance of previous experiences<br>Role of local 'political culture'<br>Elites symbolic manipulation / symbolic capital |                       |                                 |                                 |                                  |

**Table 2: Taxonomies and Approaches to Transformations**

| <b>Arab Uprisings</b> |                       |                      |                |                 |  |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------|-----------------|--|
| <i>Transition to</i>  | <i>Hybrid Regimes</i> | <i>Authoritarian</i> | <i>Brittle</i> | <i>Cyclical</i> |  |

| <i>Democracy</i>   |   | <i>Resilience</i>  | <i>Authoritarianism</i>   | <i>Authoritarianism</i>  |
|--|---|--|---|--|
| The outcome of the uprising is determined by the combination of mobilization and elite split. This explains the variety of results | New hybrid regimes configurations resulting from the uprisings, with a redistribution of power between civil and military forces (e.g. Egypt) | 'not ready yet' for the transition<br><br>reinforcement of the elites and of some of the obstacles impeding the transition (e.g. militaries, international context, economic conditions) | Reinforcement of the militaries / security forces to control and oppress the civilian populations / to take part to international military operations; external actors support (e.g. USA) | Outcome is determined by factors in DT combined with importance of political economy and political culture contexts – previous 'cycles' of reforms or repression in each country |

**Table 3: The Arab Uprisings / Arab Spring**

## 6. Project Structure

To address the research question outlined above, the project is divided into a specific set of Work Packages and following this Framework paper there are eight Work Packages.

### *Work Package 2: Country Background Reports*

This Work Package first provides a background study of each country by bringing together the state of the art in literature on political and social transformations in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq; second, it identifies variables through which long-term change processes can be tracked, evaluating available survey data and other quantitative data. The Work Package thus aims at providing the foundation for designing the ArabTrans public opinion survey in such a way as to permit the examination of claims made in the literature on democratisation/authoritarianism.

### *Work Packages 3, 4 and 5 : Survey Design, Fieldwork and Data Preparation*

Under these Work Packages the Arab Transformations seven country public opinion survey will be designed, carried out and a combined data set prepared ready for data analysis. The survey will be designed so that a time series data set can be developed using data from previous rounds of the World Values Survey and the Arab Barometer. To this end the survey will use questions from the Arab Barometer and the World Values Survey so that changes in political and social attitudes and values can be measured over time. It will also develop new questions to address issues not covered in previous surveys. The survey fieldwork will be carried out at the same time in each country by local country partners coordinated by a Survey Technical Group. Each country will produce a country data set which will then be combined to produce the Arab Transformations Data Set.

### *Work Package 6 : Country Survey Reports*

Work Package 6 will provide country and comparative analysis of the survey results. This analysis will cover key results on attitudes at the individual level to the political, social and economic situations in the region, as well as participation in a variety of activities related to the Arab Uprisings. The Work Package will produce graphically lead reports on each of the countries in the survey, as well as a more academic-oriented and thematically-focused comparative report on the region as a whole.

#### *Work Package 7: Transformation Analyses*

The main objective of this Work Package is to produce seven reports analysing political, economic and social transformations in the Middle East during the 2000-2015 period. Beyond this, the project's work provides a framework within which it is possible to identify and analyse the significance of such change factors and trends. Analysis in WP7 will combine different kinds of primary quantified data (survey data), secondary quantitative data (indicators based either on that survey data or on other sources, ranging from national income and poverty measures to rankings of political systems), or secondary qualitative data (primarily from Area Studies literature often relying on historiographical, interview, ethnographic, or participant observation data). This combination is aimed, in principle, at measuring similar underlying quantities with different methods. Such 'triangulation' between different sources may in principle help both reach more robust conclusions and identify questions which would have remained hidden using approaches singularly.

A longitudinal dataset, consisting of country-level indicators over this timeframe, will be used to produce seven reports analysing the political, economic and social change in each country and comparatively in the region as a whole between 2000 and 2015.

#### *Work Package 8: Youth and Social Media*

The eighth Work Package will focus upon how young people and social media influenced social, and, political changes in the region. It will consist of an analysis of how young people within these nations regard democratisation and social modernisation, as well as their general political attitudes. Furthermore, it seeks to understand the effects and use of social media in participating in political activities in the region.

#### *Work Package 9: EU--MENA Relations*

Work Package 9 will evaluate the impact of the Arab Uprisings upon EU-MENA relations. It will use documentary and discourse analysis to compare the rationales and strategies of the EU's changing Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the impact of the Arab Uprisings on Euro-Mediterranean relations, affected not least by the views of the EU by people within the region, which will be analysed based on ArabTrans' unique survey data on this issue. It will produce two reports on the implications of recent changes and how they affect EU policy toward the region, with particular attention given to how the EU can foster positive political, economic and social transformations.

#### *Work Package 10: Executive Summary*

Work Package 10 will provide a summary of the key findings from the project.

#### *Work Package 11: Dissemination*

The main objective of this work package is to inform policy makers, researchers and other stakeholders such as NGOs about the project's findings from the research in order to ensure the widest possible dissemination of results.

## **7. Methodology**

This section sets out the methods used in the ArabTrans project. The research is cross-national and comparative and both cross sectional and longitudinal (or more precisely cross-sectional time series) and uses case studies. The research was developed and undertaken by a multi-disciplinary team including political scientists and sociologists and including members with area studies and development studies expertise. The Consortium included

partners from within the MENA region as well as those from the European Union. The research was developed collaboratively to ensure that local cultural value systems, assumptions and thought patterns were fully taken into account in the design and execution of the research. The public opinion survey was carried out in each country by experienced local teams with the survey coordinated by a Survey Technical Group. The research was strictly comparative, the public opinion surveys carried out were identical, that is, the same sampling method and questionnaire was used in each country. The same is the case for the existing survey data sets that were drawn on for looking at changes in attitudes over time and the macrodata used for looking at socio-economic change and indexes used to measure changes in regime taken from international data sets.

The project uses a range of research tools dictated in part by the nature of the objectives of the research and in part by available forms and sources of data, spanning quantitative and qualitative methods and including a seven-country public opinion survey, secondary analysis of existing data (survey and macro data) and discourse analysis. The project therefore relies on both primary data collection and secondary data analysis (for further details of the methods used in the project see Abbott, Sapsford, & Diez-Nicolas, 2016) and of the longitudinal data base (for which, see Lomazzi & Abbott). All methods are selected to help achieve the project's overarching aim, namely to describe, explain and understand the root causes, the evolution, and future outlook of the Arab Uprisings by shedding light on *what* drives change, *how* change happens, and *where* (global and regional) transformations lead, if anywhere, with particular attention to whether transformations might lead to a transition to democracy or whether they might result in a reinforcement of authoritarianism.

4. **Comparative Research:** Comparative approaches are useful for detecting both significant similarities across an apparently diverse range of cases and distinctive features of each case, facilitating reaching more general and less idiosyncratic explanations. All too often research has assumed that the MENA region can be treated as a homogeneous whole the internal differences of which – both between and within countries – are not significant. A key objective of the project is therefore not simply that it aims to be cross-national, but that it is more systematically comparative. A comparative approach in the context of this project is fundamental to understand the similarities and differences between countries' background conditions before the Uprisings, in the way protests played out and regimes adapted to them, and in the nature, trajectories and results of post-Uprisings transformation processes.

Limitations both in funding and in practical conditions make a survey of all MENA countries impossible. This makes it necessary to select specific country cases that might be representative of the processes under examination. On that basis, countries were selected so that the surveyed sample would include a) countries which by the end of 2011 could be said to have a reasonable potential for transformation away from autocracy and towards democracy (namely, Egypt and Tunisia); b) (semi-)authoritarian regimes displaying resilience against protests (Morocco, Jordan); c) countries in which protests have led to protracted internal conflict (Libya); and d) cases in which no significant protests have taken place (Algeria); and finally e) cases in which protests were already ongoing (Iraq). In addition, countries selected include both upper middle income (Algeria, Iraq Jordan and Libya) and lower middle income countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt) as well as resource-rich (Libya, Algeria, Iraq) and relatively resource-poor. The countries were also selected to include the countries that are partners with the EU under its Neighborhood policy, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia as one of the objectives of the project was to research EU-MENA relations including the attitudes of citizens in the region to the EU and its member states.

5. **Cross-sectional Analysis:** Drawing on data from the Arab Transformations survey supplemented by the Arab Barometer III, Afro Barometer 2013, WVS Wave 6 and the Gallup World Poll 2014 the project will use cross sectional data to examine comparatively political and social attitudes in the aftermath of the 2010/11 Uprisings. The analysis will look at intra-country differences and similarities as well as cross country differences (regional, gender, age, socio-economic circumstances, religiosity, support for and involvement in the Uprisings, interest and involvement in politics) to enable an understanding of the relative contribution of composition and place to influencing political and social attitudes.
6. **Longitudinal Analysis:** Drawing on primary data from the ArabTrans survey in 2014 and on both survey and non-survey secondary quantitative data, the project will use longitudinal analysis – or more precisely, cross-sectional time series analysis – in order to detect processes of medium- and longer-term transformation. The availability of and attention to longer-term data makes it possible to investigate which events and processes were significant in the build-up to the Uprisings, which are particularly important in a post-Uprisings context to examine how national and international actors have responded to protests, how that interaction between popular demands and policy responses might play out, and perhaps most importantly whether the conditions that contributed to the Uprisings still remain.
7. juxtaposition of socio-economic change, political events (Uprisings) and changes in political and social attitudes including cohort analysis. Are attitudes and values changing and is there any evidence that the attitudes and values of younger generations differ from those of older generations?
8. **Public Opinion Survey:** Large-scale quantitative survey with face-to-face interviews will be carried out in the seven countries in order to obtain a rounded picture of political and social attitudes, values and behaviour. While such surveys have their limitations they provide a broad picture of a societies public opinion and enable the generalisation of the findings from the survey with a degree of precision to the population of each country as a whole. They will therefore provide a sound understanding of the political and social attitudes of adults in the seven countries in the aftermath of the Uprisings It will also make it possible to investigate what significant factors or combinations of factors made protests possible in the first place, triggered the protests themselves, and affected the outcomes of those processes (e.g. transition vs. retrenchment). Public opinion surveys also afford depth of analysis which more focused surveys do not provide.
9. **Discourse Analysis:** Post-Uprisings EU policy documents do more than simply describe the Union's response, they affect the processes of socio-political transformations themselves (e.g. international context, but also their internal conditions through the design and funding programmes, trade relations, etc.). The particular selectivity in such is made possible by particular assumptions and ways of thinking about policy goals, instruments, and alternatives to both. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) analyses how language affects policy and socio-political transformations, both by making it possible to assess specific, explicit claims, and by highlighting the impact of implicit epistemic schema within which policy (language) is framed.

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