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# **T**he Arab Transformations WORKING PAPER SERIES

Reconsidering the Role of Youth: Generational Differences in Political and Social Attitudes in the Arab World

Authors:

Pamela Abbott, Andrea Teti
and Roger Sapsford

UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN

ArabTrans

SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME

The Arab Transformations Project is an international research project operating within the European Commission's FP7 framework. The project looks comparatively at attitudes and behaviors in the context of the social, political and economic transformations taking place across Middle East and North Africa since February 2011. The countries covered are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq.

Ethical approval for the Project was given through the Ethical Review Procedures of the University of Aberdeen. Further details of the project can be found on the project web site at www.arabtrans.eu.

The Myth of the Youth Revolution: The Role of Young People in the 2011 Arab Uprisings

PAMELA ABBOTT, ANDREA TETI AND ROGER SAPSFORD

ABSTRACT

The story of the 'Arab Spring' as a revolt of young people against autocratic rule and to bring democracy to their countries is not a good fit to the available data. Younger people were indeed over-represented in comparison to the age distribution of the population as a whole, but some of those 'identified' as young were in fact well into middle age, in no country were a majority of the protestors younger than 35, and the introduction of procedural democracy was not the only or even the main aim of the Uprisings. There is little evidence for the 'rising tide' in MENA which has been expected to sweep away autocratic rule in favour of democratisation as successive younger generations became individualised, liberalised and secularised. There is partial evidence for secularisation but little for the radical change in liberal values and the growth of rights-based politics. (For the latter we take attitudes to gender equality and gendered norms as our case study.) The neoliberal 'structural adjustment' which MENA countries have been urged to adopt has failed to provide a basis for such a normative change, failing either to generate the jobs which would have turned the 'youth bulge' into an economic 'youth dividend' or to establish an independent middle class within which liberalisation of norms and values leads to the demand for democracy.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The Arab Uprisings in the MENA region in and around 2011 took everyone by surprise – scholars, the press, the international powers that had relations with the region and even the MENA rulers themselves (Gause 2011). The authoritarian MENA regimes appeared to have their populations well under control. Nonetheless, although the uprisings were not specifically predicted, political theory had been expecting a move towards democratic governance which was seen as long overdue. Across the world the tendency had been noted for economic development and consequent improvement in living conditions to be accompanied by a move towards democratic forms of government (see e.g. Lipset 1959, Przeworski and Limongi 1997, Przeworski et al 2000). While neither necessary nor sufficient by itself, prosperity appeared to be strongly associated with transformation of governance: 'economic factors have significant impact on democratisation' (Huntington 1991: 59). However, in 2011 the Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa were still managing to avoid this move. This working paper considers the Arab Uprisings and subsequent governance in six developing MENA countries, focusing particularly on the role of youth.

Development, Democracy and Democratic Values

Development entails a transition from peasant/agricultural to industrial and then post-industrial/'knowledge' forms of socioeconomic organisation, and the process of transition has been associated across the world with a growth in democracy. The economic benefits of development 'trickle down', so that a growing proportion of the population no longer has to worry exclusively about survival needs. Early approaches to the link between economics and democracy suggested that the likelihood of democratisation was directly proportional to the level of economic development. Lipset (1959, 1994) listed conditions which were prerequisite or co-requisite for the establishment of a sustainable democratic form of governance and included social as well as economic changes among them:

- (economic and demographic transition): economic development, industrialisation, urbanization, the growth of a middle class;
- (socioeconomic mechanisms): extended educational provision, greater equality between citizens (economic but also socio-political), the inclusion of all workers within the bounds of citizenship (and while Lipset does not explicitly discuss gender, avoiding the exclusion of more than half the population by treating women as full and equal citizens is a fairly obvious extension of the principle).

In this view, economic growth, urbanization, education and literacy lead individuals to interact in more complex ways and as a consequence to develop liberal attitudes and secular views which are expressed in their political participation. Since most Arab countries have industrialised, modernisation theory and its variants expected that Arab states would democratise or at least display evidence of pressure for democratisation. The 'democratic deficit' in Arab countries was therefore something of a puzzle, particularly as they tended to show strong rhetorical support for democracy as a system of government, in the abstract.

One development of modernisation theory has been a growing emphasis on values as well as economic circumstances (e.g. Przeworski and Limongi 1997), as precursors or co-requisites for political liberalisation of government and as semi-autonomous in the sense that value change is not precisely determined by economic change. Economic and then social development was expected to lead to a milieu driven more by ability and effort than custom and connections, leading to a greater emphasis on individual rights. Modernisation moves societies from traditional to secular rational values – 'the rules' become seen as social products to be discussed, justified and sometimes changed rather than as external to the system and fixed by tradition or religious fiat. People come to expect a greater degree of transparency and responsiveness from their governments, and they develop the will to be heard and to have some impact on decisions. Authoritarian regimes therefore experience growing mass pressure to democratise and liberalise, to the point where the complexity of institutions of control begins to elude the regime's grasp (Issawi 1956, Lerner 1958, Almond and Powell 1966).

The Uprisings could be seen as a change-point of this kind or at least as a sign of readiness: while demonstrators and supporters did not prioritize democracy and political rights in their demands they were demanding responsive government and the replacement of incumbent regimes with ones that would listen to citizens and respond to their demands (Teti et al 2017). Support for regime change was high and especially so in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, where the vast majority of citizens supported it. Debates have grown up about the extent to which value change has been sufficient to support a change in style of governance. Tessler and his colleagues (e.g. Tessler 2002) argue that that explicit support for the democracy is clearly evident in public opinion surveys. However, it has been argued for quite some while (e.g., Almond and Verba 1959) that abstract proclamations of approval are not enough and what is needed is an examination of the attitudinal base required to support and sustain them – evidence-based public rationality, inclusive and emancipatory characterisation of all groups in the population and detachment from the rule of religion in political matters (secularisation). Some (e.g. Inglehart 2017) would say that this base is not yet secure.

Unifying analyses of disparate attitudinal and political processes, attention has also focused on underlying norms or expectations for how others should and will behave (e.g. Abbott et al 2016). Both democracy and social inclusion depend on the products of social cohesion, of which the foundation is interpersonal and inter-group trust. In order to think of the rest of the population as 'we', we need to live in a perceived social world in which we respect the needs and norms of others in the belief that they will also respect ours and that the political 'contract' is one in which it is seen as rational and effective to protect others' interests in order to protect our own. Others do not need necessarily to have the same values as us and other groups do not need necessarily to have the same real interests, provided we all understand each other's position and see the most effective solution to disputes or conflicting interests as mutual and common satisfaction. This underlying 'discourse' is both product of and pre-requisite for the establishment of sustainable non-autocratic systems, and it is still weak in the MENA region (see e.g. Sapsford et al 2016).

Authoritarian resilience and cultural closure

The Middle East and North Africa stand out as the exception to world trends, managing a fair degree of economic development without much change in values or governmental style. (Even *after* the uprisings, authoritarian regimes were ousted and democratic forms put in place in several countries, but they cannot be said to have succeeded as sustainable changes, except perhaps in Tunisia, and their establishment even there must be regarded as brittle and precarious (Murphy 2011: Teti et al 2017).) Another way of looking at this problem is to consider what regimes were doing to maintain

the status quo and what barriers to change might be inherent in Islam or in Arab culture, focusing on identifying barriers to democratisation which made autocracies 'resilient'.

One line of analysis employs the paradigm of 'authoritarian resilience' (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004, Anderson 2006, Heydemann 2007) - the ability of authoritarian elites to overcome challenges from other elites and resist demands from the general population. Oil-rich MENA regimes were able to reduce the developing complexity because they were not dependent on popular support to 'pay their way', given the oil and other 'rents' which some enjoyed and the way these were invested by those who had them to bring comparative stability to the area (Hinnebusch 2006, Peters and Moore 2009).

1. 'Rentier states' were able to neutralise opposition to political repression – or at least achieve acquiescence – by providing a high level of social and economic benefits to their populations, including public-sector employment, especially for the middle classes (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Martinez 2012; Malti 2012). This was true not only for hydrocarbon-rich countries but also for the ones that benefited indirectly from oil and gas revenues in the region (Peters and Moore 2009), and for countries such as Jordan which benefited from non-economic ('strategic') rents and, in some cases, development assistance and remittances.

2. Autocrats skilful and effective at co-opting potentially disruptive forces – aspects of political Islam, for example (Pace and Cavatorta 2012), or elements of civil society organisation (Abdelrahman 2004, Jamal 2007, Haddad 2012). More subtly, authoritarian regimes adopted the appearance and institutions of democracy (Carothers 2001, Heydemann 2007, Hinebusch 2006) but gave up little or no control, thereby co-opting or subverting the use of such symbols in opposition to them.

3. Autocratic regimes had built up a powerful security sector (Bellin 2004) and regimes had the support of their armies and police forces and were accustomed, in the last resort or sometimes even the first resort, to putting down any dissent or opposition that emerged, sometimes quite violently.

A second line of explanation for the 'democratic deficit' has been 'cultural exceptionalism'- that there is something in the culture, history and/or religion of the Arab countries that prevents democratic values taking root and flourishing (e.g. Huntingdon 1993, Lewis 1990). However, Islam has demonstrated in the past that it is not incompatible with democratic forms of government in Turkey and Malaysia (Kedourie 1992) and in Muslim populations in Eastern Europe. There is a lack of evidence linking religiosity and opposition to political change (Tessler 20012), and Arab Islamic parties managed to come forward and work together within a democratic framework in both Egypt and Tunisia after the Uprisings. Stepan (2013) argues that certain conditions are necessary for democracy to flourish - a significant degree of institutional separation between religion and the state – and that this did not yet exist in the Arab world, though it has been achieved in other Muslim-majority countries. Sharabi (1988) points instead to the patriarchal and tribal authority in the family as a basis for resistance to liberalisation (see also Stepan and Robertson 2003). Whatever lies behind it, the Arab countries do display the world's strongest emphasis on traditional and survival values, and revised modernisation theory also argues that modernisation is path-dependent and that the broad cultural heritage of a society leaves an imprint of traditional cultural values that endure despite modernisation (Inglehart and Baker 2000, Inglehart and Norris 2003a).

The importance of youth in the Uprisings

Young people are often seen as key to social and political change (Cole 2014)., and the Arab Uprisings have been portrayed as a movement of youth (Abdalla 2016; Cole 2014; Khouri and Lopez 2011). Given the slow rate at which democracy has been taking hold in the MENA region, it has been argued that change comes about not so much by modification of established attitudes and practices as by intergenerational replacement. With greater prosperity as a result of economic development would come secular and liberal values, and those who grew up no longer overshadowed by economic insecurity and better educated than their precursors could aspire to individual fulfilment, human rights and some say their own governance. Values that became emphasised among them would include political participation, freedom of expression, gender equality and democratic institutional practice (Inglehart and Welzel 2010). (Gender equality has been shown to be especially important in establishing and sustaining democracies, and attitudes to gender equality are a better indicator than agreement that democracy is the best form of government – see Inglehart 2017.) A gradual shift in 'the values of the population, as younger birth cohorts replaced older ones, could establish the probabilistic paths which, even if not deterministically linear, would lead from authoritarianism to democracy.

Young people involved in the Uprisings are portrayed as more educated and urban and less religious (Cole 2014), more liberal and more supportive of secular politics and democratisation (Gardiner 2011; Esposito 2011) and as mobilised through the internet to organise demonstrations and protests (e.g. Howard and Hussein 2013). It is certainly true that young people participated in the demonstrations in large numbers, and the internet played an important role among the more educated (Howard and Hussein 2013, Vincent et al 2016). Agreement with the statement that 'democracy, for all its faults, is the best form of government' in public opinion polls carried out at the time appeared to show strong support for democracy on the part of youth (Robbins 2017). However, the extent to which the Uprisings were driven by youth has been exaggerated, as we shall see.

One characteristic common to the MENA countries was a 'youth bulge'; at time of the Uprisings, 30 per cent of the population was aged 14-24 (USAID 2011) – the comparable UK figure would have been about 12 per cent - and 60 per cent of the region's population was under 30 (Pew 2011). Given productive work for them to do, there was a substantial age bonus for states to earn, with large numbers of new workers and a correspondingly smaller size of dependent population to be supported by the output of those who are productive. However, states failed to provide decent work. On the contrary, the number of jobs fell in the public sector in line with the 'structural adjustment' pressed on MENA countries by developed countries and international finance regulators, and while state enterprises were privatised, this was not carried out in such a way as to generate replacement opportunities for decent employment. Youth unemployment rates ran high and some, particularly young women, never did make the transition from school to work, failing to join the Labour Force (i.e. they gave up seeking work or never attempted to find it in the first place, going from education into family roles as unpaid carers or burdens on the household). What work there was available tended to be part-time and/or not to require the skills and qualifications of those taking them, to be precarious in its terms and conditions and to be located in the informal sector (Abbott and Teti 2017b). Where unemployment runs high among young people the outcome at the national level is often turmoil, and this is what happened in the MENA region (Assaad 2011; Campante and Chor 2012; Hamanaka 2016; Hoffman and Jamal 2012; LaGraffe 2012).

Another common characteristic of all the countries where there were uprisings is that the protests may have had an impact in the short term, but half a decade later they all show themselves mostly as failures in terms of political change; such democracy as was established has not been sustained. Before the Uprisings all of the countries except Morocco were rated as 'not free' by Freedom House (the 2010 report – 2009 data), on an index combining civil and political rights, including freedom of the press; Morocco was rated 'partly free' and has carried this rating through to 2016 (the 2017 report). One country, Tunisia, has shown steady improvement on this index, rising to 'partly free' in 2011 (the 2012 report) and to 'free' in 2013 (the 2014 report). Egypt and Libya both had brief episodes of partial freedom (2012 in Egypt, before the overthrow of the elected government in 2013, and 2012-13 in Libya on the basis of a successful Congress election, increased transparency in constitutional revisions and the spread of media and civil society organisations) but they lapsed back to a rating of 'not free'. Jordan rose to 'partly free' for the first time in the most recent report (2016 data) on the basis of improved regulations for fair elections. Iraq has remained 'not free' throughout. Tunisia, therefore, is the one country which does still appear to be developing a viable democratic form of governance, albeit shakily. This is the country where the revolutionary movement that led to the Uprisings was most evidently a movement of youth, according to many sources.

Correlated with the supposedly central role of youth in the Uprisings is a new phenomenon, the centrality of 'online activism' and the role of social media in setting off, focusing and organising protests (Castells 2012, Cole 2014; della Porta 2014). The story that is told of the Cairo Uprising features a core group of literate, middle-class young people as organisers and drivers who were not drawn from unionised labour or existing opposition party members (though these also played an important part), nor were they radicalised Islamists or from minorities with grievances. Their linking feature was that they were educated, under-employed, relatively leaderless and comfortable with information technology (Howard and Hussein 2011). The account of the Egyptian uprising receives some confirmation from other authors (Wilson and Dunn 2011, Diwan 2013, Cuconato and Waechter 2012). Vincent et al (2016) also identify a group who were politically active online, but over half the population in all countries were active off line, through traditional routes (voting, political party or union membership) and some who were active online do not appear to have participated in demonstrations. Howard and Hussein tend to tell the same story about Tunis, but here they may be mistaken to some extent, because the Tunisian uprisings did not start in Tunis itself but in the hinterland, and other research (e.g. Beissinger et al 2015) suggests that the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings were to some extent grounded in different social backgrounds and had different priorities. In Egypt there is also the limiting factor that the percentage of the population who are internet users is not sufficient to sustain the explanatory weight that is being placed on it (Vincent et al 2016); only 17 per cent use the internet even occasionally, and in the youngest age group of the report (18-35) this rises to only 28 per cent. However, this may have been sufficient for foreign news reports and details of planned Egyptian demonstrations to be disseminated within the Facebook community, who could pass them on and recruit participants by other means, and figures are higher elsewhere.

The popular portrayal of the Uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia (but sometimes generalised to other countries as well) as powered by youth, and in particular by educated young internet users, may be a product of weaknesses in data collection. Journalistic and qualitative research reports of the time tended to be based on attendance and observation at easily accessible mass events in Cairo or Tunis

(sometimes concentrating for interviews on groups whose banners were in English and could therefore be trusted to speak that language) and qualitative research work forming relationships with groups of such people. Such samples are not representative of the protesting population as a whole and are likely to give a biased or blinkered view of what is going on.

Changes over time

Is there a 'rising tide of attitudinal and normative change towards socially inclusive and cohesive values - do we have evidence of generational changes? Much of the analysis of this topic is based on qualitative and anecdotal evidence; past attitudes cannot be investigated in this way, given the uncertainty of memory and, even more, the virtual certainty that the answer is reconstructed in the light of subsequent events, outcomes and rhetorical positions. The only way to approach the topic area qualitatively is by comparing people who are currently of different generations, and numbers are often insufficient in qualitative research for valid comparison. (This criticism holds true for all purely attitudinal issues – support for the uprisings, past perception of household and national standing, etc.; claims to have participated on the streets, however, have a public element which makes them more difficult to reconstruct in the light of present circumstances.) The results of generational comparison are sometimes unhelpful and have often been partly contradictory. Cole (2014) and Momani (2015) argue that youth are pushing for change and are more competitive, accountable and cosmopolitan than previous generations; they want democracy but also to hold strongly to religious belief – political Islam (which is not to be confused with Islamist extremism). Shediac et al (2013) find the Arab generations more united than divided, but young people are more concerned with socioeconomic factors than value-based ones. Tessler and Miller-Gonzalez (2016) argue that it is not so much that youth have unique grievances, but rather that they are more prepared to protest: they are at the vanguard of protests because they feel the grievances more intensely and because they are familiar with the use of the media. While the role of new media may have been overestimated in the Uprisings, nevertheless they played an important role in enabling demonstrations to be organised and spreading information across the region (della Porta 2014)

Representative quantitative surveys do exist, but to maximise clarity and precision there is a tendency to work on pooled data – the whole survey file rather than the individual country files – which can easily lead to confusion. While the MENA countries as a whole are very different in some respects from others, more extreme in their attitudes, and they might form a cluster when compared to the rest of world, they also show important differences between themselves.

- Analysis of Arab Barometer III responses for Tunisia and Algeria, just before the Uprisings, found generational and gender difference but also noted that the conclusion to be drawn from survey data may depend on precisely which variables are selected as indicators of values (Tessler and Miller-Gonzalez 2016). Overall they found in both countries that the younger generation were less personally religious than older ones and less interested in politics. Tunisian women and Algerian men were less in favour of democracy, Tunisian men and women less trusting and Algerian women more gender- friendly than the older generations.
- Analysis of the 6th Wave of the World Values (WVS) and Arab Barometer III, both carried out in Egypt in 2013, found little support for intergenerational differences (Elkelani 2016). Indeed, comparison of the 6th Wave of the WVS with the 4th (2001) and 5th (2008) found a shift *away* from post-materialist values by all generations and especially after 2011. Youth

(16-30) did display more post-materialist values than older generations in 2001 and 2008 and were close to the world average for youth. However, by 2013 they were well below the world average (mean 1.08 cf 2.03) and intergenerational differences were negligible. On other political values, intergenerational differences were negligible in 2013, with young people having become increasingly interested in politics and showing an interest comparable to that of older generations. Those that were better off, the more educated and those living in urban areas disproportionately supported postmaterialist values, across the generations. Analysis of WVS wave 6 data for Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and Libya found no differences between younger cohorts and older ones in attitudes to democracy but did find that younger generations were significantly more favourable to gender equality than older ones in all the countries except Libya (Inglehart 2017). However, the gap between generations remains much narrower than in the developed west.

- Moaddel and De Jong (2017) compare Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Araba, Tunisia and Turkey.
    - on individualist liberal values (measured by basis for marriage, women's right to dress as they wished and qualities desirable in a child), with 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 or over as age groups and drawing on 2011 and 2013 data, they found considerable variation between the countries, with Lebanon as the most individualist, followed by Turkey, Saudi Araba, Tunisia, Iraq, Egypt and Pakistan, with significant differences across all countries. They explain this by refence to economic developmental stage. In terms of generational differences, younger age groups were more individualistic than older ones.
    - On a gender equality index based on five attitude items ('a wife should obey her husband', 'men make better political leaders', 'men should have more right to a job', 'a university education is more important for boys', 'it is OK for men to have more than one wife') there were significant difference across countries. The Saudis and Egyptians were the least egalitarian, followed by Iraq and Pakistan, followed by Lebanon and Tunisia, followed by Turkey. Younger age groups displayed more egalitarian values than older ones.
    - A secular politics index (separation of politics and religion, preference for Islamic government, support for shari'a law) suggests that the most secularised countries were Turkey, Lebanon and Tunisia, followed by Iraq and Egypt and Pakistan l (Saudi Araba was not reported). There were significant differences across generations only in Lebanon, Pakistan and Tunisia
    - An overall Liberalism Index combining the three correlated indexes shows Pakistan as the least liberal, followed by Egypt, Saudi Araba, and Iraq, and then Lebanon, Turkey and Tunisia. Across the countries the youngest age group was consistently more liberal than the oldest

  However, changes over time in Egypt and Iraq suggest that youth attitudes change very much in line with older generations
- Following 2011, young people in two countries - Tunisia and Egypt - experienced elected government, with Islamic parties in power elected in free and fair elections (Robbins 2017). Public opinion data suggest that this changed Egyptian youth's attitudes to political Islam,

with a sharp fall in support for it but not in support for democracy. In Tunisia, by way of contrast, there was no change in support for either political Islam or democracy.

This working paper explores value transformations and young people's attitudes to democracy and governance, using a survey designed for the purpose that was carried out three years after the uprisings in MENA countries.

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ARAB TRANSFORMATIONS SURVEY FINDINGS

The Arab Transformations Survey

The survey covered adults (18+) in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia in 2014, three years after the start of the Arab Uprisings. A common questionnaire was developed for use in all the countries. Some of the questions were drawn from the Arab Barometer and the World Values Survey, and others were composed as 'added value' on security, the Arab Uprisings themselves, political involvement since the Uprisings, attitudes to the European Union and use of social media. The questionnaire was produced in English and translated into Arabic, and each local partner adjusted it to local versions of spoken Arabic. Achieved samples in each country after quality-checking ranged from 1215 to 2145 and were selected by a strategy involving elements of cluster sampling, stratification and simple random selection, to maximise population validity while minimising costs where possible without distorting the data; the details varied a little from country to country, according to local conditions. Interviews were conducted face to face, in the home in most cases but in one country the occasional interview was conducted in a local coffee-shop if the interviewee preferred. In five of the six countries interviews were recorded on a paper copy of the questionnaire; in the sixth, the agency tried out a procedure, new to them, of recording responses directly onto palm-top computers. Interviewers worked mostly in daylight hours on weekdays, but one country did call-backs later in the day in cases of non-contact, two have said that they went back in the evenings and one (where the police advised against evening work) that they called back at weekends. Quality checks included supervisor call-backs to check quality of interviewing, central dependency and coding checks and the application of a STATA routine written by Kuriakose and Robbins (2015) to identify and eliminate implausible exact and near-duplicate cases.

 'Generation' has been defined in many different ways in different papers. In this analysis we have opted for a simple five-part classification (18-24, 25-34, 35.44, 45-54, 55+) to maximise the chance of showing variations anywhere along the age range while not committing to any particular theorised account of what constitutes step-functional differences between generations, especially as this could differ between countries according to local history, culture, gender and level of affluence.

The research questions circle around the proposition that the differences between the generations in developing countries form a pattern – a 'rising tide' of liberalisation, secularisation, socially inclusive opposition to discrimination and democratisation. Specifically, we look for generational differences in:

- participation in and support for the appropriate country uprising;
- the issues that are said to have been the drivers of participation and support;
- the extent of interest and involvement in politics;
- the current main challenges the country faces;

- the extent of support for democracy as a form of government for their country; and
- the extent to which attitudes have become more secular and more liberal, taking gender as a main example.

Throughout, the main interest is intergenerational differences and the possibility of a rising tide of liberalisation, secularisation and foundational democratic values.

Generational Differences in Support for the Arab Uprisings

The limited quantitative analysis of support for and participation in the Arab Uprisings carried out on data from past surveys suggests that that the support came from across the age groups but with the oldest being less likely to support than younger age groups. Participation was highest among younger age groups. The AT survey data confirm this pattern in the pooled sample of six countries (Figure 1): the oldest age group were significantly less likely to participate in the Uprisings and younger age-groups more likely, but even in the oldest age-group more than eight per cent (1 in 12) say they were out on the streets. If age were not important in determining whether a given individual participated, the proportion of the age-group who took part in demonstrations etc. would be the same in each age group, and it is not. The three youngest age groups (there is no significant difference between them) are over-represented in the pooled sample, at just under 20 per cent of each; the participants aged 45-54 form a smaller proportion of their age group (14.5%), and the oldest group (55+) are even less likely to participate, at 8.5 per cent. (We should remember, however, that even one in twelve is by no means a trivial minority.) If we include those who said they *supported* the uprisings but did not *participate* in them as well as the participants we get a line of similar shape but with some tendency to peak in the 25-35 age group.

Figure 1: Participation (at least once) in the Arab Uprisings, (% of age-group), pooled sample


Significance:: no significant difference between the 18-24, 25-34 and 35-44 age-groups, but 45-54 and 55+ are significantly less likely to have participated

Because people are not equally divided between the age-groups, a different picture emerges if we look at how the group of participants is made up - the percentage of all those who participated that a given age-group forms (Figure 2). The youngest age-group accounts for 18 per cent of participants in the pooled sample but about a third were aged 25-34 and over a quarter 35-44; the 45-54 age-group

accounts for 14 per cent of participants, while the oldest group accounts for only 8 per cent (but it is still the case that about one participant in twelve was aged 55 or over).

Figure 2: Participation in the Arab Uprisings (% of participants), pooled sample

However, the pooled analysis is misleading because it conceals differences between the individual countries.

- In terms of their size, the Libyan and Tunisian uprisings may fairly be described as substantial popular movements, with respectively 57 per cent and 26 per cent of the total population saying they were participants. In the middle range, Morocco showed around 11 per actively participating (one in 9). In the other countries we might see the Uprisings as significant but minority movements on the street: 8 per cent in Egypt, 4 per cent in Jordan and 3 per cent in Iraq.

- More to the point, however, the pooled analysis conceals considerable differences in age distribution between the individual countries. There are no significant differences between age groups in participation in the Uprisings (Figure 3) in Libya, Jordan or Iraq, and so we can safely say that age was not important as a driver of revolt in these countries. The statement that the participants were most likely to be young does hold true in Tunisia, Egypt and perhaps Morocco – the trend is mostly negative by age in all three – but there are variations in what is to count as 'young' for this purpose. In Morocco and Egypt the 25-34 age group has the highest participation rate but in Tunisia the highest is the 18-24 group; in Morocco the 18-24 age group has one of the lowest participation rates. In all three the rate for the older age groups is lower but not trivially small.

**Figure 3: Participation in the 2011 Uprisings by country and age cohort (% of age group)**

Significance: Morocco 18-24 and 55+ lower than 25-54(p<.001), Tunisia 18-24 higher than 25+ (p<.001), 25-44 higher than 45+ (p<.001), Egypt 18-24 higher than 45+ (p<.01), 25-54 higher than 55+ (p<.01). No significant differences by age in Iraq, Jordan or Libya.

The reasons for participating in the Uprisings

When respondents were asked to nominate the two main reasons why people protested in 2011, the most frequently mentioned reason was the economic situation (56.7 per cent), followed by corruption 46.4 per cent), lack of basic services (31.6 per cent), more political freedom (19.7 per cent), to oppose authoritarian leaders (19.7 per cent). and to promote foreign interests (9.2 per cent) – see Figure 4. There were no significant differences by age for financial problems or promoting foreign interests. Age was a significant factor with regard to the other reasons, though the differences were not large: younger cohorts were more likely than older ones to nominate 'more political freedom',' oppose authoritarian leaders', 'corruption' and 'lack of basic services than people; the differences were small and the main one was between the 18-34 cohort and the rest.

Figure 4: Reasons for protesting in 2011 Uprising, by age cohorts (%), in the pooled sample

Significance ($\chi^{2)}$: 'oppose authoritarian leaders', 'corruption' (p<.001), ' more political freedom', 'basic services' (p<.05). No significant differences by age for 'promote foreign interests' or 'economic situation'.

There were some differences by country in the ordering of the importance of reasons. but in all countries political reasons were less frequently nominated than corruption and (except in Libya) economic reasons. In terms of generational differences:

- **Corruption**: in Egypt, the two youngest generations were marginally more likely to nominate corruption (χ^2 sig <0.05) and in Morocco the youngest and oldest (χ^2 sig <0.05).
- **Financial situation**: in Egypt the oldest generation was less likely to nominate this (χ^2 sig <0.001).
- **Basic services**: less likely to be mentioned by the youngest generation in Jordan and more likely in Libya (χ^2 sig <0.001).
- **Authoritarian leaders**: in Morocco less likely to be nominated by youngest generation (χ^2 sig <0.01).
- **Political freedom**: in Libya less likely to be nominated by youngest generation (χ^2 sig <0.05

- **Promoting foreign interests:** no generational differences.

Generation and Engagement in Politics

Are young people more interested in politics and/or more prepared than older generations to take political action? Formal membership of political organisations will not give us the answer in the MENA region; numbers of people that are members of political parties, trade unions and/or civil society organisations are very low and make analysis by age cohort difficult or impossible. Instead we shall use three variables as indicators or markers of political involvement: people's declared interest in politics, whether they voted in their country's most recent election, and whether they have taken part or would consider taking part in political action such as going on a demonstration, signing a petition, joining a boycott or taking part in an unofficial strike or the occupation of a building.

Interest in politics is reported as relatively high, with an average across the countries of 73 per cent, varying from a low of 57 per cent in Jordan, through around two-thirds in Egypt and Tunisia, three quarters in Morocco and 86 per cent in Iraq to a high of 88 per cent in Libya. In the pooled sample generation is significantly related to interest in politics: the youngest generation is significantly *less* likely to be interested than older generations and the 55+ generation are also significantly less interested than those aged 25-54 (χ^2 sig <0.001). However, when we look at the countries individually it is only in Jordan and Morocco that the differences are significant: in Jordan the youngest cohort is significantly less interested than other age cohorts and in Morocco the oldest age cohort is significantly less interests than other cohorts (χ^2 sig <0.001).

Figure 5: Interested in politics (% reporting interest)

Just over 60 per cent voted in the last election, varying from half in Morocco to a high of just over three-quarters in Iraq. Libya, Jordan and Tunisia all have just over 55 per cent, with Egypt on 67 per cent. Voting increases with age, with the youngest cohort the least likely to have voted, followed by 25-34 with the 35+ the most likely to have done so (χ^2 sig <0.001). However, this average pattern does not reflect what actually happened in any of the countries. In Egypt propensity to vote increases with age, with the youngest cohort being the least likely followed by the 25-34 but with no significant differences between the 35+ cohorts (χ^2 sig <0.001). In Jordan and Morocco the youngest

cohort is the least likely to vote, followed by the 2nd and 3rd and then the 4th and eldest (χ^2 sig <0.001). In Iraq voting peaks among the 35-44 cohort and there is no significant difference between the youngest and oldest cohorts. In Tunisia the youngest cohort is the least likely to vote followed by the 2nd and the eldest and then the 3rd and 4th cohorts. There are no significant differences by age in Libya.

Figure 6: Voted in last election, by age (%)

Half the respondents had taken part in political action or say they would do so, varying from a quarter in Jordan to 75 per cent in Libya, with just under two-thirds in Morocco, 59 per cent in Iraq, just under a half in Tunisia and just under a third in Egypt. However, when it comes to political action the two youngest cohorts are significantly more likely to take action, followed by 35-44, then 45-54, and 55+ the least likely. *Saying* you would take part is not the same thing as doing so, but at least it established that the action is a rhetorical or discursive possibility – that it is not ruled out as unthinkable. Looking at individual countries, in Egypt and Morocco the youngest cohort is the most likely, followed by 2nd, 3rd and 4th, with the oldest significantly less likely to say they would take part. In Libya the 1st and 2nd cohorts lead, followed by 3rd and 4th and then the oldest. In Tunisia it is the first cohort, followed by the 2nd, then the 3rd and 4th, with the oldest least likely (χ^2 sig <0.001). Differences by age are not significant in Iraq and Jordan.

Figure 7: Political action - % saying they have taken part or would do so, by age

It is of note that the younger generation are more likely to take part in political protests but substantially less likely to vote, with the notable exception of Libya - a possible marker of disenchantment with the formal political processes of democracy.

Generation and Main Challenges Facing Country

When asked what they saw as the two major challenges facing their countries in 2014, people across the sample were much more likely to nominate the economy (69.1 per cent), corruption (51.6 per cent) and/or the security situation (39.6 per cent) than totalitarianism/authoritarian governance (9 per cent), foreign interference (7.6 per cent) or even the Palestinian question (3.8 per cent). There are differences between countries. The level of concern with the economic situation, for example is very high in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia – near unanimous in Egypt at over, 90 per cent and varying between 88 per cent and 79 per cent in the other three; in Iraq it is mentioned by half the population but only by 28.5 per cent in Libya. Corruption is of great concern in Jordan (71 per cent), though there is no evidence from international statistics that it is actually worse in Jordan than in the other countries; in four of the other countries it varies from around half the population (Iraq) to about two thirds (Morocco), and it is mentioned by only 21 per cent of Egyptians, though other questions about its real incidence on the same questionnaire suggest that it is rife. Internal security is an important issue in Iraq (60 per cent), Libya (62 per cent), Egypt (51 per cent) and Tunisia (42 per cent); in Jordan and Morocco it receives much less emphasis, being picked by about one person in ten. Autocratic leadership is a lesser issue in Iraq (13 per cent), Libya (17 per cent) and Morocco (12 per cent), picked by fewer than 10 per cent in Tunisia even and by fewer than 5 per cent elsewhere. Palestine appears to have been a minor issue for Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia (just over 5 per cent) and barely an issue at all for the other countries. 'Foreign influence' was an issue in Iraq (20 per cent), unsurprisingly, but otherwise it does not climb much above five per cent in any country.

Figure 8: Main challenges facing country - % choosing as first or second

There are also generational differences overall, without much variation between countries:

- **The economic situation**: those under 45 are more likely to nominate this as a challenge and those over 55 the least likely (χ^2 sig <0.001), but in individual countries there are no significant differences between younger and older generations.
- **Corruption**: those under 45 (or 35 in Egypt) are the most likely to nominate this and those aged 55+ the least likely (χ^2 sig <0.001).

- **Internal security**: there are no significant differences by age.
- **Authoritarianism**: the under-45s are significantly more likely to mention this than older generations (χ^2 sig <0.001) but only in Egypt are the generational differences significant.
- **The Palestinian question**: there are no significant differences by age.
- **Foreign interference**: there are no significant differences by age.

Economic Challenges

Given the important place of the economic situation in the list of current challenges, it is worth expanding the analysis in this area. We shall look at specific worries about jobs and being able to educate the children, whether people think the economic situation is better or worse than before the Uprisings, how satisfied they are with their governments' performance and what hope they have for the future.

Questions on the current situation of the national and the household economy and what it was like five years ago were used to compute an indicator of economic progress: whether current economic situation is worse than five years ago (or bad – or very bad – at that time and no better now). At the national level sixty per cent of the pooled sample think things are worse now or unimproved from a bad situation. There is some variation by country (Figure 9), with Jordan and Tunisia the most likely to think the national situation is worse (86 per cent and 81 per cent respectively) and Morocco the least likely (35 per cent) but very little variation by age. The household economy (also on Figure 9) is judged as better than the nation's; only half think it worse than five years ago. Jordan stands out as the most deteriorated again (73 per cent), with Tunisia (59 per cent) and Egypt (51 per cent) as second and third, and again Morocco is the best (27 per cent). Again there is no significant variation by age.

Figure 9: National economic situation worse than five years ago or equally bad (%)

Respondents were asked which of a list of possible events worried them most as possibilities, and just under half overall said they were worried by the possibility of loosing their job or not being able to get one or where they were not economically active the breadwinner in their household losing his or her job and/or by the possibility that they would not be able to procure a good education for their

children. Jordanians seemed to be a lot less worried about job loss (28.6 per cent) but otherwise there was no great average variation between country on this item. However, Figure 10 shows the extent of variation by age on a country basis. Egypt cuts across all the others and displays a classic decrement curve, from a high level (73 per cent) in the youngest age group to 17 per cent in the highest. Iraq shows fluctuations but no overall trend by age. The other four countries follow a similar curve to Egypt's but in less exaggerated form.

Figure 10: Worried about losing or not getting a job ('much' or 'very much'), % by age

Worries about schooling varied from 37 per cent in Egypt and 41 per cent in Tunisia to 57 per cent in Libya. By age-group, worry about jobs was highest in the younger age-groups and fell away markedly among older respondents, which is perhaps not surprising, and worries about schooling peaked in middle age (58 per cent) and were at their lowest in the youngest and oldest age-groups (34.5 per cent and 28 per cent respectively). This is perhaps not surprising as those in the middle age groups are most likely to have children. Figure 11 looks at age differences within individual countries. Tunisia shows no particular trend, and perhaps also Iraq, but in the others an inverted u-shaped distribution is shown to a greater or lesser extent, with the most worry around the middle of the age range. Egypt is again the country with the most exaggerated differences. The pattern is much the same as for worries about job loss (but lower for Egypt in the first age-group), but the order of countries is not the same: Libya rises higher, and Tunisia falls lower and is not as worried about schooling.

Figure 11: Worried about inability to provide good schooling for children (% 'much' or 'very much')

On average about two thirds of the respondents are dissatisfied with their government's economic performance, ranging from high of 88.5 per cent in Tunisia to a low of 41.3 per cent in Egypt, Egypt's being the only figure under 50 per cent. There is little difference by age. Three quarters evaluate the government's specific performance in creating employment as bad or very bad, ranging from a high of nearly 90 per cent in Tunisia and Iraq to a low of 59 per cent in Egypt. There is a small downhill trend overall by age – slightly less dissatisfaction as we progress along the age scale - from 77 per cent at 18-24 to 71 per cent at 51+. Decomposing by country (Figure 12) we can see that the downward trend is entirely due to Egypt and Morocco, plus the decline in value for Tunisia at the high end of the age scale; two others show no significant trend, and Libya increases if anything.

Figure 12: Dissatisfaction with government performance in job creation (% bad or very bad), by age

'Hope for the future', in economic terms, was measured by constructing a variable to measure whether the situation in five years' time was predicted to be better than the current situation (or the current situation was seen as good now and expected to get no worse). Half the sample in Egypt and Morocco thought the national economic situation in five years' time would be good or at least better than the current one, but the figures falls to around 42 per cent in Iraq and Libya, 37.5 per cent in Tunisia and 21 per cent in Jordan. The figures for the situation of the household were very similar – within at most three or four percentage points – except in Jordan, where there were positive responses from nearly a third of the sample. There is no trend by age, whether in the pooled sample or the separate country samples, except that the family income gets a more hopeful response in the lowest age-group in five of the six counties (all except Iraq) and in two countries (Libya and Tunisia) the same is true for the national economy.

Corruption and Trust

*Dis*trust of government is at its lowest in Egypt, where only 42 per cent express it; it rises to 70 per cent or more in Iraq, Jordan and Morocco and is at its highest in Libya (81.6 per cent) and Tunisia (84.3 per cent). Distrust declines quite sharply with age in Egypt and to a lesser extent in Morocco, and two of the others (Jordan and Tunisia) show the oldest age-group as significantly less distrustful. There is no significant trend by age in Iraq and Libya.

Figure 13: Distrust of government, by age and country (%)

Distrust of the courts and the legal system is at its lowest in Egypt (36.6 per cent); Jordan and Libya are in the 40s, Iraq scores 60 per cent and Morocco and Tunisia both exceed 70 per cent. The police are least distrusted in Jordan (16 per cent), Egypt (38 per cent), then Libya and Morocco (both 56 per cent), and then Tunisia (64 per cent) and Iraq (89 per cent). There are no interesting trends by age: in Egypt distrust seems to decline with age for both, the oldest age-group have the least distrust for one or both in Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, and Iraq shows no significant trend.

At least part of the distrust of government lies in the perception of corruption as endemic. Respondents were asked to pick two problems which were current challenges for their country, and around a third named corruption among politicians as one of the two – 42 per cent in Iraq, in the 30s in four countries and a surprisingly low 4 per cent in Egypt. A larger proportion of Egyptians (17 per cent) nominated corruption among public officials, but this was still the lowest response among the six countries, with the highest being 34 per cent in Jordan. We suspect, however, that the Egyptian choice of other factors as challenges was because they were *more* challenging than corruption, not because corruption was *not* challenging. On a later question 51 per cent agreed that there was a large amount of corruption in their country's state institutions and agencies – still the lowest figure among the six countries, but over half the population and much larger than the number nominating it as a challenge; in Tunisia 62 per cent agreed, and the highest level of agreement was in Morocco (70%).. There were no age trends in the pooled data or in individual countries.

More important in the longer term is the amount of trust or distrust which people hold for the others around them, because this is what binds the society together. People in the Arab Transformations survey had little or no faith in political parties – the figure for distrust was 61 per cent in Iraq but everywhere else over 80 per cent and reaching near unanimity (95.5 per cent) in Tunisia. Civil society agencies were distrusted by 61 per cent in Egypt, 64 per cent in Morocco and by more than 70 per cent everywhere else. Indeed, a majority in each country said that most people in general were not to be trusted - the range is from 69 per cent (Libya) to 83 per cent (Tunisia). It is interesting that the country out of the six that has come nearest to establishing a conventional democracy after the Uprisings is the one whose people trust each other the least. There was some patterning by age, with the oldest ag-group less distrustful in four of the countries, but not in Morocco or Iraq.

Figure 14: Distrust of other people - % by age

Generational differences in values

As we saw above, one school of theory suggests that a tide of democratisation should by now be sweeping over the Arab world and the wave of liberalisation and individualisation of political attitudes which should be sweeping over the younger cohorts as a result of it. This is not happening, however. This section looks at the extent of support for democratisation and whether prerequisite discursive conditions have been fulfilled the barriers to democratisation provided by Islamic or Islamist cultural discourses and the extent of continued discrimination by gender.

Democratisation

On the question about democracy being the best system despite its faults – which has been taken by many analysts as the key measure of support for democracy – a strong majority in all countries would appear to be in favour of it. The lowest support is in Egypt (61 per cent), followed by about three quarters in Libya and Tunisia and over 80 per cent in Morocco, Iraq and Jordan. In four countries there is no trend by age, but Egypt shows a decline with age overall and Morocco has a pronounced decline in the final age-group (Figure 15).

Figure 15: 'Democracy is the best system' (%)

Only Morocco has a clear majority that consider democracy suitable for their country (Figure 16). Egypt and Iraq have about half and the rest are lower. However, while a third consider it definitely unsuitable in Libya, the remainder range from 21 per cent in Tunisia to 7 per cent in Morocco. As the only one of the six to establish a sustained (even if fragile) post-Uprising democracy, Tunisia's low scores and high ambivalence here are unexpected.

Figure 16: Suitability of democracy for country (%)

Religion and secularised values

Like the Arab Barometer, the AT survey shows less involvement in religion among the younger age groups than the older ones – fewer young people describe themselves as more than 'somewhat' religious. There are large differences between the countries - Egypt and Iraq, at 40-50 per cent, have far more self-described religious people than Libya and Tunisia, at the other end of the scale with respectively 21 per cent and 32 per cent – but the pattern by age is much the same in all countries (Fig. 17). There is no trend by age in identifying oneself as a Muslim rather than by nationality, though there are substantial differences by country.

Figure 17: Proportion describing themselves as 'religious', by country and age group

There is also no age trend in other markers of secularism or religiosity. – agreeing that religion is a private matter to be kept separate from socioeconomic life, feeling that religious leaders should not

meddle with elections nor advise government, preference for a religious party, or even the belief that the Shari'a should be the only law - though are substantial differences by country. Over 80 per cent considered that religious leaders should not attempt to influence elections (over 90% in Egypt and Tunisia, though only 60% in Morocco). Around 75 per cent of Egyptians and Tunisians also considered that they should not be allowed to influence government, and while other country figures are lower, only Iraq falls below 50 per cent. Egypt and Tunisia's score for agreement was also high, over 80 per cent, for the proposition that religious observance is a private matter and should be kept separate from socioeconomic life; Iraq and Libya have scores in the 70s, and Jordan and Morocco score below 50 per cent.

Gender and Politics

Gender attitudes are a useful example of an attitudinal area that is expected to change as a country democratises in the modern era, support for gender equality correlates with the stabilization of democracy and is arguably the single best indicator of a countries potential to democratize (Inglehart and Norris 2003a,b). Inglehart (2017) based on an analysis of the 6th Wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) has suggested that the common attitude question about men making better political leaders than women is a useful predictor not only of gendered political attitudes in general but of a countries' potential to become a stable democracy. He points out that no country in the WVS data set is a democracy where less than 30 per cent of the population reject the statement that 'Men make better political leaders than women'. In the AT data set it is only in Morocco (59%) and Tunisia (35.9%) that this is the case. In Libya and Iraq only a fifth do so, in Jordan 16.4 per cent and at its lowest 12.3% in Egypt. It is only in Morocco and Tunisia that there are significant differences by age with the proportion rejecting the statement generally deceasing by age possibly indicating weak evidence for a rising tide (Crammer's V sig>0.05 Morocco, >0.001 Tunisia).

Figure 18: Reject Statement that 'Men make better political leaders than women' (%)

We also looked at whether a woman can be a president or prime minister of a Muslim country, whether women may travel abroad unchaperoned, whether a university place is more important for a boy than a girl and whether family/status law should be based on the Shari'a, which is read by some

as codifying the 'domestic bargain' of financial support in exchange for domestic subservience and the conservative gender stereotyping typical of many Arab countries. The first two showed a slight increase with age cohort, and the second two showed no significant trend. There are quite marked differences by country, however (Figure 19). It is of note that even in the least conservative country on these measures, Tunisia, 19 per cent think a university place is less important for a girl, 27 per cent think a woman cannot be President or Prime Minister in a Muslim country, 38 per cent think women should not travel abroad by themselves and 62.5 per cent think that women's status should be determined by Shari'a law. Egypt is also among the lower scorers here – though with 68 per cent endorsing the Shari'a – and the other four countries score above 85 per cent. It is clear that there remains a strong view across the countries (with the possible partial exception of Tunisia) and the generations that women's primary role is as wives and mothers making them dependents of male partners and restricting their role in the public sphere.

Figure 19: Agreement with four markers of gendered social attitudes, % by country

DISCUSSION

While the extent of the protests which constituted the Arab Uprisings caught everyone by surprise, the imminence of (overdue) political change was predicted by political theory. Modernisation theory predicted change – that traditional ways of life are replaced, with industrialisation and globalisation, by ways of thought and political organisation more appropriate for the new forms of production and socioeconomic relations. Political theorists have talked about a 'democratic deficit' in the MENA countries; the natural progression to democracy has been delayed and autocratic regimes have kept the power. In revisions of Modernisation Theory, the factors seen retarding change are attitudinal and organisation; culture and history have to be overcome and are backed up by sophisticated political and symbolic responses on the part of the ruling elite to challenges to their hegemony, backed up by crude power factors such as control of the army and police. Signs of impending change were still expected, but mostly among the younger people. The expectation is one of attitude replacement rather than attitudinal change: the new age cohorts that have joined the labour market and the political arena –

more resistant to conventional wisdom and the old power structures, more secular, more open to democratisation and expecting to have their say and their influence over government organisation and policy – should by now be expected to show signs of changing the balance of attitudes in favour of democracy. This is why the story of youth at the centre of the Uprisings was so important.

What is clear, in the event, is that this has not happened, because the conditions for it have not been fulfilled; the expected 'rising tide' of political and attitudinal change has so far proved to be little more than a trickle. The immediate occasion of the Uprisings, in the view of economists and political scientists, was the series of neoliberal economic revisions forced on the developing MENA countries by the World Bank, the IMF and major aid donors and investors. Under these, government's share of control of resources was to be reduced, with large swathes of what had been government-controlled production travelling into private hands. The expectation was that this would establish a more vibrant and forward-moving private sector, generate employment and build economic growth. The economic growth occurred, but not the jobs that it was to have created: instead, industry was privatised not outside government control but into the hands of 'crony' investors in alliance with government - former elements of the government or people/companies whose interests were in the rewards of insider status more than in generating socioeconomic expansion.

Thus the pre-requisites for democratization posited by theory have not been fulfilled: the current generation had not grown up in circumstances of relative affluence compared with their parents and economic survival was still very much an issue. The old 'governance deal' of more or less guaranteed decent government jobs for the educated middle classes in exchange for complacency about authoritarian rule was broken by privatisation, but the new 'crony capitalists' did not provide any substitute. Work came to be in short supply for young people and often precarious. The extent of the problem is understated by the unemployment statistics because of the number in each country who were late joining the labour force, because they could not find jobs or were 'queuing' for decent jobs – waiting for the appearance of public-sector posts which were never going to appear (Abbott and Teti 2017b). A large proportion of young women in particular, restricted in their choice by repressive cultural attitudes to the employment and employability of women, never achieved the transition from school to the labour force, remaining inactive or lapsing into unpaid and dependent domestic roles as wives or carers for their parents. This the conditions for change – that there should be generations whose formative experience was of comfortable and secure employment and a decent life – have not been met.

When we look at individual countries we find that participation is related negatively to age in certain ways but that patterns differ between countries and that there is some variation in precisely *which* of the lower age groups are to be taken as over-representing its population.   Further, if we look not at percentage of age group but at percentage of participants, we find that the 18-24 age-group was the largest in the Iraqi and Tunisian demonstrations, contributing around a third of demonstrators, but in Egypt and Libya it contributed only 20 per cent and fewer in Morocco and Jordan. The largest group tends to be the second (25-34), except in Jordan, where it is the third (35-44). Further, the contribution made by the oldest age-group is by no means trivial – 16 per cent in Jordan, 11 per cent in Egypt and Tunisia, nearly 10 per cent in Iraq and around 5 per cent in Morocco and Libya. The conclusion is that young people were indeed active in the Arab Uprisings and somewhat over-represented in comparison to their size in the general population, but more in some countries than

others and not necessarily the very youngest age-group. The oldest age-group tended on the whole to be less active, but even so there were sizeable numbers of them on the streets.

A round of the Arab Barometer which took place just before the Uprisings showed *less* interest in politics among young people than their elders, but a further wave in 2013 suggested that interest had grown among the young and there were no longer intergenerational differences (Moaddel and deJong 2017). The Arab Transformations Survey in 2014 showed different patterns in different countries, interest tending to *increase* with age in Tunisia and Libya but *decrease* in Iraq, Egypt and Jordan; in Morocco the more elevated values were in the middle of the distribution. In terms of practical action – attending protests and demonstrations, etc. – we have seen that the younger groups were somewhat over-represented in the Uprisings. Countries differ in the proportion who say they would join a demonstrating at the present time (or have already done so) from 8 per cent in Egypt to over half in Libya, and age distribution varies by country. Thus there does seem to be *some* truth in the picture of youth as more politicised than the older generations, but not consistently and sometimes exhibiting different patterns in different countries. Younger people appear to be more mobilised in Egypt and Tunisia than elsewhere, and these are the countries which most caught the attention of the media during the Uprisings.

The liberalisation of young people's values: is there evidence for a rising tide of liberal attitudes, with young people displaying more cohesive and inclusive values? Our evidence here centres around the secularisation question and the extent to which women are afforded equal status.

- The extent to which people describe themselves as 'religious varies by country, but the same pattern of increase with age shows in the Arab Transformations Survey as has been found in Arab Barometer and the World Values Survey. Twenty-three per cent of Jordan's youngest adults describe themselves as more than 'somewhat' religious, and the percentages in Iraq, Morocco and Egypt are in the low 30s, but the proportion of those aged 55+ is in the 55-65 per cent range in all four. Tunisia has 42 per cent of those aged 55+ but only 21 per cent of the youngest age group, and the figures for Libya are 29 per cent and 15 per cent. However, there are no age trends in the tendency to identity oneself as Muslim rather than by nationality, the belief that religion should be kept separate from socioeconomic life, the rejection of the right of religious leaders to influence elections or advise governments or even a preference for law based on the shari'a.

- Gender is a good marker of people's attitudes towards equality of status, given that women make up half the population. There are some indications that the younger generations consider women in a more equal light than older generations, but they are not very marked, the level of agreement differs markedly between countries and there are internal divisions within countries (Abbott 2017). Asked for their view on whether men make better political leaders than women, fewer in the younger age groups than in the older ones said they believed this in Tunisia, and but there was no significant identifiable pattern by age in the other countries. There were some slight age trends in questions about whether a woman could be president/prime-minister in a Moslem state and on whether women could go abroad unaccompanied, but none that were detectable on whether a university place mattered more for a boy than a girl or on the necessity for family power and organisation to be governed by shari'a law. Even in Tunisia, where only 27 per cent thought a woman could not be president/prime minister and only 19 per cent thought university more important for a male than a female, over 60 per cent felt that family/status issues should be governed by the shari'a - and women were among those who believed this.

The notion of a rising tide of young people with a lust for democracy and a craving for their human rights is cast into further doubt by the fact that political outcomes, in the sense of democratic forms of government and the rule of law protecting the rights of individuals, are *not* what comes first to the mind of survey informants. In the Arab Transformations Survey (and other relatively recent opinion surveys have contained similar questions and shown similar results). Respondents were asked which two factors were most influential in bringing protestors onto the streets in or around 2011 in their country. There were variations by country but only minor and sporadic differences between generations, with young people perhaps naming a factor more often in one country and the oldest naming it less often in another. The key issues, named as one of the two by more than half the respondents, were economic grievances and corruption in government. Lack of basic services was the next most frequently named. In terms of what drove the Uprisings, protest against autocratic government and/or demands for political freedom these were named by around 20 per cent overall and there was no consistent difference between age groups.

In sum, the real picture of young people's engagement with the Uprisings is more complex than is often suggested. *Which* younger age group is most likely to have participated and/or to hold the attitudes varies by country. In some it is those aged 18-24, in others 25-34, sometimes both, sometimes everyone aged less than about 45. In some countries and for some aspects of the analysis the age gradient does not emerge at all, or only in the form of a dropping off of participation or expression of more 'modern' attitudes among those aged 55 or more. Further, because young people are only one segment to the population, despite the 'youth bulge', the largest proportion of participants/supporters actually come from older age groups even though these are less dramatically over-represented.

What is clear, from both AT and AB data, is that the Uprisings were *not* confined to their middle class and not primarily about political change and the establishment of formal 'ballot-box' democracy. Political change was indeed sought, two regimes were toppled in the short term and replaced by electoral democracies (Egypt and Tunisia), the regime was overthrown in a third (Libya) and the country descended into anarchy and two others had to buy their way out of instability through concessions and subsidies (Jordan and Morocco). It was not the only or even the major driving force, however. When asked about the most important drivers of the uprisings (or, indeed, about current challenges), people are as likely to nominate economic factors directly (economic grievances, lack of employment, lack of access to basic resources such as food or socially important ones such as education and health care) as to clamour for political power and representation, or indeed more likely, and where the demand is for democracy it is clear (see Teti and Abbott 2016, Abbott and Teti 2017a) that what is wanted is not just the thin formality of replacing government through free and fair elections, or even the right to criticise government without fear of reprisals, but the decent work and decent lives they see democracies on the other side of the Mediterranean enjoying.

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