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
The Arab Transformations WORKING PAPER SERIES

NUMBER 14

MENA in 2014: Do People Think Their Nation is Secure?

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ArabTrans



SEVENTH FRAMEWORK
PROGRAMME



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DO PEOPLE THINK THEIR NATION IS SECURE?

Abstract

Much of the art of government lies in creating the infrastructure and institutions for a decent life. Basic security – freedom from disruption by uncontrolled violence – is a prerequisite for almost everything else that goes to make up the decent society. Where violence is beyond both control and prediction there can be no planning and no promises. Outside concerns are unlikely to make investments or to disburse development aid, internally it becomes difficult or impossible to run manufacturing, service, commercial or financial concerns beyond specific defended perimeters, and even planning housing, health, education or family formation becomes a risky business.

Security starts with how safe you feel in your neighbourhood. The ArabTrans survey asked people whether they felt safe there during the day and at night, and over 80 per cent felt safe always or mostly during the day (52% always) and over 70 per cent felt safe at night always or mostly (40% always). This leaves substantial minorities who do *not* feel safe: about 1 in 25 never or rarely felt safe during the day, and about 1 in 8 never or rarely felt safe at night. Everyone except the Iraqis says that the neighbourhood situation was better five years ago, but Jordan, Egypt and Morocco have substantial majorities saying the family is at least reasonably secure at present, with Iraq not far behind and Tunisia and Libya coming last at around 30 per cent, and all countries except Jordan tend to think things will be better in the future. . Everyone except the Jordanians say it will be better in the future (and a quarter of them still believe it will be good), though the lowest figure is below half the population (in Tunisia). The figures suggest a region that is not fundamentally unhappy about security at a local level, though Jordan and Egypt are a lot happier with this aspect of life than the other countries.

Most people seem to be socially integrated at a local level. In four of the six countries over three quarters (over 80% in three of them) would trust their neighbours to help them if they were in need, and in Morocco and Tunisia the proportion who say this is lower but still constitute a majority of the population. Three quarters trust the people in their neighbourhood and/or people known to them personally in a general sense, and in Egypt and Libya this is said by more than 90 per cent of respondents. However, there is little of the trust in the wider population – the ‘anonymous other’ – which is required for the social cohesion of the nation state.

Looking at national security in 2014 at the time of the ArabTrans survey, we see that Libya and Iraq are again the two countries that rate themselves as the least secure, and they are followed by Tunisia; Egypt, Jordan and Morocco follow a long way behind. In Libya and Tunisia things were perceived to have been much better five years ago; they were also perceived to have been better in Iraq, but not by much – very few Iraqis rate the security of the nation five years ago as good, and nearly 60 per cent rate it as bad. Egypt and Jordan were more secure five years ago than in 2014; Morocco was much the same, or perhaps a little better in 2014. In five years’ time all countries expect their security to be better, but all countries have a substantial percentage of respondents who say they do not know – at least 20 per cent, except in Jordan, and approaching 40 per cent in Libya, suggesting a significantly unstable or insecure outlook.

Factors which worry respondents or are seen by them as one of the main challenges for their country, in the context of security, are internal stability and security, worry about terrorist attacks, worry about an increase in sectarian or ethnic violence, worry about the possibility of civil war and/or worry about war with another country breaking out. Iraq and Libya show the highest level of concern, followed by Tunisia (though Egypt’s figures are also high) and Morocco and Jordan are the least concerned.

1. Introduction

One useful way of looking at societies to distinguish the different kinds of social process which take place within them and which are necessary for their maintenance and sustainable development is the Social Quality Model, developed by Beck, van der Maesen, Walker and their colleagues (Beck et al 1997, 2001) to advise the European Union on future directions for European societies. Four interrelated kinds of process are identified:

- *Economic security* is sufficiency of resource, but not just having sufficient national income, nor even everyone being out of poverty. What is meant here is the viability of the present and the ability to trust that the future will also be viable, so it entails protection from life's shocks – accident, sickness, unemployment, death of providers, natural or man-made disasters – and from life-course expenses such as marriage and household-formation, birth and child-rearing, schooling and training, unemployed old age.
- *Social cohesion* consists in the processes that hold a society together, both political and ideological.
- *Social inclusion* is the extent to which all residents are equally part of the society.
- *Empowerment*, which includes agency, is the extent to which people can acquire, develop and employ their capabilities (and Amartya Sen's approach to development is very relevant here – see Sen 1993, 1999, 2004).

Cohesion and inclusion are prerequisites for economic performance beyond the local and basic level and for the empowerment of agency, but it is also true that empowerment is required for good economic performance. In other words, the 'causal' connections between types of process are not simple and linear but complex and recursive. We also need to note that these processes may be experienced by individuals but they are characteristics of a whole society – in the current discussion, a nation state – and they depend on good government for their preservation and their exercise. Much of the art of government lies in creating the infrastructure and institutions for a decent life - ensuring economic security, regulating and extending social inclusion, promoting tolerance between opposed groups, maintaining the expectation of trustworthy behaviour on the part of government and private-sector institutions and increasing the possibilities for empowerment and productive agency (Abbott, P., Wallace, C. and Sapsford, 2016). A part of this process is controlling violence and giving people peace within which to work.

2 Feeling Secure


2.1 Neighbourhood Security

How secure you feel in your neighbourhood is an aspect of the quality of individual lives but needs to be mentioned here as well, as a characteristic of societies. The 2014 ArabTrans survey asked people whether they felt safe in their neighbourhood during the day and at night, and over 80 per cent felt safe always or mostly during the day (52% always) and over 70 per cent felt safe at night always or mostly (40% always). This leaves substantial minorities who do *not* feel safe: about 1 in 25 never or rarely felt safe during the day, and about 1 in 8 never or rarely felt safe at night.

There are significant differences between countries; Figure 1 shows the differences for fear of the streets at night, and in Jordan nearly 90 per cent feel safe at night always or mostly (and 95% during the day), in Egypt and Tunisia the night-time figure is about 75 per cent, and in the other three countries it is around 60 per cent. There is some tendency overall for fear to be more widespread

in urban areas (statistically significant in all countries except Libya, which is experiencing a civil war) and to vary by region. Women show a slight tendency to be more fearful than men (but at the level of individual countries this is significant only in Egypt and Tunisia). Wave 6 of the World Values Survey shows that avoiding going out at night is one tactic that is employed, by around 20 per cent in Jordan and Tunisia but perhaps by 50 per cent in Iraq and Morocco and two thirds in Libya and Egypt, and there is a slight tendency for women to employ it more often than men, but the difference is mostly not large.

Figure 1: Feeling Safe by Night, % within Country




$\chi^2 = 1,678.49$ with 10 d.f. $p < 0.001$

To be a part of society and in a position to interact with and trust others you need to feel that you are safe in the street and the home. If your life, physical well-being and property are not safe, you do not have a developable future in the society.

More general, less specifically targeted questions in the ArabTrans Survey ask about the security of the family and of the neighbourhood, now, in the past and in the future (Figure 2). Looking at positive responses – scores which indicate that the family is secure. We find that Jordan almost unanimously (94%) regarded the past as more secure than the present, it has the highest proportion regarding the present as at least reasonably secure for the family but it stands alone in its rating of the future, which is the second-highest among the second countries but a little less than its rating of the present. Egypt has the highest expectation of security in the future, among those who gave a substantive response (see below), and along with the five other countries more respondents see the family in five years' time as more secure than at the present time. Iraq is unusual in seeing the past as less secure for the family than the present. Ratings of current, past and future security of the neighbourhood are very similar.


Figure 2: Judgment that family is secure - past, present and future: % calling it secure, by country



All differences are statistically significant at $p < 0.001$ by χ^2

Of note is the fact that judgments about the past and present are subject to only a very small non-response rate – less than one per cent – but the questions about the future elicit a ‘don’t know’ response from around a quarter of respondents. This undoubtedly reflects some degree of genuine uncertainty (and so inability to plan for the future), but the overall figure conceals very substantial country differences (Figure 3), from 4 per cent in Jordan to over 40 per cent in Libya and nearly 35 per cent in Egypt. The pattern of response is the same for all – even Jordan’s future figure for non-response is many times larger than the figures for the present or the past. However, at least part of the explanation for the discrepancy is likely to be an interviewer effect: it is likely that the Jordanian interviewers were more successfully trained to probe rather than accepting a non-response the first time it was offered.

Figure 3: Judgment that family will be secure in the future: % saying they do not know, by country



One of the duties of government is to keep crime under control and peace on the streets, and these seven countries were not at all impressed with its performance in the middle of this decade (Table 1). Half the population or more in Egypt and Jordan are reasonably satisfied with the overall performance of government according to the ArabTrans survey, but the specific questions on crime and violence in the Afrobarometer give much lower figures, with only a tenth rating their handling of these as reasonably good. In Morocco and Tunisia between a fifth and a quarter are reasonably satisfied with government performance, and much the same is true for the handling of crime. In Iraq and Libya only a fifth, or less, trust their government in general. Trust in the police is high in Jordan and over 50 per cent in Egypt, but only 35-45 per cent show any degree of trust in Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, and in Iraq the figure is only 10 per cent. The army, which also policies civil order at times in these countries, seems to be trusted more than the police, and particularly in Iraq, a result that is also linked to post-Saddam reforms, army de-Baathification, and the increasing control Southern Shi’as have gained of state institutions generally.

Table 1: Ratings of Government, Police and Army (% using two most favourable scoring categories)

| | Egypt | Iraq | Jordan | Libya | Morocco | Tunisia |
|---|-------|------|--------|-------|---------|---------|
| (AT) Satisfaction with performance of Government (definitely or rather satisfied) | 64.0 | 21.4 | 50.5 | 15.5 | 28.5 | 21.2 |
| (AfB) How Government is handling crime (very well or fairly well) ¹ | 10.4 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 27.1 | 24.1 |
| (AfB) How Government is handling violent conflict between communities (very well or fairly well) ¹ | 10.8 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 23.2 | 20.1 |
| (AT) Trust in police (a great deal or quite a lot) | 62.2 | 10.8 | 83.7 | 44.5 | 43.7 | 36.4 |
| (AT) Trust in the army (a great deal or quite a lot) ² | n/a | 63.7 | 88.3 | 59.8 | 56.0 | n/a |

All differences are statistically significant at $p < 0.001$ using χ^2

AT ArabTrans Survey. AfB AfroBarometer.

1: The AfroBarometer did not include Iraq, Jordan or Libya in this Round. 2: question not asked in Egypt or Tunisia

Given the high level of satisfaction with the army and in some countries with the general performance of Government as a whole (though less so with regard to specific issues, such as delivery of health services, education, etc.), it is instructive to consider the extent to which our respondents felt safe from interference and violence perpetrated by the government itself (Table 2) – something which the stereotypes portray as common in authoritarian regimes. We do not have a straightforward question on fear of unlawful arrest, but in all countries around half or more feel things have got better in the past five years (but only 30% in Iraq). The AfroBarometer shows substantial confidence that respondents will not be intimidated or attacked for their politics and around half (fewer in Tunisia) saying they do not need to be careful what they say. There is agreement across the range of countries that people nowadays are free to criticise the government (though less that they are free to express opinions, in another part of the questionnaire), and a substantial minority in most countries say they are free to sue the government or its agencies - surprisingly, with little or no effect of income on the likelihood of saying this.

Table 2: Markers of government violence and intimidation

| | Egypt | Iraq | Jordan | Libya | Morocco | Tunisia |
|---|-------|------|--------|-------|---------|---------|
| (AfB) Fear of political intimidation or violence (little or none at all) ¹ | 64.2 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 82.8 | 86.6 |
| (AT) Extent to which people can live without fear of unlawful arrest (much or somewhat better than five year ago) | 56.0 | 30.7 | 50.4 | 51.4 | 47.9 | 66.5 |
| (AfB) extent to which need to be careful what you say about politics (little or none at all) ¹ | 42.8 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 39.0 | 26.3 |
| (AB) Freedom to express opinions is guaranteed (to a great extent) | 34.5 | 28.1 | 29.6 | 41.1 | 23.7 | 48.8 |
| (AB) people nowadays are able to criticise the government without fear (yes) | 89.1 | 79.2 | 77.4 | 85.4 | 68.3 | 86.6 |
| (AB) people are free to sue the government and its agencies | 24.5 | 13.0 | 16.0 | 18.6 | 8.0 | 34.0 |

All differences are statistically significant at $p < 0.001$ using χ^2

AT ArabTrans Survey. AfB AfroBarometer. AB Arab Barometer

1: The AfroBarometer did not include Iraq, Jordan or Libya in this Round. 2: question not asked in Egypt or Tunisia

Thus nearly 90 per cent of Jordanians, three quarters of Egyptians and Tunisians and 60 per cent of residents in the other three countries felt safe in their neighbourhood even at night, but this means that substantial minorities feel threatened, at least some of the time. There is no particular demographic pattern to this feeling; women are rather more likely to be nervous out at night, but this is true across the world. Asked a more abstract question about the security of their family, everyone except the Iraqis says that things were better five years ago, but Jordan, Egypt and Morocco have substantial majorities saying the family is at least reasonably secure at present, with Iraq not far behind and Tunisia and Libya coming last at around 30 per cent. Everyone except the Jordanians say it will be better in the future (and a quarter of them still believe it will be good), though the lowest figure is below half the population (in Tunisia). Half the population or less are satisfied with the Government's performance (except in Egypt, where the overall satisfaction is a little higher), and where we have data on satisfaction with control of crime and violence we can see that only a quarter are reasonably satisfied with their Government's performance (and only 10% of Egyptians). A majority of Jordanians say they have some faith in their police (though other research suggests the figure for the Egyptians is unlikely), but in the other countries less than half say they trust them; where we have data on the army we find it is trusted a little more than the police, or in Iraq a great deal more. The figures suggest a region that is not fundamentally unhappy about security at a local level, though Jordan and Egypt are a lot happier with this aspect of life than the other countries, but crime and violence is nonetheless an issue and presumably does prevent people from playing a full part in local life.

2.2 Trusting Other People

Despite some feeling of insecurity in their neighbourhoods, particularly at night, most people seem to be socially integrated at a local level. In four of the six countries over three quarters (over 80% in three of them) would trust their neighbours to help them if they were in need, and in Morocco and Tunisia the proportion who say this is lower but still constitute a majority of the population (Table 3). Three quarters trust the people in their neighbourhood and/or people known to them personally in a general sense, and in Egypt and Libya this is said by more than 90 per cent of respondents. However, there is little of that trust in the wider population – the 'anonymous other' – which is required for the social cohesion of the nation state (Abbott et al 2016). Around 70 per cent or more (83% in Tunisia) say that people are not to be trusted. A similar but in most countries higher proportion say that you need to be careful of people rather than trusting them. A third or more feel that people are more likely to take advantage of you than try to be fair, which strikes directly at the shared norm of fair dealing which is required for the functioning of democratic political institutions (Almond and Verba 1963), the market economy (Raiser 1998) or even basic tolerance of diversity within a functioning collective (Inglehart 1997).

Table 3: Trust and social support (% endorsing views)

| | Egypt | Iraq | Jordan | Libya | Morocco | Tunisia |
|---|----------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|-------------|------------|
| (AT) Neighbours will help when you need it | 80.6 | 83.5 | 81.8 | 75.8 | 51.2 | 66.5 |
| (WVS) Trust in people in the neighbourhood | 92.0 | 88.2 | 83.9 | 87.4 | 81.4 | 76.2 |
| (WVS) Trust in people known to me personally | 93.1 | 80.7 | 79.5 | 81.5 | 76.7 | 75.0 |
| (AT) People are not to be trusted | 70.1 | 72.7 | 76.5 | 69.3 | 77.5 | 83.4 |
| (WVS) You can't be too careful (vs People can be trusted) | 73.9 | 60.8 | 76.1 | 88.2 | 83.8 | 84.0 |
| (WVS) People take advantage of you (rather than trying to be fair) ¹ | 34.2 (49.3) | 36.0 (55.4) | 34.6 (38.3) | 32.1 (n/a) | 49.2 (24.9) | 26.2 (n/a) |

All differences are statistically significant at $p < 0.001$ using χ^2

AT ArabTrans Survey.

WVS World Values Survey.

1: This question was asked in the form of a 10-point scale; the percentages given are for scores of 1-4 – definite trust. Those in brackets are answers to an alternative 'yes/no' question (which was not asked in Libya or Tunisia).

Where a country has functioned as a whole within world economic and political systems and then breaks up into disarray, the growth of trust in the immediately seen and experienced at the expense of the more remote and in some sense imagined is often seen as a reaction to the loss of shared norms and expectations for how economic interactions and social relations shall be conducted – a state of anomie (Abbott and Beck 2003, Jalaeipour 2006) or involution (Burawoy 1997, 2002) or localisation (Aberg and Sandberg 2003), and withdrawal into the familiar and the local may be seen as a rational reversion to earlier forms of socio-economic life, given that the current form no longer gives guidance on how to act in current circumstances (see, e.g. Rose-Ackerman 2001, Levada et al 2002). What you tend to find where shared templates become inappropriate in changed contexts and there is no confidence in the social or economic future is an atomised society in which trust is confined to small local pockets of interaction.

3 Violence at the National Level

3.1 Wars, Protests and the Social Cohesion of Nations

What we have been looking at in the preceding sections is the extent to which social relations are underpinned by shared norms and values for how groups and individuals will and should behave towards each other – norms which act to unify and to include. These norms will be breached if local life is not secure and safe. On the other hand, retreat *into* local life and lack of trust in the wider world is a sure sign that they are not established and viable at the level of the society. The failure to establish them can be due to government's failure to establish its credentials for regulating society and the economy in the interests of all, or the belief that government is ineffective and other powerful actors are running the society in their own interests, or a domination of some groups by others, as in South Africa before the end of apartheid. Protests and demonstrations may be seen as frustrated reactions to the breakdown of a credible consensus, and particularly if they become violent, but at the same time they must also be seen as attempts to rescue and reform or rebuild consensus. They will be legitimated if it is successful and change the content of the consensus to restore a credible sense.

The larger and more organised conflicts which we would call 'civil wars' are another matter. Ethnic/religious disputes may sometimes be a stage in the (re)formation of a consensus, but the aim might instead be division into separate geographical and political communities negotiating with each other as 'strangers' or 'foreigners'. Civil wars and persistent mass uprisings in general may be seen as instruments for changing a regime but may be aimed at dividing an uneasy collectivity into two or more regimes along existing 'fracture lines' (expressing ethnic and/or religious difference perhaps but also often also having an economic base). Partition reestablishes the social cohesion of societies, but *within* factions rather than across them.

Foreign invasion, paradoxically, may increase the cohesion of a nation and give it a firmer identity in the minds of its citizens, as the history of Europe during the second world war bears witness. If the invasion leads to successful conquest, however, it may be the ultimate invalidator of consensual norms, changing not the norm but the entity within which those who follow the norm are seen as included. Events on this scale do not just challenge the existing discursive regime to rebalance the diverse interests within it; rather, they wipe away the existing discourse and aim to include its actors in a quite different discursive regime, as members or more often as subordinates. Putting it another way, the bombs and machine guns become not just a 'last-resort' way of arguing about what is fair; rather, they take over the role of argument and redefine the object and boundary within which such an argument can be assigned a meaning.

3.2 Public violence: the context

All of the countries we have considered here have undergone periods of extreme violence, before and mostly also after the Uprisings which act as a focus for this research. There are some similarities but more differences in what this violence has done for the cohesion of the country. The basic similarities are ably summarised and narrated by Marc Lynch (2012):

1. Despite the repressive and authoritarian nature of all the regimes, popular protest was no new thing across the Middle East and North Africa; the history of protest stretches back over 30 years. The density of protests is indicated by the fact that in Egypt alone, in the last decade of the last century, there were thousands of strikes called to protest aspects of governance, law and economic management, along with public protests even by judges and lawyers. Protest was therefore not unthinkable or shocking, and some people had experience in organising it, though not on the scale of the 2011 Uprisings.
2. Young people in all the countries faced the same situation, with expanding access to education followed decreasing access to worthwhile jobs. (By 'young' in this context we do not mean adolescence; the 'young' protestors were often in their late twenties or their thirties.
3. Although access may have been limited in many countries, both by cost and by deliberate government suppression, the web and the foreign television broadcasts gave the 2011 protests a visibility they had never had before.
4. The ruling elites were becoming visibly more cynical and corruption in many countries was overstepping any acceptable limit.
5. The tactics for resisting protest were also well worked out. Where it was not possible to contain the protest by often brutal policing action, they consisted in some combination of economic concessions (reduction in food or fuel prices, for example), a change of government (e.g. replacing a distrusted prime minister) and promise of legal and constitutional reform. The last of these did indeed take place, but often on such a tight

timetable that fundamental change could not be thought through and relatively small changes were all that was delivered.

The differences were at least in part the political systems of the various countries. Ray Hinnebusch argues that populist authoritarian regimes have reliable instruments of repression. (Hinnebusch 2006) They have strong *mukhabarat* (intelligence and security) services that support regimes in constantly keeping the population under surveillance but also in successfully preventing coups. Security states spend enormous amount of their GDP on overgrown security, intelligence, and military facilities at the expense of investment on socio-economic causes. The Cold War environment along with the widespread perceptions of regional instability led to allocating a significant percentage of the budget to military and security apparatuses. Similarly, “securitocracy” is a term coined to capture the prominence of security in power and dominion. Since the 1960s the term has been relevant in the literature on Middle Eastern countries. Yossef and Cerami, argue that despite the *securitocracy* the regimes failed to prevent, and to suppress, the Uprisings. These events were “characterised not by traditional revolutionary tactics, that is a small, ideological and organised group that gradually attracts the sympathy of the masses leading to mass revolt, but rather by leaderless demonstrations, spontaneously assembled through social media websites, involving tens of thousands of angry people, especially the young, demanding an end to the rule of the regime in power, that simply overwhelmed the capacity of the regular police and intelligence services” (Yossef & Cerami 2015).

A different kind of protest is required, for example, where your country has a king accorded some degree of divine right to rule, as in Morocco and Jordan. The workings of the system of power around the monarchy, which in Morocco is called the *Makhzen*, are very important. This system employs devices such as broad co-optation and elite rotation to stabilise authoritarian rule, and technocratisation and securitisation of political discourse to ‘immunise’ against the risk that the democratic potential of the institutional façade the regimes have given themselves actually spilled over into popular voice in or control over the political sphere. Elite rotation was also a characteristic of the Syrian system before it imploded into civil war. Another factor was the economic situation of the country – how much it *could* give away as concessions – and its political relations with the rest of the world. A third was recent history; Iraq, for example, had been torn by wars for many years. A fourth was the extent to which the army declined to put down initial large protests, as happened in Egypt and Tunisia.

Tunisia and *Egypt* are both republics, democratic in principle. Tunisia may be characterised as a revolution which was successful in principle – it succeeded in dislodging a President - but where it is not yet sure that the gains that have been made will be cemented into something sustainable; in Egypt, similarly, protests forced a change of regime but fundamental change has not ensued. Tunisia’s 2010-2011 revolution was about political rights but more about the economic situation and involved more than half the population according to the ArabTrans survey – over 20 per cent who participated in demonstrations and a further 35 per cent who did not join in but describe themselves as having been in support. The class base was reasonably broad: civil servants, human rights activists, artists and popular musicians were marching alongside workers who had called strikes in sympathy. Participation in the protests that followed in 2011 were motivated by concerns about high levels of corruption, high unemployment and limited economic opportunities (a particular concern of younger protestors) and the inequalities between the Mediterranean coastal region and the more impoverished interior. The security services handled early protests relatively gently, but later ones were put down with more savagery; there were deaths in Egypt in late 2011

and hundreds were injured in Tunisian protests towards the end of 2012. The main challenges facing the Government were to establish political stability and credibility, to restore security (which has deteriorated since the beginning of 2011) and to reduce unemployment and restore falling living standards.

Egypt, on the other hand, is a republic where what was gained in 2011 has been lost again. There were large protests in all of the major cities at the beginning of 2011 calling for political and economic reform and curbs on the security services, but less than a third of the population now claim to have been involved (7% actively demonstrating and 22% as supporters). Supporters were younger, in the middle income bracket and mostly metropolitan. New elections produced a new government led by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood's election clearly owed more to the fact that they were not tainted with the history of the previous regime than it did to any general desire among protestors for 'Islamisation' of laws or government, the Brotherhood proved incapable of moderating its ideology, alienated secular reformist groups and came into conflict with the army and the judiciary. A new Constitution was approved with a 64 per cent majority in a 2012 referendum, but only a third of the electorate turned out to vote, there was great concern about the broad powers given to the President and the role of Islam as the basis of law, and opposition came to a head in June of 2013, when 17 provincial governors were appointed all of whom were Brotherhood-affiliated. Amid fears that Egypt was on the verge of severe civil strife, the army ousted the Brotherhood in July and a new constitution was passed in January 2014 which bans religious political parties, tempers reference to Islam as the basis of Egyptian law and increases the authority and autonomy of the military and the judiciary. Thus the Uprisings have not yet resulted in greater political freedom and a government more responsive to the wishes of the people, but rather a return to an authoritarian regime.

Jordan and Morocco are monarchies, with executive governments nominally run by Prime Ministers; while dissidents may look for the replacement of a Prime Minister they do not attack the king, unless perhaps to seek limitation of his absolute powers. In *Morocco* thousands demonstrated in the major cities at the beginning of 2011 for political reform and a new Constitution curbing the power of the King, but they appear again to have constituted only a third of the population (11% as active demonstrators, with a further 22% in support). The population as a whole had mixed feelings about the Uprisings, as demonstrated by the names the events were given: 'Arab Spring' or 'Democratic Spring' by about a third, more neutral names such as 'Revolution', 'Civil War' or 'Arab Uprising' by another third, and 'Conspiracy' or 'Arab Destruction' by a quarter. Initially the King offered the demonstrators enhanced food subsidies, but by March he was prepared to promise a new Constitution, and this was put to Referendum in June and accepted by over 98 per cent of the population. Rallies and demonstrations continued, however, over the speed of implementation (which meant that many key issues were not considered) and also the extent of corruption and the high cost of living. In 2013 the King puts in a new government, with power shared across a broader spectrum, but demonstrations continued. In 2014 a protest by the judges about the lack of judicial independence was put down by police, and civil servants and teachers marched about the effects of austerity plans on their employment and the cost of living. In September 2015 there were regional elections, and the ruling group gained only 25 per cent of the seats. Although the level of protests has died down, discontent clearly remains at much its old level.

In *Jordan*, ethnic/political diversity complicates the question of social inclusion. The Jordanian population includes

- ethnic Jordanians and passport-holding "East Bankers" (of Bedouin or tribal origin);

- ethnic Palestinians, many but not all of whom hold a Jordanian passport but also have the right of return to Palestine; and
- others (mainly Iraqi or Syrian refugees) who do not have a Jordanian passport.

There are traditional divisions between East Bankers on the one hand and Palestinian Jordanians on the other: the former fear that they will become dominated by a Palestinian-Jordanian majority and that they will lose their preferential access to government jobs, but the latter are well aware that a skewed electoral system ensures East-Banker control of Parliament. The problems are exacerbated by neo-liberal reforms on the one hand and reductions in public-sector spending on the other, required by the IMF in return for the loans necessary to shore up the economy. Although Jordan is not itself threatened with invasion, it faces considerable challenges based on the turbulence of the region, of which the most important are probably that

- the security situation in Syria, together with developments in Iraq and Gaza, has resulted in a large influx of refugees, placing a considerable strain on national systems and infrastructure;
- the economy was hit first by the 2008 Global Economic Crisis and then by the Arab Uprisings, and GDP growth slowed from 6.6 per cent through most of the century's first decade to 2.3 per cent between 2009 and 2013, barely enough to cover the costs of population increase. There is a widening budget deficit and rising debt, despite the increase in the loans and grants from international donors on which Jordan depends, and unemployment rates are high, especially among young people.

Secularism is supported politically by the King of Jordan and the government, mostly perhaps as a political defence against the main opposition – the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the Islamic Action Front. Political and civic groups have the right of association, but only under rigid restrictions imposed by the Interior Ministry and the intelligence service. Civil rights are guaranteed in principle, but violations occur if deemed politically necessary by the rulers. The 2011 Uprisings did not involve a large segment of the population – only 13 per cent say they supported them, and only 4 per cent claimed that they were actually involved in demonstrations; they were mostly East-Bankers. The dominant names for the events translate as ‘conspiracy against the Arabs’ or ‘Arab destruction’.

3.3 Countries which have faced invasion

Libya and Iraq are different again because they have recent (indeed, ongoing) experience of violence from outside the country. The main problem *Libya* faced at the time of the ArabTrans survey in 2014 was the ongoing struggle for power between the revolutionary brigades and the National Transitional Council; it was and remains torn by civil wars and vulnerable to external threat. There was almost no security, corruption was widespread and government did not seem to prioritise the welfare of citizens. The infrastructure was very poor due to neglect before 2011, and in 2011 it was estimated that it would take at least ten years to rebuild what was damaged by the first civil war. Human capital also needed to be rebuilt, as there is a shortage of skilled labour and a lack of entrepreneurial skills as well as inefficient public institutions. Government lacked the capacity to enforce law and order, parts of the country were controlled *de facto* by various tribal militias and jihadist groups and three governments are competing for power in 2014: the elected Tobruk-based House of Representative, the UN-brokered National Transitional Council and the Tripoli-based General National Congress.

The 'Day of Rage' in 2011, formally centred around a prison massacre more than a decade earlier and the recent arrest of a lawyer representing the families of victims, attracted the support of around 70 per cent of the population, most of them as active demonstrators, and rapidly escalated into full-scale Civil War. The security forces were very violent in attempting to put this down and many protestors were killed or injured. After a UN resolution citing the attacks on civilians as potential war crimes, the French, UK and US enforced a no-fly zone over Libya and started a land operation to limit Gaddafi's power and access to arms. They backed the National Transitional Council, which took Tripoli and then Sirte, and Gaddafi was killed. The July 2012 elections, with an 80 per cent turnout, led to the establishment of the GNC. Initially Libyans were euphoric at the overthrow of Gaddafi, and most voted in the 2012 election, but disillusion has set in since then because the state remained fragmented and law enforcement is weak; the state had no monopoly over policing and security. Governments have found it difficult to build a state security apparatus following the first civil war, as the various paramilitary forces and militias have not been willing to give up their arms and swear loyalty to the state security forces. Since 2012 the Libyan economy deteriorated, as did government's ability to meet welfare needs and provide employment. The country was in disarray and there was a struggle between those that wanted an Islamist government and those that wanted a secular one; in 2012, for example, the control of Benghazi was taken over by an Islamist militia, and at one stage the Shura Council formally allied itself with the emerging ISIS. During the period when the survey was carried out the country was in turmoil; what has been referred to as the Second Libyan Civil War was breaking out, triggered by the *Operation Dignity* offensive in Benghazi on 16th May 2014. The current general feeling is well summarised by Chris Stephen (2016), writing in the *Guardian*:

Five years ago he picked up a gun and joined Libya's rebels to depose Muammar Gaddafi in a blaze of patriotic vigour. Half a decade later the Tripoli medical student will mark Wednesday's anniversary of the Arab spring revolution treating militia fighters wounded in battles with Islamic State. Libya marks the fifth anniversary of its revolution with the country torn by civil war and Isis expanding quickly into the chaos. "Back then it was simple, we fought for freedom," says the medical student, who asked to remain anonymous. "But a lot of time, you wonder was it worth it?"

Iraq has also undergone foreign invasion by a Western coalition, twice – once in 1991 with the sanction of the United Nations to drive Iraq back out of Kuwait (but leaving Saddam Hussein in power) and once without United Nations backing, to destroy a regime which was seen as producing and disseminating weapons of mass destruction. The second invasion, in 2003, succeeded in dislodging Saddam Hussein from power. US troops remained in place in the defeated country, a Constitution was agreed in 2005 and a new Government of national unity was put in place in 2006 after several rounds of election. The US withdrew its armed forces in stages between 2007 and 2011, but they had returned by 2014 in the form of air support to help defend against the encroaching ISIS.

This is the only one of the six countries we have been describing that has a mix of Sunni and Shi'a population, and before Hussein was dislodged the dominant Sunni ran a secular Government and regard the Shi'ites and Kurds as one of the problems; after Saddam Hussein came to power in 1979 any sign of protest by Shi'ites or Kurds were heavily repressed. Now the federal state is Shi'a-dominated and the three elements (the Kurds are the third) are showing signs of falling apart. On the other hand, (1) ISIS is on the doorstep, (2) the view is common that those in power are building

their own success at the expense of everyone else, and (3) there is general agreement that the government is incompetent/inefficient at providing basic services.

A majority of those living in the Northern region are Sunni and a majority of those living in the Southern region are Shi'ite, with an equal proportion of Shi'a and Sunni living in the Central Region. A majority in the Northern region are Kurds, and a majority of those living in the Central and Southern regions are Arab, but we do not know the exact proportion of Kurds: the ArabTrans survey did not ask about Kurdish or other ethnicity; the Third Wave of the Arab Barometer suggests that about 16 per cent of the population are Kurdish but does not identify where in the country they live. The main dividing line in Iraq has been said to be religious denomination, but there is evidence that Region makes a difference in its own right, at least with respect to identity – the self-assigned identities of Shi'ites living in the Central and Southern Regions are similar but not identical. Central Sunnis are very different from Northern Sunni (but still clearly different from Central Shi'ites), while the Shi'ites are similar in the two regions.

Only 17 per cent participated in the Uprisings of 2011 – a mere 2.7 per cent as active demonstrators and the rest as self-declared passive supporters – but it is notable that around 60 per cent of the population choose an 'up-beat' name (Arab Spring, Democratic Spring) when asked what they call these events. The Uprisings in Iraq were to protest against corruption (50%) or to demand improved basic services (43%), with economic problems as third reason (30%). More political reasons were selected less often by respondents; demanding political freedom was chosen by 25 per cent and opposition to authoritarian leadership by 23 per cent.

Looking at the distributions, corruption and political issues would seem to rank higher with the Sunni than the Shi'a; while the Sunni response in the Central Region is considerably lower than in Northern Region and more commensurate with the Shi'a response there, it *is* higher, and the Sunni Central response is higher than the Sunni Northern response as regards the political issues. In terms of the demand for improved services, the two Sunni responses are lower than the two Shi'ite ones, but Southern Region's response is particularly high and Northern Region's is particularly low. The interpretation is not clear-cut, but we are inclined to see Religion as what makes a difference as regards corruption and the political issues (while noting the strength of the Northern Region's 'corruption' response) but to see the services issue as more closely related to Region. Economic issues appear on the whole to be nation-wide when analysed in this way.

The Sunni Arabs feel excluded and alienated in a Shi'a-dominated state. In the past the division between Sunni and Shi'ite was driven by political and articulated through theological and doctrinal divisions, but in post-2003 Iraqi it has become driven by competition for power, resources and status. In Saddam Hussein's Iraq Sunni Arabs dominated the state but they did not have an identity as Sunni; rather, they saw themselves as nation-building within a secular state.

The dangers foreseen were foreign invasion, Kurdish nationalism and Shi'a Islamists. Since the overthrow of Saddam's Ba'athist regime in 2003, state building has been Shi'a-centric and sectarian and an Arab Sunni identity has been strengthened in opposition to this, blurring the distinction between rejection of the Shi'a political project and outright anti-Shi'ism. The tensions between Sunni Arabs, Shi'a Arabs and Kurds has expressed itself in demands for community representation rather than inclusive state building. Shi'a dissent has been kept in check by the dominance of the Shi'a state. Sunni Arabs who already felt marginalised and victimised have retreated even further into sectarian identity politics following the 2010 election, when despite losing the vote, Maliki retained power and continued to promote Shi'a dominance. This has

reinvigorated militant networks and there has been increasing conflict added to by the spiraling sectarian violence in Syria. In the summer of 2014 while the survey was being carried out the self-styled “Islamic State” took control of Mosul, Tikrit, Tal Afar and Al-Qalm and declared an Islamic Caliphate - an extreme expression of the dynamic between Shi’a centric state building and Sunni rejection. The Kurds, meanwhile, have continued to argue for more autonomy/independence, although in response to the rise of the self-styled “Islamic State” they have moved instead to demanding a fairer distribution of oil revenues.

3.4 Perceptions of the Nation’s Security

Looking at the middle block of Figure 4, signifying countries’ ratings of their own security in 2014 at the time of the ArabTrans survey, we see without surprise that Libya and Iraq are the two countries that rate themselves as the least secure, followed by Tunisia (perhaps because of a clear memory of the relatively recent suppression of demonstrations there); Egypt, Jordan and Morocco follow a long way behind. In Libya and Tunisia things were perceived to have been much better five years ago (see also Figure 5, which has the columns rearranged to make it easier to see progress within country over time); they were also perceived to have been better in Iraq, but not by much – very few Iraqis rate the security of the nation five years ago as good, and nearly 60 per cent rate it as bad. Egypt and Jordan were more secure five years ago than in 2014; Morocco was much the same, or perhaps a little better in 2014. In five years’ time all countries expect their security to be better, but all countries have a substantial percentage of respondents who say they do not know – at least 20 per cent, except in Jordan, and approaching 40 per cent in Libya, perhaps suggesting a significantly unstable or insecure outlook.

Figure 4: Security of the nation, five years ago, in 2014 and in 5 years’ time, by year





Figure 5: Security of the nation, five years ago, in 2014 and in 5 years' time, by country




Note: all differences between countries in Figures 4 and 5 are significant at $p < 0.001$, using χ^2

People are not without hope for their own futures, however. Comparing the judgments of the nation's security and the family's, now and in five years' time (Figure 6), we find that the family is quite consistently judged as safer and more secure than the nation as a whole, sometimes by a quite substantial margin, though the figures follow the same broad pattern by country. In Iraq, for example, three quarters think the current national security is weak but only a third think the same of their family's security, and a quarter see the nation's security as improving to 'good' in five years' time, but over half think the same of the family. At the other extreme, in Morocco 15 per cent see the current national security as bad and slightly fewer think the security of their family is the primary concern, while 58 per cent expect the nation's security to be good in five years' time, with 63 per cent considering that the security of their family will increase within the next five years. (Note that these figures exclude missing values, which on the judgment of the future can be as high as 40 per cent in Libya and Egypt.)

Comparing percentages of those who think the future security of family and nation will be good, there is no pattern by gender, nor by age (except in Egypt, where positive expectations appear to increase with age), but in most countries there is a tendency for those who have lower household incomes to predict poorer security for the nation, and in Iraq, Libya and Tunisia they do so for the family as well.

Figure 6: Security of the family and of the nation, 2014 and in five years' time



All differences between countries are significant at $p < 0.001$, using χ^2

Missing values have been omitted from this analysis.

We would expect geographical region within a country to make a considerable difference, reflecting proximity to external threat, but on the face of it the patterns which emerge do not appear closely related to current armed episodes. We have information about the regions in four countries, and Table 4 shows expectations for future security by region. Egypt has high hopes for the future, across the country, but within the hinterland, located in Upper Egypt they are perhaps a little less hopeful. Jordan, again, has reasonably high hopes, but perhaps a little more so in the North and least so in the South. Libya shows regional differences, with the East most likely to expect security in the future and the South definitely least so. The pattern in Iraq, finally, is surprising. In two of the three regions (including the North, where Benghazi has been dominated by Islamic militias, some of which have expressed an allegiance to ISIS) a strong majority expect good security in five years' time. In the central region (which includes Baghdad) however, more than half think the region's future security will be bad and less than 20 per cent think it will be good.

Table 4: Judgments of future security by region

| | Region | Future security of region | | |
|---------------|------------------------|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| | | Poor | Average | Good |
| Egypt | Metropolitan districts | 6.7 | 9.8 | 83.5 |
| | Lower Egypt | 4.6 | 8.7 | 86.7 |
| | Upper Egypt | 9.1 | 16.0 | 74.9 |
| <i>Iraq</i> | <i>North</i> | <i>18.5</i> | <i>12.9</i> | <i>68.6</i> |
| | <i>Central</i> | <i>56.2</i> | <i>25.9</i> | <i>17.9</i> |
| | <i>South</i> | <i>4.1</i> | <i>16.1</i> | <i>79.2</i> |
| Libya | West | 29.6 | 10.4 | 60.0 |
| | East | 14.7 | 26.2 | 59.1 |
| | South | 37.6 | 23.9 | 38.5 |
| <i>Jordan</i> | <i>Central</i> | <i>25.4</i> | <i>20.0</i> | <i>54.6</i> |
| | <i>North</i> | <i>22.0</i> | <i>15.6</i> | <i>62.4</i> |
| | <i>South</i> | <i>30.1</i> | <i>19.7</i> | <i>50.2</i> |


Relative affluence and the extent of social inclusion (in the sense of feeling that government cares) might be related factors in explaining variation between regions. On the other hand, it is certainly the case that there were ‘no go’ areas for our interviewers in some of the more troubled countries – areas which they did not enter for their own safety and/or because forbidden to do so by the police, the army or a militia – and this could be muting what might otherwise have been found.

In Figures 4 and 5 the countries were arranged in order of their current ratings – those who gave the highest figure for ‘poor security in the nation in 2014’ came first. The same ordering is used in Figure 7. The Figure summarises responses to selected ‘attitude’ items – factors which may be worrying respondents or seen by them as one of the main challenges for their country:

- internal stability and security, seen as a main challenge (% mentioning it as first or second choice);
- worry about terrorist attacks in the country (much or very much);
- worry about an increase in sectarian or ethnic violence (much or very much);
- worry about the possibility of civil war (much or very much);
- worry about war breaking out with another country (much or very much).

The pattern is much the same as for the more general and abstract questions about security: Iraq and Libya show the highest level of concern, followed by Tunisia (though Egypt’s figures are also high) and Morocco and Jordan are the least concerned. It may be noted, however, that Egypt and Tunisia, and perhaps Morocco, are more concerned about terrorism than their other responses would suggest; indeed, Tunisia exceeds Iraq and Libya in this respect.

Figure 7: Worries and challenges related to security



4 Conclusions

Basic security – freedom from disruption by uncontrolled violence – is a prerequisite for almost everything else that goes to make up the decent society. All of the MENA countries are afraid of terrorist incidents – even in the lowest country, Jordan, the fear stands at 40 per cent of the population, and in two countries around 80 per cent of the population list this as something about which they are worried. Sectarian or ethnic violence is considered a problem by more than a third in all the six countries and by over 50 per cent in two of them (Iraq and Tunisia – and it stands at 49 per cent in Libya). The possibility of civil war is of concern to more than half the population in four of the six countries and to substantial minorities in the other two, war itself, with outside agencies, is something more than half the population worry about in five of the six countries (and 40% even in Jordan). Where violence is beyond both control and prediction there can be no planning and no promises. Outside concerns are unlikely to make investments or to disburse development aid, internally it becomes difficult or impossible to run manufacturing, service, commercial or financial concerns beyond specific defended perimeters, and even planning housing, health, education or family formation becomes a risky business.

This is perhaps the ultimate in anomie: where nothing can be predicted with any reasonable certainty, there cannot be shared expectations or mutual plans. In the extreme we are talking about depression, despair and the retreat into face-to-face solidarity and mutual defence. Happily, however, things have not yet come to this pass, in the eyes of those who live in these countries. As we have seen, very many more feel confident that at least their family’s security will be maintained in the medium term, so there is a platform on which to stand while governments are formed or reinvigorated and try to put a shape to the future, if and when the ‘discourse of conquest’ passes away and an attempt is made to return to a state that governs itself through the inclusion and involvement of its citizens.

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