2014
The Article ' Ausgeträumt: Mit Blick auf das internationale System ist es höchste Zeit, die richtigen Schlüsse aus dem Jahr 1914 zu ziehen. Ein Deutscher und sein polnischer Konterpart gehen bereits mit gutem Beispiel voran.' has been published on 7 March 2014 in the German edition of The European.
Ausgeträumt
Mit Blick auf das internationale System ist es höchste Zeit, die richtigen Schlüsse aus dem Jahr 1914 zu ziehen. Ein Deutscher und sein polnischer Konterpart gehen bereits mit gutem Beispiel voran.
San Diego Air and Space Museum Archive „Kann man aus der Geschichte lernen?“ - Diese auf etwa 265.000 Websites und auch wieder rechtzeitig zum Jahrestag des Ersten Weltkriegs gestellte Frage ist in etwa so ergiebig wie die Frage, ob es sinnvoll ist, zu atmen. Da jedes menschliche Handeln notwendigerweise ausschließlich auf Erfahrungen der Vergangenheit beruhen kann, egal ob sie nun hundert Sekunden oder hundert Jahre alt sind, haben wir überhaupt keine andere Wahl - ob wir es wollen oder nicht -, als aus der Geschichte zu lernen.
Da daher die Frage, ob man aus der Geschichte lernen kann, sinnvollerweise nur bejaht werden kann, ist ein eifriger Wettbewerb darüber ausgebrochen, wer die meisten Parallelen zwischen 1914 und 2014 aufzählen kann. Momentan scheint jeder Kolumnist in seiner Lieblingskrise Strukturähnlichkeiten zur Julikrise 1914 zu entdecken, um dann in dramatischer Manier die Lösung eben dieser Krise anzumahnen. Schließlich wissen wir ja alle, was ansonsten passiert - siehe Juli 1914. Das Einzige, was hier jedoch oftmals wirklich gesagt wird, ist, dass Krisen eskalieren und außer Kontrolle geraten können. Dies ist genauso richtig wie es banal und irreführend ist. Irreführend, da beinahe alle der eskalierten Krisen der Vergangenheit eben nicht zu kataklystischen Zusammenbrüchen des internationalen Systems oder von Gemeinwesen geführt haben.
Den Blick nach Asien richten
Am ehesten einleuchtend ist noch der Vergleich des europäischen Staatensystems der Welt vor 1914 mit der heutigen Situation in Südostasien. Die Bedingungen, unter denen Deutschland anno dazumal emporkam und unter denen China heute aufsteigt, sind tatsächlich strukturähnlich. Wir wissen aber spätestens seit Paul Kennedys „The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers“, dass die Art, wie der Aufstieg von Großmächten gemanagt wird und wie konfliktreich er ist, von der Staatskunst der Handelnden abhängt.
Daher ist die These, dass „wir gerade im Ost- und Südchinesischen Meer“, so ein „Spiegel Online“-Kolumnist , „ein regelrechtes Reenactment der europäischen Welten-Krise erleben“, fragwürdig. „Im Pazifik“, so die Behauptung, „lässt sich China von derselben Verblendung leiten, die einst die Deutschen zugrunde richtete.“ Daher werde „die Geschichte […] in die eigene Wiederholung getrieben“. Diese Behauptung ist ziemlich hanebüchen, da die Staatskunst Chinas und der Weltkriegsakteure auf völlig unterschiedlichen strategischen Traditionen beruhen.
Während die 1914 in Europa vorherrschende Tradition an eine Lösung strategischer Probleme durch ein allentscheidendes, heroisches Kräftemessen in einem einzigen Zusammenprall glaubte, beruht chinesische Staatskunst auf indirekter, geduldiger, jahrelanger Raffinesse. Bei ihr geht es darum, den Gegner strategisch zu umzingeln und einzuschließen, um so allmählich relative Vorteile zu bekommen, ohne den Gegner völlig zu vernichten. Daher wird eben nicht die Geschichte in eine Wiederholung in den Meeren Chinas getrieben.
Natürlich kann es dort zu einer, auch militärischen, Eskalation kommen. Schließlich erinnert uns der Chinaexperte Iain Johnston daran, auch auf kriegerische Traditionen und nicht nur auf die Einflüsse von Konfuzius und Mengzi im strategischen Denken Chinas zu schauen. Die Form der Eskalation würde aber nicht von europäischen strategischen Traditionen des 19. Jahrhunderts getrieben und wohl kaum zu einem Kataklysmus führen.
Die neue Unübersichtlichkeit
Dennoch gibt es viele gute Gründe, von der „unheimlichen Aktualität des Ersten Weltkriegs“ („Spiegel“) zu sprechen, denn auch wenn eine neue Julikrise in der Form einer gesamtsystemgefährdenden Krise zwar möglich, aber äußerst unwahrscheinlich ist, ähnelt die Welt nach Ende des bipolaren Kalten Krieges immer mehr der multipolaren Welt von vor 1914.
Auch hat sich der Traum der 1990er-Jahre, dass nun ein Zeitalter eines funktionierenden institutionalisierten, auf allgemein anerkannten Normen und Werten basierenden internationalen Systems anbrechen würde, als Illusion erwiesen. Die Probleme des 21. Jahrhunderts erfordern daher viel mehr als erträumte realpolitische Antworten. Auch daher ist die realpolitische Welt des Vorabends des Ersten Weltkriegs aktueller denn je.
Sie hilft uns, die größte strategische Herausforderung unserer Tage zu meistern. Diese besteht darin, eine funktionierende Balance von Idealismus und Realismus, von einer auf Frieden durch Stabilität und einer auf Werten beruhenden internationalen Politik zu finden. Wie eine solche Balance aussehen könnte, wird im Moment allerorts diskutiert, sei es bei der „Zeit“ zwischen dem stabilitätsorientierten Herausgeber Helmut Schmidt und dem werteorientierten Außenpolitikchef Jörg Lau, oder sei es auf den Gängen der UN über die auf Michael Ignatieff zurückgehende „Responsibility to Protect“(R2P)-Doktrin.
So lebhaft auch diskutiert wird, die Amerikaner stehen heute ohne eine funktionierende grand strategy dar, die Europäer haben nicht einmal eine. Auch mit der Ikone von humanitarian interventionism Samantha Power als Obamas UN-Gesandte werden „rote Linien“ in Syrien und anderswo munter und ohne wirkliche Konsequenz überschritten.
Daher ist es höchste Zeit, die realpolitischen Lehren der Zeit vor 1914 ernst zu nehmen, ohne dadurch zu blinden Machtpolitikern zu werden.
Interessanterweise kam erst Bewegung in die Krise der Ukraine, als mit Radosław Sikorski und Frank-Walter Steinmeier die beiden Außenminister aktiv wurden, die weltweit wohl am besten verstehen, dass werteorientierte Außenpolitik nur möglich ist, wenn sie mit Realpolitik in Balance gehalten wird.
Es ist kein Zufall, dass erst seit der Rückkehr Steinmeiers ins Auswärtige Amt die Bundesregierung den 100. Jahrestag des Ersten Weltkriegs ernst nimmt.
Andrea Mura, former fellow of the Centre for Global Security and Governance, now works with the Oecumene: Citizenship after Orientalism ERC funded project. He has recently published the article The austerity of the commons: a struggle for the essential in OpenDemocracy.
His interview with New York based Professor David Harvey on debt and money can be accessed here.
An interview with Rosi Braidotti, Professor at the University of Utrecht (NL) can be found here .
In a precarious context induced by a struggle for the essential, one term has re-emerged as indispensable, providing many of us with a new sense of direction, creation and sharing, and ultimately, like a boomerang, assuming the 'austere' dignity of that which cannot be renounced: the commons.
When in Spring 2010 'austerity' began to re-appear on the European landscape as a concept, populating the headlines of newspapers and official documents to account for the massive cuts on public spending that European governments were just about to devise, not many, perhaps, had seriously considered the whole range of meanings that the term might imply for and disclose to European citizens, with its references to a 'sternness' and 'severity' of lifestyle, and, above all, to the 'inessential' that needs to be violently cast off from 'public' and 'private' life.
In Italy, the battle over what defines 'the essential' went far beyond strict economic boundaries, traversing society in all its aspects, and even transgressing those very categories, public and private, that had begun to appear, themselves, as 'inessential' to those who opposed the necessity of austerity measures.
Today's Italian crisis is not the simple expression of the wider economic crisis of Europe, or south Europe in particular. It is the sign of a deeper and much more pervasive uncertainty, the expression of a shaking of the time-honoured cultural, social and political foundations of Italian society.
In this precarious context induced by a struggle for the essential, however, one term re-emerged as indispensable, providing many with a new sense of direction, desire and sharing, ultimately assuming, like a boomerang effect, the 'austere' dignity of that which cannot be renounced: this is 'the commons', the concept and political practice that also informed - among many other 'acts' of 'critical' significance in these years - Spatial Struggle, an event organised in September 2013 at Teatro Valle in Rome, in collaboration with the Oecumene project .
The latter event was an 'event' in a political and transformative sense, allowing a few intense days of sharing, debates, change, creation, and political enactment among artists, researchers, activists or simple citizens who together 'made' the 'experience of the commons' in those days.
Beyond identity politics
Although a central concept for many, the commons only began to be widely acknowledged as a fundamental social practice in Italy following the 2011 Italian water referendum, which signalled the successful effort of citizens to resist, together with a law privatising water services in Italy, a more generalised attempt to privatise public services with an economic value. An aggressive campaign of privatisation had begun years earlier, but the recent necessity for austerity cuts provided a further legitimising expedient in that direction.
Social practices based on the 'commons', however, are not simply the expression of a movement of resistance against the private exploitation of natural resources and public goods. What became immediately clear in Italy in fact, was that the defence of the commons meant at the same time the creation of a new kind of political and social bond. A political relationship beyond classes, beyond the traditional and formal idea of citizenship, beyond any identity logics of belonging.
This is not to say that those political movements that assume the claim of the 'commons' as their foundation do not begin their 'action' as a form of resistance and response to the private exploitation and depletion of public goods. The 2011 movement certainly emerged in that way. But in its defence of the 'commons', it quickly expanded its range of action so as to extend the idea of common goods (beni comuni) beyond the sphere of natural resources towards what has been called the 'immaterial' commons (health, education, culture, knowledge, etc.).
This included, naturally, those very cultural spaces in the cities (the occupation of Teatro Valle, the day after the water referendum, belongs to this category) that had been more and more targeted by privatisation campaigners. As acts of resistance and reaction, the practices of the 'commons' have an unlimited possibility of action in an unlimited capitalist market. As the problematic phrase 'work as commons' demonstrates, they can also affect the entire world of labour.
Commoning
But what is the 'constituent' perspective of these movements? What is it that lies within them, which is not only or not simply resistance and reaction? What is that distinguishes them from a mere defence of 'the public'?
One answer to these questions should point precisely to the ability of any struggle and political conflict over the commons to throw up and reflect new forms of socialisation: to express practices and actions of commoning. In this sense, as both action and practice, the commoning traverses contemporary reflections on the 'being-in-common', and the 'commonwealth' as social and political alternatives to the neoliberal 'society of individuals' in competition with one another. It stands as a new subjectivitywhich is alternative to the self-made man, the neo-liberal entrepreneur-of-the-self who, in the age of the debt economy however, can only take on itself the costs that the state and trade no longer assume.
It is in the light of such a perspective that new possibilities are disclosed, for instance allowing a new 'right to the city' to emerge through the very claim that urban spaces, in their intimate link with culture, 'must be defended' from privatization; or, realising new forms of cooperation between those workers and citizens who both experience and oppose the 'precarisation' of work and the dismantling of the welfare state, thereby producing a new form of 'commonfare', which overcomes 'workfare' and 'public welfare'.
Each of these cases is far from determining once and for all what the 'commons' is, as the 'commons' constantly re-produces itself every time new forms of socialisation and citizenship are enacted. The practice and action of 'commoning' both precede and follow the 'commons', giving expression to it.
Spatial Struggles
It is for such reasons that Spatial Struggles, the event this week's guest feature on openDemocracy tries to recount, stood as an experience of the commons.
Perhaps, for many who attended, the unfolding of that event might have appeared improvised, unexpected or disorganised, but if this was true, it is precisely because it was a form of 'commoning'!
When normal citizens, artist and and activists at Teatro Valle met the researchers of the Oecumene team for the first time, the sensation that they were all moving from a quasi 'nothing-in-common' to a practice of sharing and common creation was strong. That such a transformative movement was possible became immediately clear when a tour of the ancient theatre was organised, which transmitted the magic of Teatro Valle with its anecdotes about the great artists who had performed there, included Mozart and Nobel prizewinner Luigi Pirandello, their 'critical' audiences, the city and its turbulent society who kept traversing that space in different ages, infusing it with an on-going quest for politics, art, ethics.
It became immediately clear that Teatro Valle had never been simply an empty space to be occupied and defended from plunderers; it rather stood as a living space, a living theatre, to be safeguarded and nurtured, living because of the histories that have populated it and that not only survive through transmission from one audience to another, but also by the continuous enrichment of new contributions from those who keep sharing, creating and questing 'in' the theatre. This practice of commoning could immediately be sensed at the end of that tour: a new social bond had just been established - which kept on growing in the days that followed, through discussion after discussion, performance after performance, espresso after espresso!
The research agenda of the Oecumene team, had been aimed at rethinking citizenship beyond traditional tropes in contemporary European thought, precisely exploring how people in different parts of the world creatively and inventively bring political acts into being and open up spaces for struggle and resistance against dominant regimes of thought and power. So perhaps it is no accident that it was in this social and artistic 'scenario', that profuse artistic, intellectual and political encounters occurred between ourselves and 'Valle'.
In this intense dialogue, we could think through what is essential about the commons at a time when austerity's emphasis on scarcity seems to have rather effectively concealed the abundant possibilities of creation, and its relentless social and political production of new codes and new bonds.
Indebted citizenship - an interview with David Harvey in Teatro Valle.
2013
- The Syrian Uprising: Antagonists and Actors
- Andrea Tety on Italy - May 2013
- Andrea Teti on Egypt - February 2013
The Syrian Uprising: 'Antagonists and Actors'. 18th June 2013.
University of St. Andrews Conference on Syria.
Author: Jack Keays.
Foreword:
The University of St. Andrews recently hosted a two day graduate conference on the crisis in Syria. Entitled “The Syrian Uprising: Drivers and Dynamics”, and organised by the University's Centre for Syrian Studies. Bringing together PhD students with experts and professionals from across the world, the conference sought to explore on its first day the 'actors and antagonists' in the uprising, along with expounding their context and motivations.
This report is based on the intensive sessions held throughout the first day of the conference, and I am grateful to Professor Raymond Hinnebusch, for the efforts in establishing such an important and timely event.
Antagonists and Actors I:
Primacy was lent to establishing grounds for understanding the Syrian government's response to protests in the early months of 2011. The rationale of the state and the military regularly tied back to state reform of the early 2000s in the transition period between Hafez al-Asad, and his son, Bashar. Importantly, the government had taken on efforts to 'modernise authoritarianism' through economic reform and establishing privileged networks of elites, in line with other state efforts in the region moving toward 'post-populist' and neo-liberal models of rule. In Syria however, unlike Egypt and Tunisia, the military did not identify their leader as an obstacle to their survival. Especially close ties between military and government forces and poor civil/military relations resulted in a perceived collapse of 'neutral professionalism' if Bashar al-Asad were to fall. The military proved fundamental in large sections of society. Economically active in construction, industry, agriculture, service sectors as well as illegal arms trading, corruption and smuggling, meant that large sections of private enterprise relied heavily on military activity in preserving the system. Moreover, the inherited 'Machiavellian' nature of the republic, allowed the state to maintain a huge potential for counterinsurgency violence should it be necessary.
According to participants, state tactics therefore sought to undermine any opposition and draw it into violent conflict in order to destroy legitimacy and win militarily. While military force was escalated slowly in order to normalise its function, the government sought to drive out civilian populations from urban centres in order to force a humanitarian crisis on the opposition, thus diverting attention and resources away from any resistance.
Antagonists and Actors II:
In actors' responses to the uprising, the Muslim Brotherhood has proven to be a particularly interesting case study. With their complex past in Syria, most notably signified by the Hama uprising of 1982, their role today has been marred somewhat by misleading and contradictory signals as well as complex geopolitical relations with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and other opposition forces in Syria. In this regard, the [Ghassan] 'Hitto Affair' in the Syrian National Coalition, cannot be seen simply as an example of Qatar supporting the Brotherhood in order to remove Moaz Al-Khatib. Suspicions remain high regarding the Brotherhood's monopoly over visions for a future Syria, with references to 'Islamic state' politics being regularly misused in the media. It became clear in discussion that while difficult to measure, the group remains strong, well-financed and organised; as demonstrated through relief efforts and da'wah (preaching of Islam), both contributing to the creation of a popular base in Syria.
In drawing tentative conclusions, it was argued that the group must be thought of as politicians first and foremost. As a party, they want to reach power, and in the Syrian context they maintain a dubious past with an uncertain future. They have been widely criticised for an inability to address a moderate audience, and seem to maintain unclear positions on more radical Salafist groups and Jabhat an-Nusra. More structurally, they remain poor militarily and their difficulty to deal with regional and generational divisions within the party is having adverse affects on their potential success in a 'post-Asad Syria'. Ultimately, the Brotherhood is struggling with the difficulty of moving from a passive and largely absent role in Syrian politics to one of real opposition. If they can succeed in this, they may well create a new political model, different from Egypt.
Identity, Context and Constituencies:
As noted by some throughout the conference, sectarianism has played a profound role in defining and framing the conflict's external discourse, but not necessarily the conflict itself. At one and the same time, it has been overstated and understated. For mainstream media, it presents a simple explanatory feature with which to analyse long-standing, complex animosities. Moreover, for the government in Syria, a sectarian reading has proven beneficial; through branding any opposition as foreign backed terrorist groups, a sectarian message has remained implicit through suggested Sunni opposition Al-Qaeda links. Meanwhile, grass-roots movement narratives were not sectarian, but more closely linked to collective actions on key grievances; however increasing involvement from Salafi Islamist groups openly embracing a sectarian narrative have taken the media spotlight. Important shortcomings of such readings were repeatedly emphasised. First and foremost, such interpretations neglect the cross-sectarian nature of the regime in Syria, and omit ideological characteristics of pan-arab or nationalist sentiment in the population. Furthermore, it obscures vital socio-economic aspects, notably the large urban Sunni middle class that is not unanimously in support of the opposition, while further still ignoring the roots of the uprising and the political motivations operating under the surface.
In an attempt to redirect focus away from sects in Syria, it was suggested that an analysis of tribal groups and their history in the country is necessary; the politics of tribes in Syria represents a far more useful lens for viewing the conflict today. It was put forward that throughout the 1960s, before and during the presidency of Hafez al-Asad, economic and social challenges to tribal groups were growing, while tribes remained powerful across the country. Hafez al-Asad sought therefore to compromise with tribal groups through a system of clientalism to avoid the creation of a 'tribal crescent'. Such tribal cleintalism proved its worth in the 1982 crushing of the Hama uprising, and in the conflict today, Bashar al-Asad is argued to be using tribal Sheikhs as guarantors, appointing Sunni representatives with strong local backgrounds and influence. In the wider geopolitical game, Saudi Arabia is believed to favour tribal links as it represents the exact opposite to the mass politics of the Muslim Brotherhood position.
Conclusions:
The Syrian conflict represents an exceptionally complex and unpredictable situation, and one that has embroiled the political attentions of the region's and the world's major powers. Its enduring violence and resulting catastrophic humanitarian situation have only fueled our attention; and as such, it has become increasingly difficult to establish key facts and to remain emotionally detached in one's reading of the crisis and of potential solutions. With this in mind, it is vital to encourage further study of the conflict's antagonists and actors with the aim of driving a greater understanding of the dynamics, in order to propose workable, measured and constructive political solutions to this and future conflict.
Latest article by Dr Andrea Teti on Italy and the 2013 election for Egypt Independent
See also the Brief written for The Arab Forum for Alternatives available here:Teti_2013_AFA_Italy_General_Elections.pdf
An Italian spring? Italy's 2013 general election
Berlusconi put a on brave face by emphasizing his comeback. But gaining 5 percentage pointson his all-time low of 17 percent in December would be nothing to cheer about, had hisopponents' campaign not been such an unmitigated disaster. The Democratic Party wasexpected to win comfortably, and yet one of its leaders, Piero Fassina, sat stumped for wordslive on television, incredulous as he saw early results trickling in.
Not only did the Democrats have a meagre lead on Berlusconi's coalition, but they were beingseriously challenged by a political movement that had never run in general elections, and didn'teven exist until a few years ago. Led by former political satirist Beppe Grillo, the Five StarMovement, or M5S, ran on a platform of social justice and rule of law, which resonated withmany Italians, tired of the old political class's unwillingness to reform.
Particularly at this time of austerity, when working people's jobs and finances are being hit hardto pay for a crisis they were not responsible for, the lavish lifestyle of the political elites and theirinability to pass seemingly basic reforms such as effective anti-corruption legislation deeplyjarred with much of the Italian electorate.
Much to everyone's surprise, the M5S ended up being the largest single party by share of the vote, with 25.5 percent of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies (109 seats) and 23.8 percent in the Senate (54 seats). The rest of the results for mainstream parties tell the story of defeat that is virtually unequalled in Italy's post-war history.
The Democratic Party coalition obtained 31.6 percent in the Senate (120 seats). In theChamber of Deputies, its 29.54 percent share won it 345 seats, thanks to Italy's controversialelection law designed to keep new parties out, which automatically awards the largest coalition 55 percent of seats. But the party itself got only 25.4 percent of the vote, down from 33.18percent in 2008.
Berlusconi's coalition obtained 30.7 percent in the Senate (117 seats) and 29.1 percent in theChamber of Deputies (125 seats). But his own party received a meagre 21.56 percent of thevote, a massive drop from 37.38 percent in 2008. Mario Monti's hastily gathered list, which hadhoped to attract centrists and conservatives, obtained a miserable 9.1 percent (18 seats) in theSenate, and 10.5 percent (47 seats) in the Chamber — his grouping is nowhere near to beingthe decisive political force he had hoped it would be.
How did the Five Star Movement do so well? M5S is a young political organization — as well asa political organization made of mostly young activists — with a very strong emphasis onhonesty and transparency in public life, as well as on social and economic justice, which hasattracted voters from across the political spectrum and from across the country. Commentatorsand the M5S itself strongly emphasize the movement's reliance on the Internet as a tool ofpolitical organization, but many voters and activists have been attracted also by a“conventional” political approach based on openness and on mass mobilization in squaresacross Italy, rather than relying on television and newspapers.
But the success of M5S is also a product of the old political class's failures. The challenges Italyfaces are daunting. Unemployment and underemployment are rising steadily, particularlyamong the young. Small and medium enterprises, which have traditionally been the backboneof the economy, are suffering badly.In this context, the Bank of Italy estimates that every year, the country loses more than 120billion euros in tax fraud, corruption is estimated to cost 60 billion to 100 billion euros a year,while organized crime is conservatively estimated to be worth about 150 billion euros. BothBerlusconi and his traditional opponents on the left have been in government over the past 20years, and neither have been willing or able to begin tackling these problems.
They have remained, however, the most numerous and best-paid political class in Europe, withparliamentary salaries averaging 15,000 euros — more than LE130 million — per month. Theyare also the most scandal-ridden in Europe, with 10 percent of the former parliament beingeither under investigation or sentenced, including Berlusconi himself, and close allies of his, likeCesare Previti, who has been found guilty of a decades-long association with the Palermo'snotorious mafia.
This political and economic context explains why the new parliament faces deadlock. In theChamber of Deputies, the Democratic Party-led coalition has a 55 percent majority, thanks toItaly's controversial election law, but in the Senate, no single party or coalition has a majority,and in Italy, the two houses of parliament have exactly the same powers. The only possiblemajorities are between two of the first three parties — the Democratic Party, or PD; Berlusconi'sPeople of Freedom, or PdL, party; and M5S.
However, an alliance between M5S and the PdL is impossible, because the entire platform of the M5S is built against the moral, legal and financial corruption of the old system Berlusconirepresents. A PD-PdL alliance would be the political kiss of death for the Democrats, already tainted by their past collaboration with Berlusconi.
Meantime, the M5S will be carefully trying to avoid the accusation of stalling the entire Italianpolitical system. Most observers agree that a second round of general elections will be necessary.
In the short term however, the most likely scenario is a PD-led government, which will needM5S support in the Senate — leverage the M5S will try to use to push through key reforms in itsprogram, including laws on key issues like corruption, elections and the media. These laws mayseriously damage Berlusconi's financial interests, and he will certainly try to discredit the PD assubjugated to the European Union's directives and paint the M5S as irresponsible, as well assimply attempting to buy off opposition parliamentarians, as he famously did in the past.
Italy's precarious political equilibrium is worrying to key European leaders because its economyis simply too big to fail, and if Italy were to renegotiate its relationship with its Europeancreditors, any concession might have significant consequences on countries like Greece and Spain. But more widely, what the success of the M5S represents is a challenge to the approachto economic reform, which has too often rewarded the rich responsible for the problems, whilemaking the working classes pay for Europe's economic mess.
Italians are neither Euro-skeptic nor against economic reforms per se, but they want to seegrowth and jobs, they want to see effective anti-corruption measures and they want to see taxevasion tackled. This is something they have in common with their counterparts north and southof the Mediterranean.
The EU and its most powerful member states have thus far ignored those calls and preferredreforms that weaken working Italians by increasing their taxes, cutting services and makingtheir jobs less secure. Italy's electoral result, like previous protest movements in Greece andSpain, is a wake-up call to Europe's elites that the question of social justice cannot be ignored.
Andrea Teti is interviewed by Anne Allmeling for Deutsche Welle on Egpt's troubled transition.
Translated into German as “Ãşgypten braucht nachhaltige Politik .”
2012
To watch Centre for Global Security and Governance expert and Co-Director Dr Andrea Teti's thoughts on the return of Berlusconi on the France24 'Debates' programme on 22 November 2012 follow this link .
2011
- Andrea Teti on Egypt - November 2011
- Andrew Newby on Greece - October 2011
- Andrew Newby on Utoya - July 2011
- Andrea Teti on Italy - July 2011
- Thomas Weber - June 2011
- Tom Weber - Arab Spring - June 2011
- Andrew Newby - June 2011
- Andrea Teti - May 2011
- Andrea Teti - February 2011
To watch the presentation of Centre for Global Security and Governance expert and HCAS Fellow Andrew Newby at the 10th Anniversary Symposium of Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies in Helsinki in October 2011, please click on the heading above.
To read about the reflections of Centre for Global Security and Governance expert Andrew Newby on the recent terror attacks in Norway for Italian online newspaper Affaritaliani, please click on the heading above.
To read Centre for Global Security and Governance expert Andrea Teti's letter to the editor of the Economist in which he challenges the idea that Italy requires the kind of reforms advocated by The Economist, please click on the heading above.
To read the June 20, 2011, Op-ed article about the 'Lessons of the Aftermath of Word War One for the Arab Spring ' that Centre for Global Security and Governance Director Dr Thomas Weber wrote for Al Arabiya.
To read the June 20, 2011, Op-ed article about the 'Lessons of the Aftermath of Word War One for the Arab Spring' that Centre for Global Security and Governance Director Dr Thomas Weber wrote for Al Arabiya, please click on the heading above.
Analysis: Northern Europe and the Bailout of Greece and Portugal - Taking the Long View
'Finland got a great deal of charitable assistance from Great Britain in the nineteenth century. The British had a strong collective will to help the Finns out of their predicament during the famine times. Lists of donors were published in the press. Although there was also charity given to Ireland during the Great Famine, popular discourse in Britain was more judgmental towards the Irish people during the 1840s and 50s. The British were keen to help the Finns for three main reasons: firstly, they had a very bad conscience over the bombing which took place on the Baltic front during the Crimean War. Although the Finnish nation was seen as a fair target - it was a Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire - there was a clear 'racial' distinction made between the Finns and the Russians. The British navy pulverized much of the southern and western coast of Finland, even 'non-military' targets, thus causing consternation in parliament and among the wider public. In damaging Finland's infrastructure so seriously, the British contributed directly to the conditions that helped cause famine in subsequent years. Secondly, as a hard-working Protestant people, the Finns were perceived as more likely to put any charitable contributions to good use than the “lazy” Irish. Thirdly, there was a strong economic imperative: Finland was a vital business partner for many British companies, in areas such as timber and tar. By encouraging economic regeneration in Finland, Britain could also benefit economically.
In the modern world, charitable or aid decisions are often influenced by similar underlying, or sometimes even overt, prejudices. Public reactions to recent natural disasters in Haiti and Pakistan, for example, were quite different. In the European debate, we are once more seeing a kind of division between the north and the south, and age-old attitudes to the people of these regions are resurfacing. It seems that Finland would be much keener to open the “money taps” if, say, Estonia or Sweden were in some sort of economic difficulties, than Portugal or Greece. National economies, however, are very vulnerable and situations can change rapidly. Finland itself saw a deep and lengthy recession only twenty years ago. Contributing to an economic bail-out of a national economy, especially when that nation is so strongly linked economically to one's own, is not necessarily a decision which can be based on charitable instincts, but one which requires a sober and long-term economic view. Being part of an economic system brings both benefits and, sometimes, problems - a long-term view is required.'
Dr. Andrew Newby is Senior Lecturer in Aberdeen's Department of History as well as a fellow of the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies. He is a member of the cross-national research network 'Nordic Centre of Excellence: The Nordic Welfare State - Historical Foundations and Future Challenges (NordWel)'.
The original Finnish version of Dr. Newby's text is available at: http://www.helsinki.fi/tieteennakokulma/liekki/newby.html
Published: June 2, 2011
Analysis: The End of Berlusconi?
On 31 May 2011, Centre for Global Security and Governance expert Dr Andrea Teti appeared on Al Jazeera's 'Inside Story' to provide his analysis on whether Silvio Berlusconi still has a political future after his crushing defeat in the Italian local elections that took place on 30 May.
Analysis: Shaping Egypt's Future - How will the transition of power in Egypt be managed, and what role will the military play?
On 2 February, 2011, Centre for Global Security and Governance expert Dr Andrea Teti appeared on Al Jazeera's 'Inside Story' to share his views on Egypt's future.